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Internet connectivity has been added to the classrooms of United States (U.S.) K-12 
schools, but recognition of the security risks and related management responsibilities to 
address increased risk exposure is not apparent. Providing a sufficient level of access for 
K-12 students to learn through exploration and experimentation needs to be balanced 
with sufficient limitations to minimize the risk of technically proficient participants 
inflicting harm through school resources. Problems of inappropriate use such as 
adjusting grades, tampering with work of other students, and defacing Web sites by K-12 
students are already appearing in U.S. newspapers. In addition, the growing level of 
Internet security incidents such as worms and malicious code puts K-12 technology 
infrastructure and data at risk. 
Each K-12 school and school district has a unique set oftechnical capabilities that must 
be balanced against the risk of misuse to establish appropriate security. Applying 
security risk management can allow K-12 administrators to identify areas of weak 
security that pose unacceptable risk and plan for needed improvements. Within this 
investigation, a security risk methodology was selected, tailored to incorporate 
organizational characteristics and regulatory requirements unique to K-12 schools and 
school districts, and successfully applied by the Scarsdale Public School District, 
Scarsdale, New York. In addition, several K-12 school officials including school board 
members, technology directors, and superintendents, reviewed the tailored methodology 
and affirmed its applicability to their schools and school districts. 
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability EvaluationsM (OCTA VE®) 
Methodology was selected by this investigator for evaluating the security risk ofK-12 
schools and school districts. The OCTAVE Methodology applies a security risk 
management approach developed by researchers at the Carnegie Mellon® Software 
Engineering Institute (SEIsM). The methodology is used by over 1,000 medical, 
financial, manufacturing, and government organizations, and allows for self-direction. It 
is available at no cost and provides a wide range of tailoring capabilities for adapting 
SM 
® 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation and SEI are service marks of 
Carnegie Mellon University. 
OCTA VB and Carnegie Mellon are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
security risk management to unique domains. As a result, the aCTA VE Methodology 
provided a reasonable option for validating the use of security risk management in K-12 
schools and school districts. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Statement of the Problem Investigated and the Goal That Was Achieved 
How should school administrators establish and support appropriate educational 
access to the Internet? Reports issued by the United States (U.S.) Department of 
Education (ED) claim that two-thirds of the country's classrooms are now wired for 
Internet use (Kavanaugh-Brown, 2000). Estimates from the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) indicate that 90% of the public schools have some form of Internet 
access. According to Cattagni and Westat (2001),60% are wired for individual 
classroom usage and other schools have shared computer labs and library media centers. 
Federal funding for this effort through the education rate (E-rate) program had reached 
$5.8 billion as of February 28,2001 (Cattagni & Westat). 
Technology Use in Education 
The role of technology in education is unclear. According to Holmes (1999), 
much ofthe classroom use of computers is custodial in nature. Students are given 
assignments unrelated to their studies to provide teachers with planning time while their 
students are occupied in the computer lab (Scott, 2001). According to Cuban (2001), 
who documented computer usage by shadowing students within selected schools in 
California, a small cadre of early adopter teachers used technology extensively in the 
classroom, but for the majority of instruction, computer use was minimal. This same 
study identified a group of students (estimated at 5%) who gained technical expertise 
outside ofthe classroom and subsequently helped teachers and staff keep the technology 
functioning (Cuban). Based on a survey by the National School Boards Foundation 
(NSBF), students provided technical support in over half of the 811 school districts 
surveyed. Student technical assistance was reported as a critical resource to compensate 
for limitations in funding and availability of the school staffs technical skills (NSBF, 
2002a). 
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Internet usage in K-12 schools and school districts is expected to grow as teachers 
gain familiarity with technology and the school curriculum is adjusted to include 
additional computer applications (Cattagni & Westat, 2001). The usage is expected to 
expand beyond simple topic searches to include e-mail, chat sessions, library SUbscription 
services, construction of Web sites, shared data and software files, videoconferencing, 
and virtual classroom experiences (WBEC, 2000). 
Internet Context 
Convenience of access to an ever-expanding array of information and an 
extensive communication environment that supports direct links with networked devices 
on the Internet brings a unique suite of risks (Carpenter, 2001). The System 
Administration, Audit, Network, Security Institute (SANS), a provider ofInternet 
security training, estimates that between 7,000 and 10,000 devices with known 
vulnerabilities are added to the Internet daily, and that hackers seeking these 
vulnerabilities are initiating thousands of programs on the Internet at all times (Landers, 
2002). If such vulnerabilities are found and exploited, the infonnation resources stored 
on networked devices could be corrupted and the contents damaged, lost, or copied 
illegally. Moreover, the control of the networked device can be usurped by internal and 
external sources for unexpected activities if proper protection mechanisms are not 
established (Schneier, 2000). 
K-12 school administrators must recognize and address the risks inherent in the 
environment their systems have joined (Schneier, 2000). In a survey conducted in the 
spring of2003 by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the San Francisco Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Computer Intrusion Squad, 530 computer security 
practitioners working for U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial institutions, 
medical institutions, and universities were asked to report on security issues from the 
preceding 12 months. The summary results indicated that 95% detected computer 
security breaches, 38% detected network penetration from the outside, and 82% detected 
computer viruses (Richardson, 2003). 
Systems are not delivered with sufficient levels of security to survive exposure on 
the Internet (Carpenter, 2001). Extensive lock-down procedures that include removing 
unneeded software, changing default passwords, incorporating anti-virus protection, and 
restricting administrative access for every device can improve the situation based on 
research of past exploits by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) (Allen, 2001). 
These procedures are unique to the specific design of each device and require detailed 
knowledge of the specific hardware and software for successful application. As devices 
are linked into an infrastructure and connected to the Internet, protection of access to the 
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devices and control of individuals authorized to use them increasingly become areas of 
security concern (CERT, 1998). 
Without proper controls, Internet connectivity can mean that every individual on 
the network from the source point to a target destination (e.g. Web site, e-mail recipient, 
chat room) can view and change all contents of any communication (Schneier, 2000). 
The addition of protection devices such as encrypted communication mechanisms are 
needed to assure the confidentiality and integrity of content (Parker, 1998). Protection 
for Internet-accessible devices against unexpected changes and unsafe content may 
require the addition of anti-virus software, firewalls, intrusion-detection capabilities, and 
filtering software (Lesniak, 2002). Controlling who can use the network and retrieve 
content from interconnected devices requires effective authentication and authorization 
mechanisms. 
User access is commonly controlled through assigned identification codes and 
passwords. As a consequence, network users must choose passwords wisely and know 
how to protect their access capabilities (Parker, 1998). Added network switches and 
routers may be required to further limit which information assets a network user can 
access. Steps to maintain the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of network 
resources and communication content can be costly to implement and resource intensive 
to maintain (Allen, Alberts, Behrens, Laswell, & Wilson, 2000). 
Risk for Children Using the Internet 
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Content on the Internet is not subject to any review or rating system and adult-
only material is widespread (Stein, 1999). The online pornography industry exceeded an 
annual level of $1 billion by the end of 2000 (Lane III, 2000). SexTracker, a Web service 
that monitors adult sites, issued reports of26,000 active Web locations with as many as 
60 million unique visitors a day (Webb, 2001). Filtering was proposed by software 
developers such as Microsoft and Netscape, and Internet Service Providers (lSPs), such 
as America Online (AOL), to screen out inappropriate material for minors (Hunter, 
1999). However, Internet filtering has not been proved or disproved as effective in 
protecting children. Censorship opponents such as the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (EPIC) and the American Library Association (ALA) claim the risk of 
unwarranted censorship exceeds the protection capabilities of available products 
(Hunter). 
According to Stein (1999), regulations to control Internet advertising are not in 
place and, as a result, marketing companies are taking advantage of Internet connectivity 
mechanisms to bombard users of search engines and other Internet services with ads. 
Advertisers such as DoubleClick have developed techniques to exploit Internet 
connectivity and install hidden monitoring programs on user devices to track a user's 
Internet access. Prior Web site access is used to select content for banner ads and trigger 
the display of Web pages, called pop-up screens, which match perceived user interests 
(Scheer, 2001). Blocking mechanisms such as firewalls can be installed to restrict access 
to storage on a user's device and minimize the risk ofthis level of intrusion. Companies 
such as Lavasoft offer scanning software to locate these monitoring programs and 
deactivate them. However, the monitoring software can be reactivated by subsequent 
Web site access if blocking mechanisms are not implemented (Lavasoft, 2002). 
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Children with Internet access may communicate personal information 
inappropriately and illegally to outside organizations and individuals. Compliance with the 
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Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) has added another level of complexity 
to the problem of managing Internet communications for schools with students under the 
age of 13 (Anthony & Cohn, 2000). This federal law was passed in 1998 and went into 
effect in Apri12000 limiting, through regulations administered by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the online collection and use of personally identifiable information 
obtained from children under the age of 13 (FTC, 2003). Written parental permission is 
required for the collection and use ofthis data and strict privacy restrictions apply (Cannon, 
2001). Children are easily tricked into providing information through games accessible at 
popular sites (Cannon). Information collection has become intense as businesses attempt to 
capture online the estimated $200 billion in spending that children directly and indirectly 
influence through their families (Armstrong & Casement, 2000). 
Even if the child provides no specific input, the use of electronic tracking and 
probes into the available data on an Internet-accessible device used by a child can be 
extensive if the device is not configured to block the monitoring (Armstrong & Casement, 
2000). 
Software tools are available on the Internet to track the physical location of an Internet-
accessible device through information sent from that device within an Internet 
communication message. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in 
Alexandria, VA uses one such tool called VisualRoute from Visualware. This tool 
graphically displays the physical origins of communications to track threats against 
children and tips received at its Web site (Moad, 2001). The Google search engine, 
available to any Internet user at the Google Web site (http://www.google.com). provides an 
additional trace feature that returns a location map when a telephone number formatted 
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with hyphens is entered in the search request block. Any location with a listed telephone 
number is included in the mapping function. While VisualRoute and Google are not 100% 
accurate, the capability is sufficiently robust to place unsuspecting children at risk should 
someone seek to locate and harm them (Moad). 
With Internet access, network users have the opportunity to violate copyright laws 
such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998. It is a simple process to 
download popular music stored in Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) files that have 
an MP3 file extension (designating the file as audio) by using programs, such as Napster 
and Gnutella, that bypass copyright protection mechanisms (Clayton & Watkins, 2002). 
The ease with which tapes and CDs can be copied promotes a disregard for intellectual 
property rights (Colkin, 2002). Due to the popularity of free-music sites, the recording 
companies are striking back by filing lawsuits against ISPs that allow access to Internet 
sites where illegal copies of recordings are posted (Johnston, 2002). The Recording 
Industry Association of America (RlAA) initiated legal action against college students 
who provided free-music sites that violated copyright laws from college campus 
networks. These students bypassed acceptable use requirements and technology 
monitoring mechanisms that were established by the colleges and aimed to avoid 
inappropriate use ofthe connectivity. These cases were settled in May 2003 when the 
students involved in the suit agreed to pay between $12,000 and $17,500 each and cease 
illegal song-swapping (Reuters, 2003). These same issues can apply to software and 
other copyright materials that can be plagiarized easily with electronic tools. The RIAA 
has threatened to sue any identified sources of illegal music (Reuters). School 
administrators, teachers, and others who establish and maintain K-12 Internet 
environments must consider ways to insure that users of the vast array of intellectual 
property housed on the Internet handle that content ethically (Armstrong & Casement, 
2000). 
8 
Internet access can provide students and other network users with a means of 
violating the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of2001. An 
individual who attempts to access other Internet sites from K-12 facilities without 
authorization is subject to criminal prosecution, and the school or school district would be 
expected to assist in tracking the perpetrator (Mackenzie & Goldman, 2000). Police are 
reporting the involvement of youth in global crimes who do not recognize the magnitude 
of their actions (Snell, 2002). Since K-12 schools and school districts are actively 
encouraging students to build academic skills that would, ironically, also allow them to 
become hackers, careful consideration must be given to providing effective awareness 
education, deterrents, and monitoring mechanisms (Cuban, 2001). 
Risk for K-12 Schools and School Districts with Internet Access 
Information critical to the K-12 school or school district can be endangered by 
Internet access. For example, a Washington State high-school student broke into the 
school's computer system and altered transcripts for other students for a fee (Lange, 
Davis, Jaye, Erwin, Mullarney, Clarke, & Loesch, 2000). As K-12 schools and school 
districts expand the use of Web access and consider opening the use of networks to 
parents and community service groups, control of connectivity becomes more complex 
and the risk of illegal use expands (PTA, 2001). In a recent court case, a Philadelphia 
man was sent to prison for attacking a library Web site and posting obscene images 
(Blackwell, 2002). Web sites can be extremely vulnerable to attack unless properly 
secured, and the existence of a Web site provides a footprint to the provider's network 
that may make the site easier to compromise (Scambray, McClure, & Kurtz, 2001). 
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Tracking intruders, determining how they gain access to a particular network, and 
coordinating activities between school administration and legal authorities for 
prosecuting hackers require time and technical expertise (Tipton & Krause, 2000). The 
flexibility ofthe Internet's communication mechanisms allows an attacker to adjust any 
and all communication content to avoid detection. As a result, tracking alleged 
perpetrators has become a global issue (Lipson, 2002). 
Expanding network access to the Internet may also give unexpected participants 
undue access to personal information about students, staff, and faculty_ Social security 
numbers, salaries, medical information, home addresses, grades, and other personal 
information may reside on the network (Allen et at, 2000). Restricting access to 
sensitive and confidential information by appropriate users requires careful consideration 
and monitoring to avoid the risk of privacy invasion, inappropriate modification, and 
identity theft (parker, 1998). 
Designing Internet connectivity appropriate to K-12 school or school district use 
is a challenge in security risk management; there are many options with no obvious right 
choice. The issues are both organizational and operational, and cannot be isolated to 
technology alone (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Every option has risks that must be 
identified, adjusted to specific local requirements, and appropriately managed (Schneier, 
2000). Resources of time, money, and technical expertise are finite, so each school or 
school district must make choices among competing requirements (Allen et aI., 2000). 
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By identifying the risks of each option, evaluating their potential impact, and prioritizing 
the risks, school administrators can tranSfOlTIl risk assessment results into requirements 
that define policy and technology choices (Alberts & Dorofee). Applying a reusable 
process that structures the issues and incorporates good general security practices can 
facilitate the process of security improvement (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation SM 
(OCTAVE®) Methodology was released for public use by the Carnegie Mellon® 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI sM) in September 2001 (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
This methodology was developed to help organizations address operational security risk 
management, which includes the management of Internet connectivity in K-12 schools 
and school districts. The U.S. Department of Defense medical community selected this 
methodology to meet the mandated risk assessment requirement for compliance with 
Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIP AA) security regulations (Alberts & 
Dorofee, 2001 c). The methodology provides a systematic approach for a complex 
organization to identify the information assets that need protection, identify security 
requirements for these assets, identify potential threats, identify network vulnerabilities, 
and evaluate technology risks by comparing current practices to accepted best practices. 
The OCTAVE Catalog of Practices is incorporated into the OCTAVE Methodology to 
provide a basis of good security practices needed by all types of organizations (Alberts & 
Dorofee,2001a). These practices are drawn from the analysis of Internet security 
problems reported to the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center 
SM 
® 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation and SEI are service marks of 
Carnegie Mellon University. 
OCTAVE is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
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(CERT®/CC), recommendations by the British Standards Institute (BSI) and the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), and SEI experience assisting U.S. 
government and medical organizations with security risk management (Alberts, Dorofee 
& Allen, 2001). 
The goal of this research was to validate the effectiveness of a security risk 
management approach tailored for the K-12 school domain. The OCTAVE 
Methodology was selected for use in this validation effort based on cost and tailoring 
capabilities. Through the use of tailoring capabilities within the OCTAVE Methodology, 
a domain-specific security risk methodology was developed for K-12 schools and school 
districts. This tailored methodology was validated at a selected school district and 
successfully applied by the school district. The selected K-12 school district included 
considerations of Internet security risk in its district planning to address technology 
support and improvement. 
Design of the tailored methodology required identification of the unique 
information security issues appropriate to Internet connectivity for K-12 schools and 
school districts. Appropriate options were selected to tailor the OCTAVE Methodology 
to fit the unique needs ofK-12 schools and school districts (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Validation of the methodology required personnel within a selected school district to 
learn and apply that methodology. An analysis team composed of five participants from 
the teaching, administration, and technology units was assembled to represent the range 
of technology needs and technical support throughout the school district. The analysis 
team discussed Internet security within a structured process that exposed participants to 
® CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
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the range of issues and good security practices that should be considered for use in a K-
12 school or school district. The structured process guided the analysis team members in 
selecting appropriate protection strategies to meet the specific protection needs of their 
school district (Alberts & Dorofee). 
Participants from the selected school district evaluated both the results of the 
methodology and the value of its use in addressing K-12 school security risk 
management. To be considered for selection, the K-12 school district was required to 
have a full age range of students and actively use technology within the curriculum at 
most grade levels. Technology support staff needed to work for the K-12 school or 
school district rather than an external provider organization to assure onsite availability 
and eliminate conflicts with vendor contract provisions. Analysis team participants were 
required to commit sufficient time to learn and complete the evaluation within an eight 
week timeframe. 
The Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD) was the selected school district for 
validation of the tailored methodology. This K-12 school district met all the selection 
criteria. In addition, the curriculum director and technology manager expressed strong 
interest in identifying and addressing the security needs of the school district. The SPSD 
consists of one high-school with an enrollment of 1,200 students, one middle school with 
an enrollment of 900 students, and five elementary schools with enrollment in each 
school ranging from 350 to 500 students. Every school has at least one computer 
laboratory for use by every grade level. In addition to the laboratory, every classroom 
has active computer connections for instructional use by teachers. A fiber-optic Gigabit 
Ethernet wide-area network (WAN) interlinks all schools. The Technical Services staff, 
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with third-party support, coordinates district-based technology activities. ISP services, 
firewall operations, and content filtering are handled by a third party. Students attend 
regularly scheduled computer classes at all grade levels. The computer education 
curriculum includes courses addressing computer operations, publishing and presentation, 
creativity and design, problem-solving, and research. All students, starting in 
kindergarten, are provided with access to the school network. 
Evaluation ofthe effectiveness of the K-12 tailored methodology at the SPSD was 
based on four perspectives. The first perspective was provided by Christopher Alberts, 
one of the researchers at the SEI who developed the OCTAVE Methodology. This 
review focused on the process of tailoring the methodology to maintain consistency with 
the OCTAVE Criteria (http://www.cert.org/octave), a set of general core requirements 
that must be incorporated into every tailored version (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). These 
requirements are described in detail in Chapter 3. 
Participants at the SPSD, who provided the second perspective, reported an 
enhanced understanding of Internet security issues within the school district and 
perceived value for time spent using the methodology. Feedback from those participants 
also identified the need for additional changes to the tailored methodology. Those 
changes were compared to the OCTAVE Methodology to identify possible limitations in 
the initial tailoring of it and issues related to the effectiveness of using it in K-12 schools 
and school districts. 
A third perspective from K-12 experts provided an indication of the applicability 
of the risk management approach to Internet security in K-12 schools and school districts 
beyond the selected school district. The tailored methodology was presented for review 
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and comment to a group composed of ten individuals actively participating in the K -12 
school environment including school board members, technology directors, and 
superintendents. Review participants were selected from the membership of the 
Consortium for School Networking (CoSN), a national non-profit organization that draws 
its members from school districts and related organizations across the U.S. 
The fourth perspective was assembled from observations of this researcher as the 
methodology was introduced to the selected school district and used by the analysis team. 
The resulting plans and strategies were expected to share commonalities with those from 
U.S. government agencies, financial institutions, universities, and foreign corporations 
that had already applied the OCTAVE Methodology. All organizations using Internet 
connectivity are impacted by security threats, such as worms and viruses, which place the 
integrity of network resources at risk (Pethia, 2003). 
Relevance and Significance 
The use of Internet connectivity within K-12 schools and school districts touches 
a wide range of regulatory, political, and social challenges for educators (NSBF, 2002b). 
Regulations for educational reform to provide greater accountability, choice, and 
flexibility in federal programs were implemented in 2001 through the No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB) Act (ED, 2001). School districts such as Jefferson County, Kentucky 
(http://www.jefferson.kI2.ky.us) assembled years of paper records into Web-accessible 
data repositories to help educators at local, district, state, and federal levels prove that the 
$200 billion in federal spending initiated by the Elementary and Secondary Education 
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Act (ESEA) of 1965 provided benefit to children attending K-12 schools receiving these 
funds (ED). Funding through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) E-rate 
program provided more than $6 billion to establish futemet connectivity in K -12 schools, 
school districts, and classrooms as a portion of the ESEA funding (ED). To meet the 
NCLB requirements, educators must also prove that poverty, race, ethnicity, disability, 
and limited English proficiency have not hindered the progress of the children attending 
schools that received federal funds (ED). 
Organizations such as the American Student List (ASL) and the National 
Research Center for College and University Admissions (NRCCUA) have deceptively 
collected information about children using survey instruments distributed in the 
classroom under the pretense of college scholarship opportunities and sold survey results 
to marketing organizations (EPIC, 2003). The 2001 Education Bill included a provision 
for parents to inspect survey instruments distributed in the classroom and exclude their 
children from participation (EPIC). According to the Electronic Privacy fuformation 
Center (EPIC), the ASL, NRCCUA, and other organizations that collect and sell 
information related to children might invoke the Freedom offuformation Act (FOIA) to 
obtain access to data repositories assembled by K-12 schools and school districts to 
satisfy the NCLB reporting requirements. IfK-12 schools and school districts do not 
implement appropriate information management, there is a high risk that parental 
restrictions will be bypassed and student privacy compromised (EPIC). Appropriate 
management of information access can be addressed through effective security risk 
management (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
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Internet Content Filtering 
Federal legislators responded to concerns of voters attempting to protect children 
from seeing inappropriate Internet material with a series of laws including the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 and the Child Online Protection Act 
(COP A) of 1999. Censorship opponents such as the EPIC and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) successfully challenged these laws in the courts as 
unconstitutional, based on the First Amendment freedom of speech (Hunter, 1999). In 
the court rulings that struck down the CDA and COP A, filtering was championed as a 
better alternative to federal legislation because it was less restrictive and designed to be 
equally effective (Hunter). 
In 2000, supporters in the U.S. Congress favoring protective measures for 
children responded to the courts by passing the Children's Internet Protection Act 
(CIP A). This act linked a requirement for filtering Internet content to E-rate funding 
available for supporting Internet access for school-age children through the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Klosek, 2000). The details of implementation 
including deciding when and how to apply filtering are the responsibility of each school 
district (Clark, 2001). In light of federal efforts to link public funding to a requirement 
for filtering, vendor hardware and software products were installed in K-12 schools and 
school districts across the country to restrict access to Internet content (PTA, 2001). The 
ALA and ACLU presented arguments before the Supreme Court in March 2003 that 
content filtering mandated by the CIP A blocks access to material that should be available 
to everyone based on constitutional protection and requested that the act be declared 
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unconstitutional. A decision on this issue is expected from the Court in 2004 (Pruitt, 
2003). 
Existing filtering products are highly controversial. None of the options work 
properly 100% of the time (EPIC, 1999b). A research team from Consumer Reports 
assembled a study test of the effectiveness of six filter products against 86 Web sites 
containing harmful content that filtering products should block. Their findings, described 
in the article titled "Digital Chaperones for Kids," published in Consumer Reports, March 
2001, indicated the blocking process for all six products failed at least 20% of the tests 
(as cited in King, 2001). Without due care, the risks of exposure to illegal material and 
blocked access to legitimate sources are significant (Li, 2000). 
The Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU declared that the local community standard 
must be applied to define the line between pornography and obscenity. This line is 
critical since pornography is protected by the Constitution under the First Amendment 
freedom of speech but obscenity is not (Lane III, 2000). The determination of what is 
legal for adults and harmful to minors is subject to extensive local interpretation 
(Fienberg, 2001). A school would be criticized if a child saw inappropriate content, but 
held liable if anyone used school-provided Internet connectivity to gain access to illegal 
materials (Lane III). 
The U.S. Congress identified the need for filtering to protect a child from 
unsuitable materials on the Internet and assigned the filtering responsibility to the parent 
or legal caregiver (GAO, 1998) A group of citizens in Holland, Michigan attempted to 
pass a referendum banning Internet access from library and school computers in their 
community because children might be exposed to "obscene, sexually explicit or other 
material harmful to minors" (Bradsher, 2000, p. A12). The voters turned down the 
referendum with 55% opposed and 45% in favor; voter turnout was double the expected 
level. Exceptional voter turnout was attributed to the interest and concern of voters 
regarding this issue (Bradsher). Some caregivers are turning to home-schooling to 
maintain an assurance of quality and control over their child's education. In 1999, over 
850,000 children were schooled in their homes (Sale, 2002). 
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According to consumer research, only six percent of caregivers rely on filtering 
products at home when allowing children to be online without close adult supervision 
(King,2001). In contrast, school technical support personnel rely primarily on content 
filtering to control access to the Internet (Cope & Brewin, 2000). A survey of technology 
decision makers in 811 school districts funded by the National School Boards Foundation 
(NSBF, 2002a) found that 90% of the respondents installed filtering software. In 
addition, 78% reported teacher supervision as the central part of their effort to provide a 
safe access environment (NSBF). 
The application of content filtering requires two components: (1) a rating to be 
applied to each Internet address and (2) a filter module that uses the rating to determine 
whether to grant or block access to a site selection. Ratings can be assigned to a Web site 
through self-rating or via a third party. Also, ratings can be created dynamically within 
the filter module to block any content matching selected keywords that are considered 
objectionable (EPIC, 1999b). 
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) developed an open standard called the 
Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) that provides a means for sites to 
incorporate a self-selected electronically readable rating within each Web page. The PICS 
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standard provides a universal language for Web site self-rating, establishes general 
rating-based rules, and defines a label format without providing guidance for the content 
of the label itself (http://www.w3.org/PICS/iacwcv2.htm). Rating systems have been 
developed by the Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA) (http://www.icra.org) and 
SafeSurfTM (http://www.safesurf.com) to provide a means for Web developers to 
implement the PICS standard (http://www.safesurf.comlssplan.htm). However, self-rating 
is subject to both accidental and deliberate misinterpretation without penalty (Hunter, 
1999). 
The use of blocking software for the filtering module can allow the installer to 
select specific words that will trigger a browser to block a site irrespective ofthe site self-
rating (EPIC, 1999b). Selecting word blocking can occur based on content in ads and 
banners appearing on pages that may be unrelated to the actual content of the page and 
vary with each access request. The installer must select whether to block unrated pages 
(EPIC). The filtering module can reside on a local device, an Internet access point at a 
school or school district network, an access point maintained by an ISP, a state-controlled 
Internet-access link, or a regional access point that crosses multiple states (Hunter, 1999). 
When installation choices apply to a wide geographic area, the potential for disagreement 
with local expectations is high, and the possibility of illegal access restrictions increases 
(ALA, 1999). In an effort to balance between competing views, the Bertelsmann 
Foundation released a proposal in September 1999 to establish a voluntary international 
content rating and filtering system, but that proposal did not gain wide acceptance 
(Hunter). 
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New York State leased a product called I-Gear (later renamed Web Security) from 
Symantec (http://enterprisesecurity.symantic.com) to filter Internet content for public 
schools in the state. Web site access was blocked by this product based on an encrypted 
list that identified sites considered unacceptable. Reverse engineering of this list by 
Peacefire, an advocacy organization for freedom of access to Internet information 
(http://www.peacefire.org), identified 470,000 sites that were blocked. According to 
Peacefire, 76% of the Web-based educational pages, or Web addresses ending in .edu, 
were blocked improperly, preventing school children from accessing educational 
information defined specifically for their use (Harrison, 2000). As K-12 schools and 
school districts become more reliant on Internet information sources, censorship 
opponents, such as ALA, ACLU, and EPIC, become more concerned about the ability of 
software filters to reflect value judgments by restricting access to selected Web content 
(Hunter, 1999). 
Mechanisms for circumventing a filter are obtained easily using anonymous Web 
sites (e.g., http://www.anonymizer.com) or tools downloaded to a local device. 
Interaction with Web sites, e-mail, news groups, and chat groups can be hidden from the 
filtering module through encryption mechanisms (NSBF, 2002b). Other aids used to 
disable blocking software are provided by Peacefire, based on the organization's claim 
that much of the inappropriate blocking is deliberate and should be circumvented 
(http://www.peacefire.org). 
Blocking software should inform the user of the blocking decision process so that 
inappropriate applications can be identified and corrected, but many software filtering 
packages do not provide this option (Balkin, Noveck, & Roosevelt, 1999). The installer 
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of the filtering module chooses how to inform the requestor about the filtering decision 
by blocking the full page or only blocking out the offending words. Filtering tools cannot 
evaluate words within a context or distinguish between different uses of a sequence of 
letters (Hunter, 1999). For instance, the Beaver College Web site disappeared from 
student availability after filtering software providers added "beaver" to their list of slang 
terms. As a consequence, the 147-year-old institution changed its name to Arcadia 
University (LaRue, 2000). 
Typically, a third-party rating system is implemented using categories such as 
violence, profanity, sex, and nudity that are created by the rating group. Screening at the 
installation point is based on blocking some or all of the available categories. The rating 
group assigns a category to the Web locations identified as potentially objectionable. 
These assignments are stored in a proprietary database maintained by the rating group 
and used by the subscriber's filtering module to apply the rating system (EPIC, 1999b). 
Software programs, employed by the rating group to search for new Internet sites that 
may warrant blocking, assign an automatic category based on a set of criteria developed 
uniquely by each rating group (Finkelstein, 2001). Researchers working for the rating 
group visually review the Web site to confirm or adjust the automatic selection to 
compensate for limitations in the automated process. Web locations are periodically 
rechecked for validity since Web content may change, requiring an adjustment to the 
category assignment. Changes and additions to the category assignment file are provided 
to subscribers on a predetermined frequency (Finkelstein). 
Independent rating groups such as the United Federation of Child Safe Web Sites 
(UFCWS) offer a certification for filtering systems. The UFCWS provides the 
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iWatchDog™ program (http://www.iwatchdog.info) and certifies rating systems using 
the iWatchDog Commercial Certification Service (ICCSTM). Any site using the ICCSTM 
certified rating system, such as SafeSurfTM, can display a logo that indicates a guarantee 
of a child safety rating. Organizations voluntarily submit their Web site content to the 
iWatchdog™ program for review to obtain an approval rating (EPIC, 1999b). Filtering 
modules can be restricted to allow access to only certified sites or to limit access to a 
specific list assembled by a local user. This is considered the most restrictive approach in 
that only anticipated content can be viewed, and anything not on the accepted list is 
blocked (TechLearning, 2000). 
All organizations are faced with risks stemming from the misuse of Internet 
connectivity and the subsequent access to inappropriate content (Cohen, 2000). The 
challenge in establishing access to the Internet is the inability to limit access to specific 
content areas deemed appropriate by the organization. Employee time and bandwidth are 
lost to entertainment opportunities for news, music, movies, and shopping (Cohen). 
Also, there is the potential to access controversial content (i.e., gambling and 
pornography) that carries legal restrictions in many geographic areas, as well as illegal 
content (i.e., obscene material and child pornography) (Lane III, 2000). In a survey 
conducted by the career Web site vault.com, 90.3% of the 1,200 U.S. employees who 
were contacted claimed to have accessed sites that were against their company's 
acceptable use policy (AUP) on company time (Cohen). 
In response to potential liabilities, instead of trusting employees not to be 
tempted, many U.S. businesses, medical facilities, and government agencies implemented 
filtering programs to block employee access to inappropriate materials (Schulman, 2001). 
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Websense (http://www.websense.com) was the leading filter choice for U.S. businesses 
in 2002, based on sales dollars, installation locations that number over 18,000, and usage 
by the largest U.S. companies, including 282 ofthe Fortune 500 organizations 
(http://www.websense.com!products/index.cfin). According to the Web sense Web site, 
the master database provides more than 80 possible category assignments for one billion 
Web pages with weekly updates for an additiona125,000. Category assignments are built 
manually, and the vendor offers a procedure for Web-page owners to dispute the category 
decision (Kranich, 2001). Available options allow for restrictions based on time of day, 
employee role, rating category, or keyword. Internet content and usage growth is 
estimated to double every year (Oklyzko, 2000). Maintaining an effective filter when the 
content base on the Internet is changing constantly requires a steady commitment of 
resources, and the potential for inappropriate blocking is high (Schulman). 
Internet Risks Not Addressed by Content Filtering 
Cuban (2001) reports that selected students have advanced technological skills 
acquired outside of school through friends, family, and self-teaching. This competence 
has allowed these students to learn the details oftheir school's environment and to 
augment the administrative support of its technology infrastructure. Interviews with 
teenage hackers documented by Verton (2002) identify active learning of in-depth 
technology skills through exploration of home and school facilities by fifth-grade 
students ages 10 - 11. Some of these teenagers reported adjusting grades and plagiarizing 
assignments from other students by hacking into the school system. The students 
established prestige with peers, teachers, and administrators by creating school network 
problems they subsequently fixed. 
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Technically proficient parental and teacher authority figures helped some students 
learn to establish appropriate boundaries for acceptable and unacceptable actions and 
thereby avoid committing illegal acts (Verton, 2002). K-12 school and school district 
administrators must maintain a difficult balance between the educational role of the 
school environment to provide a learning space for children with a technology aptitude, 
and the business needs of the school environment to gather and protect information that 
must be kept private. K-12 schools and school districts have an added responsibility to 
provide technology use to all participants in the school environment based on 
commitments to E-rate and other connectivity funding sources (NSBF, 2002a). 
Advanced technical skills are not always required for students to adjust online 
information inappropriately. A sixth grader took the opportunity to change his reading 
assignment grades after his teacher failed to close the computer session and then went to 
lunch (Shah, 2003). Six students at Fremont, California's Mission San Jose High School 
gained access to the student grading system and adjusted their semester grades by 
collecting the teacher's authentication data using keyboard-tracking software tools they 
obtained from the Internet and installed on the teacher's classroom computer (Akizuki, 
2003). 
Control through enforcement of AUPs can incorporate behavior expectations for 
all users of the school infrastructure (Littman, 1998). AUP implementation has been 
successful at the high-school and university level. However, an AUP is difficult to 
implement in an environment where participants are still learning reading and 
comprehension skills (Cattagni & Westat, 2001). Only 19% of the K-12 school districts 
included in a 2002 survey by the National School Boards Foundation (NSBF) have tried 
to implement an AUP, and only 2% report any audit mechanism to confirm its 
effectiveness (NSBF, 2002a). An AUP codifies guidelines for online communication 
with specific sanctions for inappropriate use (Lange et aI., 2000). In universities, AUPs 
may indicate that research activities cannot include commercial efforts (Lesniak, 2002). 
LeBaron and Collier (2001) contend that the AUP should reflect an overall policy for 
technology use at the school board level. 
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Writing an effective AUP is not an insignificant effort, and enforcement depends 
heavily on the appropriate wording and a consistent application (Kovacich, 1998). LeBaron 
and Collier (2001) suggest accessing Web sites that provide guidance for writing an AUP 
such as: Bellingham, Washington Board Policy (http://www.bham.wednet.edulpolicies.htm); 
Armadillo at Rice University 
(http://chico.rice.eduiarmadillolRiceiResources/acceptable.html); 
Internet Advocate (http://www.monroe.lib.in.us/~lchampe1/netadv.html); and K-12 AUPs 
(http://www.erehwon.comlk12aup). Selecting an appropriate template must involve the 
consideration of how Internet content is used acceptably within the school's environment 
and connectivity issues that an AUP should address. Some AUPs are targeted to specific 
problems such as protection from pornography, while others focus on privacy issues 
(Chapin, 1999). 
School administrators must consider whether the technology in place at their site 
supports the intent oftheir specific AUP. Parents may be required to provide permission 
in writing for their child's technology use based on the school's defined AUP (CoSN, 
2002). Inconsistencies between the use of content-filtering software and school policy 
can be considered an inappropriate implementation of the AUP by the school and an 
opening to liability if a child's Internet access is handled improperly (Anthony & Cohn, 
2000). 
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In 2000, Mackenzie and Goldman reported that University of Delaware students 
launched hacker attacks into commercial enterprises in violation of the university's AUP. 
These attacks - at the time an internal policing issue for the university - are now in 
violation of the USA PATRIOT Act of2001 (EFF, 2002). By providing the access 
means for illegal acts, a K-12 school or school district assumes part ofthe liability of the 
student's actions unless a clear pattern of definition and enforcement of acceptable use 
can be shown (Kenneally, 2002). University students throughout the world who have the 
access, skills, and time increasingly participate in attacks on other Internet users 
(EDUCAUSE,2002). As the skills needed to execute attacks decrease, the risk of 
younger children's involvement in Internet abuse is expected to rise (Schwartau, 2001). 
The amount of critical information about each child assembled at school Web 
locations is growing based on the recognition that caregiver involvement in the child's 
schooling is a key ingredient in student achievement and accountability (ED, 2001). Web 
site access provides an inexpensive and effective communication channel to link a child 
with parents and other individuals outside ofthe classroom environment who influence 
the child (ED, 2000a). Personal information about each child, such as a social security 
number, address, homework assignments, grades, and electronic report cards, can be 
accessed via the Web along with school calendars, school activities, and other general 
information (NSBF, 2002a). As more personal content for a child becomes remotely 
accessible, the risk increases that organizations and individuals such as peers, non-
custodial parents, advertisers, and pedophiles will attempt to use the content 
inappropriately (Quittner, 200 I). 
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Computer access and the availability of Internet connectivity is expanding beyond 
the boundaries of the classroom for school children. For instance, two elementary 
schools in Pennsylvania participate in an experiment to provide 2417 (24 hours a day, 7 
days a week) connectivity aimed at proving the value of ubiquitous technology for 
education (O'Toole, 2002). In another experiment, fifth graders in Iowa schools are 
provided with a small handheld device for their individual use at all times (Levine, 2000). 
As school-provided access expands beyond classroom time, the teacher can no longer be 
expected to provide complete monitoring for Internet use. University administrators 
already experience many problems (such as the e-mail harassment of students and 
experimental hacking) that are attributed to expanded access to unrestricted Internet 
communication capabilities. These problems are expected to increase among younger 
students as unmonitored connectivity expands (Mackenzie & Goldman, 2000). 
Universities report a growing struggle to balance open access with security 
management (EDUCAUSE, 2002). Faculty and administration in post-secondary schools 
have an increased awareness of security challenges and risks based on the national 
recognition of the technology capability available within this environment of high 
participant turnover, highly decentralized management, and broad technology diversity 
(EDUCAUSE). For example, in March 2003, a student at the University of Texas (UT) 
was charged with the largest information theft to date involving a university. In this case, 
the personal information of over 55,000 students, staff, and faculty was compromised 
using a security-access weakness that allowed a student to execute a program at the UT 
Web site and retrieve data that the assigned authorization level should have blocked 
(Brulliard,2003). 
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According to administrators at the University of Delaware, success in managing 
its networked environment requires an extensive emphasis on training students, faculty, 
and administration, coupled with enforced policies and practices that discourage abuse, 
assure the fair adjUdication of offenders, and provide protection for victims (Mackenzie 
& Goldman, 2000). Programs such as Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse, funded 
through the Consortium for School Networking (CoSN, 2002), issue a similar message to 
K-12 schools and school districts - that the issues facing higher education are also a 
growing concern for younger students (CoSN). 
Updegrove and Long (2001) in a presentation on March 19,2001 to the 
EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Task Force on System Security identified six challenges for 
information security in higher education: (1) the tradition of freely sharing information; 
(2) limitations in direct control over individual participants; (3) a broadly disbursed 
technology environment; (4) limited financial resources already taxed to meet basic 
functional needs; (5) an extensive individual autonomy in defining and expanding 
available resources; and (6) a limited understanding of the role of centralized control on 
technology. Many of these challenges are applicable to K-12 schools and school districts 
as their technology environments expand. According to Updegrove and Long (p. 14), 
"K-12 school system networks are the only sites (in the U.S.) which have worse network 
and system security than higher education." 
There is an expanding realization that any poorly protected site on the Internet is a 
potential threat to all Internet users (http://www.cert.orgltech_tipslhome_networks.html). 
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Attackers can take control of unprotected devices and use them as remote staging areas for 
attacking others (Allen & Sledge, 2002). Negligence claims against the owners of insecure 
networks are proposed as a means of promoting responsible behavior by victims of hacker 
attacks (Kenneally, 2002). Responsible network management for every organization 
requires effective policies and procedures for managing acceptable use by network 
participants and sufficiently knowledgeable technical support to maintain the systems at a 
level where vulnerability exposure is minimized (Wadlow, 2000). 
Security Risk Management 
Trust was a key component of the Internet design when it was implemented 
initially in 1969 (Schneier, 2000). Internet connectivity with cross-country linkages grew 
from four hosts distributed on four nodes in 1969 to 15 nodes and 23 hosts in 1971. The 
connectivity was used to facilitate communication among research and government sites 
(Zakon, 2003). The protocols established at that time such as the Border Gate Protocol 
(BGP), which allows routers to direct Internet traffic efficiently, were designed to scale 
easily and cheaply by building a communication environment using links among existing 
local area networks (LANs). Those links were based on an assumed level oftrust that is 
no longer valid (Schneier). 
The Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) was 
established in 1988 through a collaborative agreement between Carnegie Mellon and the 
U. S. Department of Defense. This agreement was established in response to the Morris 
worm, a self-replicating program released by William Morris that crippled the Internet 
earlier the same year and impacted worldwide communications (CERT, 1998). The 
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number of reported incidents ofwonns, viruses, and denial of service (DoS) attacks has 
risen from six in 1988 to 137,529 in 2003, doubling in volume each year (CERT, 2003a). 
Analysis of incident data at CERT/CC indicates that shrinking levels of 
knowledge are needed to mount ever-expanding levels of attacks via the Internet (CERT, 
2003b). Wonn and virus attacks are spreading at an increasing speed and affecting a 
greater number of sites more rapidly. Reactive methods of protection are failing because 
software vendors cannot create and distribute patches ahead ofthe attack impact cycle 
(Staniford, Paxson, & Weaver, 2002). 
The initial creator of a new attack process is highly skilled technically, but others 
with much less capability who learn of the exploit through electronic bulletin boards can 
easily adapt the code and reuse it against different targets (Parker, 1998). As 
communication capabilities on the Internet expand, the speed at which new attack 
infonnation becomes available to less skilled agents increases (Allen, 2001). In its 
January 2003 report to the U.S. Congress, the Institute for Infonnation Infrastructure 
Protection (I3P) included organized crime, terrorist groups, and citizens in foreign 
nations as being increasingly involved as major attack agents (I3P, 2003). 
The ease of installation for Internet connectivity and the availability of 
standardized software tools from database vendors such as Microsoft and Apple to build 
Web access for existing data have lulled new users of technology into a false sense of 
security (Carpenter, 2001). The same tools that aid in building Web access are used in 
generating attacks (Scambray et aI., 2001). The Google search engine, a widely used 
Internet tool available at the Google Web site (http://www.google.com). provides 
knowledgeable hackers with a list of unprotected Web-enabled databases that use 
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standard software templates when searches are initiated using default text phrases built 
into the templates (Null, 2003). Apple Corporation and the Drexel University College of 
Medicine were notified by Null when unprotected FileMaker Pro databases containing 
sensitive personal and medical information appeared in a search-query response contains 
phrases used by FileMaker Pro Web Companion, a component that provides Internet 
access to databases built using FileMaker Pro tools. Because of the low knowledge 
threshold and ease of use, tools such as FileMaker Pro are selected for use by K -12 
schools and school districts (NETS, 2002). 
Reactive protection strategies are insufficient due to the increased attack speed 
and severity (Allen, 2001). Vulnerability assessments are used by many organizations to 
identify and fix software security problems, but the results of those assessments are 
hampered because oflimitations in the available assessment tools (Peltier, 2002). 
Vulnerability tools can identify patterns that match known problems in the technology 
infrastructure, but they cannot identify poor administration practices and missing or 
incomplete policies (Alberts, Behrens, Pethia & Wilson, 2000). Using vulnerability tools 
requires specialized technical skills, and the improper use of such tools can damage the 
technology infrastructure. The volume of output can be overwhelming and difficult to 
analyze. The recommended actions selected by these tools can be in opposition to the 
needs of the organization. Careful skilled review is needed before changes recommended 
by a tool are selected for implementation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Experience with the limitations of vulnerability assessments in providing 
sufficiently context-sensitive results led researchers at the Carnegie Mellon Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) to develop a security risk management methodology that an 
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organization could self-direct and tailor to fit its specific needs (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2002). A security risk management approach that includes both organizational and 
technological issues addresses a broader range of security risk than vulnerability 
assessments (Peltier, 2001). Security risk management emphasizes recognition, 
resistance, and recovery based on the premise that total avoidance is not feasible (Peltier). 
Each organization has a unique information environment and a finite level of resources 
with which to identify and establish controls in addressing security risk (Alberts & 
Dorofee). One of the major challenges in the security risk management field is the 
identification of relevant risk for a specific organization (Alberts et aI., 2000). Each site 
has a unique network structure, a unique mix of technical capabilities, and a unique mix 
of network services and users. The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) Methodology was released in September 2001 to 
address unique organizational security risk management needs (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2001c). 
The OCTAVE Methodology incorporates a Catalog of Practices (Alberts et aI., 
2001) that contains good security practices drawn from the analysis of problems reported 
to the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC), standards 
from internationally recognized organizations, and results from in-depth evaluations at 
medical, manufacturing, and government organizations (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
These practices represent good general security practices every organization should 
address to exhibit due diligence in handling security risk. However, detailed actions and 
domain-specific issues such as regulations and role-specific needs are not included in that 
catalog (Alberts et al.). 
With the realization that organizations have neither unlimited resources nor 
unlimited time to devote to security risk management, each organization must select the 
appropriate security practice areas to mitigate based on its unique site characteristics, 
current operational environment, and applicable legal and regulatory mandates (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 2002). Instructions are provided within the OCTAVE Methodology for 
tailoring the processes and practices to address the needs of specific types of 
organizations (Alberts et aI., 2001). OCTAVE tailoring capabilities were used in this 
investigation to incorporate unique security practices for K-12 schools and school 
districts into the methodology. 
Barriers and Issues 
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Designing and maintaining an appropriate and secure Internet connectivity 
solution that accommodates educational and legal requirements and is suitably flexible to 
handle the unique local needs ofK-12 schools and school districts is a complex problem 
(Wasserman, 2000). Stakeholders such as teachers, librarians, students, parents, school 
board members, school administrators, and educational funding groups at local, state, and 
federal levels come from different disciplines with varying perspectives on security. 
Issues can be politically charged (Armstrong, Sibley, & Samara, 2003). 
Accountability for the federal dollars spent on technology support for education is 
increasing without a clear definition ofthe expected role of technology in education (ED, 
2001). Studies of the learning process, such as those conducted by the Archimedes 
Project at Stanford University's Center for the Study of Language and Information, 
confinn the promise of technology to facilitate access to infonnation, but indicate that 
access does not necessarily correlate to a better learning environment (Scott, 2001). 
34 
Teachers have been slow to adopt technology to enhance the educational 
experience, based on a survey of middle-school and high-school students by the Pew 
Internet and American Life Project in 2002 (Sarkar, 2002). Cuban (2001) identified the 
availability oftechnical assistance as a key ingredient for the expanded use of technology 
in the classroom. School administrators have focused on technology to help address 
existing resource constraints to meet administrative and regulatory responsibilities 
without recognizing the need for expanded resources to enhance the adoption of the new 
education medium (NSBF, 2002a). Federal programs and legislation such as the No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of2001 increased the need for monitoring and reporting 
capabilities to meet the growing accountability focus of U.S. federal funding sources 
(ED, 2001). K-12 schools and school districts have responded by assembling online 
reporting facilities containing confidential and sensitive data (EPIC, 2003). 
Controlling access to systems and services is more complicated in an environment 
with a transient population and heavily distributed management (Annstrong et aI., 2003). 
Common practices used in business environments, such as individual access accounts 
with passwords and digital signatures, are more difficult to establish and maintain with a 
constantly changing population of young people (McNabb, Valdez, Nowakowski, & 
Hawkes, 1999). Closely monitored usage is recommended for very young students with 
progressive independence, as they prove able to act responsibly (Marcroft, 1998). The 
primary focus for monitoring online security has been the teacher, as reported by 78% of 
the 811 school administrators in the NSBF-sponsored 2002 survey (NSBF, 2002a). 
Given the wide range of skills exhibited by teachers in the field of technology, the 
potential for inappropriate use of Internet access is high (NETS, 2002). 
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Technology support in the not-for-profit sector is difficult to obtain. Funding 
sources are inconsistent and often nonexistent (Schneider, 1999). The heavy reliance on 
volunteer support becomes an additional issue for school administrators (PTA, 2001). 
Students, teachers, and administrators may need to share network resources for cost-
effective solutions (McNabb et aI., 1999). When the available technical support cannot 
meet their minimum needs, K-12 schools and school districts supplement this support 
with student assistance (NSBF, 2002a). Teachers are urged to expand the use of 
technology with limited support and limited training (LeBaron & Collier, 2001). These 
same teachers are responsible for monitoring the appropriate use of technology by 
students (NSBF). 
The expanded accountability imposed by NCLB regulations has motivated school 
officials in Maryland and Mississippi to seek assistance from industry volunteers such as 
AWS Convergence Technologies, Inc., which established a subsidiary company named 
OnTarget to provide a service that houses K-12 student data and provides reporting 
capabilities that meet NCLB requirements (A WS, 2002). Schools in these states input 
years of detailed student assessment information into databases that reside at corporate 
locations (Morgan, 2000). By using an environment for assembling and reporting 
sensitive data with which they have only a limited formal relationship, school officials 
risk alternative uses ofthat content without their knowledge (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
While many information protection strategies are available for addressing a wide 
range of specific Internet security issues, typically those strategies involve large financial 
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commitments, and the implementers are trained security professionals familiar with the 
intricacies of Internet communication (Parker, 1998). A low-cost methodology for 
information owners untrained in the details of information security to use to identify and 
address their own security risk is a recent development (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Released in September 2001, the OCTAVE Methodology is one of the first 
methodologies available for general use that can be tailored and self-directed by an 
organization without additional cost for training and support (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001c). 
Through the expanded application of the OCTAVE Methodology in its first year, the 
value of creating versions of the methodology unique to specific domains based on 
differences in organizational structure, regulatory climate, and risk exposure was 
confirmed (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Security practices within the OCTAVE 
Methodology are too general for domains with unique regulatory requirements (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 2001c). 
Recognition of Internet security as a requirement within the K-12 school 
environment is relatively recent (CoSN, 2002). The primary focus at the national level is 
on accountability for the $200 billion of federal money that was spent on technology for 
education since the passage ofthe Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 
1965. The NCLB Act of2001 is an extension ofthe ESEA with enforced accountability 
tied to standard test results (ED, 2001). The total cost of ownership is a major initiative 
ofthe U.S. Department of Education (ED) in understanding the full cost of technology 
including support, connectivity, replacement, disposal, retrofitting, and training (CoSN). 
Security is not included as a specific attribute in that program. Federal funding for 
security implementations is available at post-secondary institutions but not at K-12 
schools and school districts at this time (Keith Krueger, personal communication, 
February 20, 2003). 
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
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This researcher has not attempted to address the value of technology in education. 
Many forms of technology have been applied to education over the years, and their 
success or failure must be based on the met or unmet needs of each school (Scott, 2001). 
The vision of how technology can be applied and the goals for using technology within 
the environment of student learning must already be established before an information 
security evaluation methodology can be used (ED, 2000a). This researcher has not 
addressed the definition of measurements for evaluating the penetration of technology 
into classroom use. Metrics such as classroom hours in the computer lab or assignments 
with computer-usage components were identified by Chambers, Lieberman, Parrish, 
Kaleba, Campen, and Stullich (2000) in a report commissioned by the U.S. Department 
of Education (ED), but the utility of such metrics has yet to be confirmed. 
An appropriate Internet environment must support the learning goals and 
objectives defined by educators and not attempt to delineate a solution for educational 
problems with technology (Holmes, 1999). A general migration of education away from 
a teacher-centric focus to a student-centric one places a greater burden on K -12 schools 
and school districts for individualization (Hanson, 2001). Technology is identified as a 
low-cost way to meet this need, but the value of this transition is as yet unconfirmed 
(Norris, Solloway, & Sullivan, 2002). Researchers such as Healey (1998) identified 
problems caused by exposing children below a specified skill level to technology too 
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soon in their learning process. The concern that classroom time is consumed by devices 
when it should be focused on human interactions was not addressed by this research 
(Sabelli,2001). Each school must establish the use oftechnologywithin the curricula 
selected for its students. A school's security issues must be considered subordinate to its 
learning goals. As such, the applicability of the technology must be determined before 
appropriate security controls can be defined (Healy). 
The methodology used in this study addresses the planning aspects of information 
security and not the details of security monitoring and intrusion detection within an 
individual environment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The OCTAVE Methodology 
provides a process for developing information security plans to protect critical 
information assets within a K-12 school or school district. Approaches to include 
evaluation results within a continuous planning cycle, as well as acquisition strategies for 
new technology, are suggested but not specifically incorporated within the OCTAVE 
Methodology (Alberts & Dorofee). 
This researcher has not addressed a means of evaluating specific Internet content 
for value and accuracy. Internet connectivity offers access to valuable information as 
well as misinformation that is deliberately or accidentally misleading (polly, 2001). 
Defining the line between appropriate controls and over-control must be handled by each 
individual K-12 school or school district. Within a range of behaviors, each K-12 school 
and school district establishes a level that is appropriate for the students, administration, 
teachers, parents, and others who are granted access to the local infrastructure based on 
local controls (CoSN, 2002). 
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Technology provides a means of establishing the standardized enforcement of 
selected security controls that apply equally to all participants. The OCTAVE 
Methodology provides a structured process for the identification of security risk to guide 
the selection of appropriate technology controls (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). This process 
has neither defined the value of selected controls, nor identified a preference for 
centralized versus distributed control. Each K-12 school and school district must 
establish the level and manner of control appropriate to its needs before using the security 
risk methodology to identify inconsistencies that could allow the selected level of control 
to be subverted (Quittner, 2001). 
This researcher has not tried to compare the value of different security risk 
assessment methodologies for K-12 schools and school districts. Rather, this researcher 
employs a methodology that is widely used, available at no cost, and capable of 
incorporating the context-sensitive issues unique to a domain such as K-12 schools and 
school districts. In addition, the methodology selected for this research is specifically 
identified not to promote or reject specific technology standards, equipment, or 
connections since K-12 schools and school districts use a wide range of devices and 
connectivity solutions (Cattagni & Westat, 2001). Prior to defining information risk, 
each entity must define the hardware and software environment that best fits its needs 
within the regulatory and financial limitations imposed on it both internally and 
externally (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Definitions 
Asset - Something of value to the entity such as information, systems, services, and 
people. An asset is considered critical if its inappropriate disclosure or 
modification, unavailability, or destruction would prevent the K-12 school or 
school district from fulfilling its mission (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Availability - The period of time or frequency that an asset is present or usable (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 2002). 
Best Practices - Security practices identified by security experts as effective in 
addressing Internet security risk (Parker, 1998). 
Confidentiality - The need to keep information that is private, sensitive, personal, and 
proprietary inaccessible to unauthorized users (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
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Evaluation Criteria - A measurement of risk to the K-12 school or school district as 
expressed through a set of negative occurrences that could happen and the 
qualitative degree (high, medium, or low) to which an occurrence will impact the 
mission and continued existence of the entity (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Exploit - The use of technology to violate security policies established to protect critical 
information assets (Peltier, 2001). 
Filtering Module - Software or hardware that prevents access to certain Internet sites or 
Web content based on assigned criteria (EPIC, 1999a). 
Generic Threat Profile - Based on SEI experience with threat analys.is, a general set of 
threat profiles developed to apply to a wide range of organizations. These profiles 
group threats into four categories: (1) human actors using network access; (2) 
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human actors using physical access; (3) system problems; and (4) other problems 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Information Assurance - Protection of the data available within a networked environment 
to provide a specified level of availability, integrity, confidentiality, and 
authenticity (McKnight, 2002). 
Integrity - Validity and wholeness of an information asset (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
OCTAVE Approach - A framework that incorporates aspects of organizational 
management, risk management, and information security risk evaluation for 
application to security risk management (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ia). 
OCTAVE Catalog of Practices - Good general security practices for strategic and 
operational security areas drawn from the analysis of security problems reported 
to the CERT/CC, the SEI's experience in security risk evaluations, and security 
practice standards from the British Standards Institute (BSI) and NIST (Alberts & 
Dorofee, 2002). 
OCTAVE Criteria - Key concepts referred to as principles, characteristics ofthe key 
concepts referred to as attributes, and defined results referred to as outputs that 
define the requirements for a methodology that supports the paradigm for security 
risk management defined in the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
OCT A VE Methodology - A three-phase process that is based on the OCTA VE Approach 
and used to apply risk management to information security through the 
identification and analysis of information assets, threats, and vulnerabilities 
within organizational and technological infrastructures. The OCTAVE 
Methodology supports the development of plans for improving the security of 
identified assets based on good security practices (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ic). 
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Rating System - Criteria used by a vendor to assign Internet sites to categories for access 
blocking through the use ofa filtering module (EPIC, 1999a). 
Risk - A threat with an associated impact. Risk involves a triggering event that may be 
initiated by a human, technology, or natural causes. That event will impact an 
information asset, but whether or not the event will occur is unknown (Alberts & 
Dorofee, 2002). The severity of each risk varies for each organization based on 
its selected risk evaluation criteria (Peltier, 2001). 
Security Practices - Actions initiated by an organization that help implement and 
maintain security (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Security Requirements - Qualities of an asset (e.g., confidentiality, availability, and 
integrity) that are important for the organization to protect. Failure of a security 
requirement results in a security compromise outcome (disclosure, modification, 
loss/destruction, or interruption) (Parker, 1998). 
Technology Vulnerability - Weakness in the infrastructure that allows an asset to be 
compromised. Technology vulnerabilities are introduced through the application 
design, implementation, and configuration of the network infrastructure (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 2002). 
Threat - The potential for an occurrence of an undesirable event that would compromise 
the security requirements for an asset (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
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Threat Profile - A visual depiction of the sources of a threat to an infolTIlation asset 
composed of an access means (network access, physical access, system problems, 
or other problems); an optional actor (insider or outsider); an optional motive 
(accidental or deliberate); and a security compromise outcome (disclosure, 
modification, loss/destruction, or interruption) (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Vulnerability Assessment - An evaluation of a network infrastructure and/or selected 
components such as servers, desktop computers, firewalls, and routers. A 
vulnerability assessment employs software tools written to identify known 
security problems based on missing software patches; default configuration 
options; and other design, configuration, and implementation errors that allow 
intruders to compromise the device or infrastructure (Peltier, 2001). 
Summary 
The expanded use ofInternet connectivity in K-12 schools and school districts 
provides access to a vast array of content and enhances communication capabilities that 
may improve teaching and administration (PTA, 2001). Extensive resources through 
programs such as E-rate were applied to connect schools with the Internet (ED, 2001). 
Content filtering is mandated for Internet connectivity supported by E-rate funds (ED), 
but the value of filtering remains controversial (Hunter, 1999). Court challenges have 
been successful in removing requirements imposed by the Communication Decency Act 
(CDA) and the Child Online Protection Act (COP A), and a similar fate is expected for 
those imposed by the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIP A) in 2004 by the Supreme 
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Court (Pruitt, 2003). Extensive resources were applied to insert Internet connectivity into 
the K-12 school environment. However, issues related to the security ofK-12 Web 
connections, network resources, and safeguarding users from access to materials deemed 
inappropriate did not receive an equivalent level of attention (NSBF, 2002a). 
Teachers with limited technical training and limited technical support are required 
to address a wide range of technical needs for the K-12 schools and school districts 
(NSBF,2002a). Students with access to technology outside of the classroom both 
challenge and assist the capability of teachers, and gain broad access to school 
technology resources that may not be sufficiently supervised (Schwartau, 2001). 
Efforts by K-12 schools and school districts to address the accountability 
requirements of student performance imposed by the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act 
of 200 1 through the construction of data repositories have expanded the volume of 
personal student information available via the Web (A WS, 2002). The protection 
mechanisms applied to this sensitive information appear insufficient (Allen, 2001). 
Risks to information assets from Internet access have multiplied, options for 
attacking Web-based information assets have expanded, and the technical expertise 
needed to inflict great damage using Internet connectivity has rapidly decreased 
(Schneier, 2000). Each K-12 school and school district has a unique set of technology 
requirements, participants, and infrastructure that define potential security threats within 
its environment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Also, each K-12 school and school district 
has a different level of risk tolerance based on the potential impacts a realized threat 
would deliver. Identifying the threats, risks, unacceptable impacts, and ways of 
effectively applying protection is best accomplished through information security risk 
management (Peltier, 2001). 
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The OCTAVE Methodology, a three-phase approach to information security risk 
management, has been applied successfully in over 1,000 medical, government, financial, 
and manufacturing organizations throughout the world (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The 
OCTAVE Methodology provides a suitable framework for addressing security risk in K-
12 schools and school districts. This methodology is a self-directed process that 
incorporates good general security practices with tailoring mechanisms for addressing 
unique security needs (Alberts & Dorofee). This researcher identified the unique security 
practices and issues appropriate to K-12 schools and school districts. Those unique needs 
were applied to the OCTAVE Methodology to develop a tailored security risk 
methodology. The Scarsdale Public School District used that methodology to address its 
security risk management needs. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
Historical Overview of the Research Literature 
Three streams of research converge to establish the basis for using security risk 
management for the protection of Internet connectivity in K-12 schools and school 
districts. One stream centers on research into the actual uses of technology within K -12 
schools and school districts, and the perceived value of infusing technology into 
education. The identification and response to perceived problems arising from the use of 
the Internet by K -12 students form a second stream. This second stream is interlinked to 
the growth of access to pornography, gambling, and other adult-only content, as well as 
ready access to undesirable elements that prey on the unsuspecting via the World Wide 
Web. The third stream is built on research stemming from the recognition by medical, 
financial, and government organizations of the need for information security risk 
management to balance the expanding reliance on Internet connectivity with the growing 
risks connectivity introduces. Each stream has a wealth of research literature that, when 
blended together, establishes a critical need for security risk management within K-12 
schools and school districts. 
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Use of Technology in Schools 
The establishment of the E-rate provided a major funding source for inserting 
technology into the K-12 classroom (ED, 2000b). Preliminary surveys commissioned 
through the U.S. Department of Education (ED) identified this infusion as a success 
based on the growth ofIntemet access in the K-12 classroom from 1994 to 2000 
(Cattagni & Westat, 2001). A large portion ofE-rate funding was targeted to support K-
12 schools and school districts in less financially capable regions, and to address the 
perceived digital divide assumed to exist between the affluent and poor geographic 
regions (ED, 2000b). An ED study released in 2000 indicated that the geographic areas 
evaluated with the highest level of poverty had the lowest percentage of application 
requests for available E-rate funding. 
Measuring Technology Value 
The Web-Based Education Commission (WBEC), in a report to the U.S. President 
and the U.S. Congress in December 2000, predicted that computer usage would have a 
direct and positive impact on student learning, and underscored the need for expanded 
teacher technology training and research in the application oflearning tools in K-12 
schools and school districts (WBEC). Another study performed by Norris, Soloway, and 
Sullivan (2002) considered the impact of technology over the last 25 years on a range of 
possible effects on student performance, including higher test scores and increased 
student motivation. Study results indicate a negligible impact so far, and the authors 
claim that the potential impact will not be realized until technology is as readily available 
to the student as the textbook (Norris et al.). On average, nine children share each 
computer in K-12 schools in the U.S. (NSBF, 2002a). 
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Research reported by Armstrong and Casement (2000) identified two assumptions 
that form the basis for emphasizing technology in K-12 schools and school districts. The 
first is that computer technology makes education more productive, relevant, and 
interesting for all students. Based on that assumption, the installation of any technology 
facilitates student learning (Armstrong & Casement). The second assumption is that if 
children are to fully participate in a society that is increasingly dependent on technology, 
schools must teach them about that technology. LeBaron and Collier (2001) assembled a 
set of success stories on the benefits of infusing technology into the classroom. Since 
most ofthe examples they cite occurred in 2000 and 2001, it is too soon to evaluate the 
long-range impact of technology availability and use on student learning. Kallick and 
Wilson (2001) attempted to define a way to measure the value oftechnology within the 
K-12 classroom by identifying changes within the school environment. Those changes 
included planning approaches for technology use and specific assignments that use 
multimedia capable of providing added value to the learning process. However, the 
success of that attempt is unconfirmed except by individual comments from teachers and 
students. 
A study by Cuban (2001) involved an in-depth review of technology usage in 
three California K-12 schools. The results were evaluated based on the characteristics of 
the student and teaching populations of each school. Cuban sought to identify a 
correlation between economic levels and years of experience, or some other indicator of 
teacher motivation in support of technology adoption. According to Cuban, the primary 
indicators that motivated technology adoption were administrative support provided in 
the form of recognition, the allocation of additional time for teacher skill building, and 
the availability of skilled technical resources for problem resolution. 
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The U.S. Department of Education (ED) identified a greater availability of 
technology in schools, the effective usage of technology by teachers in the classroom, 
and student's increased technology literacy as emerging priorities in 1996 at the Forum 
on the Future of Technology in Education (ED, 1997). The International Society for 
Technology in Education (ISTE) established qualitative standards of excellence for K-12 
schools and school districts. Based on those standards, the ISTE defined strategic goals 
for the effective use of technology by administrators, teachers, and students in the 
National Education Technology Standards for School Administrators (NETS-A), 
National Education Technology Standards for School Teachers (NETS-T), and National 
Education Technology Standards for School Students (NETS-S) (ISTE, 2002). The 
Consortium for Technology Standards for School Administrators (TSSA) has contributed 
strategic planning approaches to technology with an emphasis on the added value 
technology brings to administration (TSSA, 2001). 
The ISTE and TSSA emphasize the quality and benefits of technology. However, 
few metrics exist with which to compare the value of the technology-enhanced classroom 
approach to the traditional classroom approach. Norris, Soloway, and Sullivan (2002), 
using brief survey questionnaires administered to 10,000 teachers over a range of five 
years, compared the application of technology in the classroom to state and district 
achievement test results for the students exposed to the technology. No significant 
impact from technology use has been achieved so far (Norris et al.). Technology infusion 
into the classroom has been attempted in the past with television broadcasts, cable 
50 
programming, and video projection. According to LeBaron and Collier (2001), much of 
this equipment remains unused with no impact on classroom learning. Without clear 
value, teachers will likely view the process associated with deploying technology and 
transiting from one media to another for curriculum delivery in the classroom as time-
consuming and costly and therefore resist it (LeBaron & Collier). 
Fisher (2000) suggests that a technology tools that provides content manipulation 
and deconstruction (such as zooming, stop-action, repositioning, and moving images) 
adds value to the teaching capabilities because it allows each student to manipUlate 
curriculum content for individual learning. Potentially, each child will have a preferred 
media for learning just as individuals have a preferred communication style (Armstrong 
& Casement, 2000). Kallick and Wilson (2001) do not think that specific technology 
characteristics have intrinsic educational value because the tools for content manipulation 
and deconstruction are changing too quickly to be analyzed effectively. According to 
Kallick and Wilson, the successful adoption of technology in the classroom depends on 
individual teacher acceptance within the existing course content and budget planning 
mechanisms. Further decomposition of the technology's potential uses does not increase 
its educational value (Kallick and Wilson). 
Legislative Mandates 
K-12 schools and school districts must adhere to the regulations issued by local, 
state, and federal agencies to assure accountability and standardization in educational 
practices. The range of regulations that apply to each K-12 school and school district can 
differ based on the types of additional services provided to the students (such as health 
care and psychological counseling) and the level of access to course materials granted to 
students and teachers (Salomon, Cassat, & Thibeau, 2003). Regulations that apply to 
most K-12 schools and school districts are described in the remainder of this section. 
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The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of2001 establishes measurements for the 
accountability of the local and state decision-making processes in providing assistance to 
disabled and under-served children, including the homeless and those who live in the 
inner city. Local and state officials must assure that all K-12 schools meet or exceed 
statewide proficiency goals (ED, 2001). Children served in unsafe or poorly performing 
schools can transfer to another school with the help of federal funds. A school losing a 
significant portion of its student body through this transfer mechanism will close (ED). 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERP A) mandated protection 
for the privacy of student's educational records (ED, 2002a). Parents have the right to 
inspect their children's school records and request corrections, and children who turn 18 
can inspect and correct their own records. Written permission is required from the parent 
or child over 18 to release student school information to parties not specifically 
exempted. Exempted requests would originate from school officials with legitimate 
educational requirements, another school to which the student is transferring, financial 
aid providers, and emergency health care providers (ED). Directory information 
consisting of student's name, address, telephone number, date and place of birth, honors, 
awards, and dates of attendance may be released without consent, but the parent or child 
over 18 must be notified in advance and provided with an option to be removed from the 
directory (ED). Advertisers and other mass-mailing organizations request directory 
information from educational institutions under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
for use in targeted solicitations (Saloman, Casset, & Thibeau, 2003). 
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The Electronic Privacy Infonnation Center (EPIC) (http://www.epic.org) 
presented arguments to the U.S. Supreme Court in January 2003 through a brief filed in a 
FOIA case (BATR v. City of Chicago). The EPIC claims that technology can allow 
broad, open access and public oversight to government infonnation if that technology is 
applied appropriately to protect private data. The EPIC is joined by 16 legal scholars and 
technical experts in advocating the use of technology to encode personal data instead of 
removing it before responding to FOIA requests. If the Court agrees, infonnation 
providers will no longer be responsible for limiting access to private data, but will be 
required to apply the data-encoding technology needed to restrict access (Pruitt, 2003). 
K-12 schools and school districts that collect personal student data need to evaluate the 
mechanisms currently in place to meet FERP A regulations and consider how those 
mechanisms may be impacted by future changes in regulations (pruitt). 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIP AA) of 1996 was 
enacted to protect the privacy of patient's medical data. K-12 schools and school districts 
that participate in the health care of students and teachers may be obligated to comply 
with the specific mandates of the privacy and security regulations within the HIP AA 
issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) (Salomon et aI., 
2003). Entities subject to HIP AA regulations were required to provide written notice of 
electronic infonnation practices to all participants by April 14, 2003. To assure 
compliance, these practices must include manual or technology-based mechanisms that 
monitor and confinn the protection of health infonnation within the entity (Salomon et 
al.). 
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California voters approved regulations that apply to all entities collecting personal 
information about California residents. Those regulations mandate individual notification 
when personal information is sUbjected to inappropriate disclosure. Other states are 
expected to follow this lead (Salomon et aI., 2003). An education reporter in Palo Alto, 
California was able to access student's grades, phone numbers, addresses, medical 
information, psychological evaluations, and photographs using the Palo Alto Unified 
School District's insecure wireless network (Metz, 2003). This problem was later 
addressed by the district superintendent, but not before there was adverse publicity and 
threats oflegal action from parents who had not been notified of the disclosure (Metz). 
K-12 schools and school districts that work closely with colleges and universities 
are impacted by the Technology Education and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act 
of2001 (Salomon et aI., 2003). This law relaxed certain copyright restrictions to provide 
a broader use of materials within the framework of technology-mediated educational 
settings. Unauthorized retransmission is strictly prohibited, and technology controls for 
authentication and access protection are required (Salomon et al.). 
There is a growing reliance on technology to enforce federal school regulations. 
Without effective management, limitations in the technology expertise in K-12 schools 
and school districts will increase the risk of regulatory noncompliance (Salomon et aI., 
2003). 
Protection for Children Using the Internet 
Early studies by Stein (1999) pointed out that increased computer usage by 
children ofK-12 school age reduced the number of hours children spent in front ofthe 
television. Parental concern for children's use of the Internet to access inappropriate 
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content was accelerated by warning reports issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) (1998) and federal committees such as the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation (GAO, 1998). The visibility and profitability of the 
pornography industry rely on the strong communication capability of the Internet based 
on documentation by Lane III (2000). Regulations such as the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA) of 1996 and the Child Online Protection Act (COP A) of 1999 were passed to 
mandate the behaviors of Web site providers for handling content inappropriate for 
children. The constitutionality of the mandates was successfully challenged in the courts 
as violations of the First Amendment by censorship opponents such as the EPIC and 
ALA (Biskupic, 1999). The U.S. Congress shifted the regulatory effort to the K-12 
schools and school districts by linking Internet access supported through E-rate funds 
with a filtering mandate to protect each child from accessing unsuitable materials on the 
Internet (ED, 2000b). As a result, each K-12 school and school district that implemented 
connectivity funded by the Child Internet Protection Act (CIP A) through the E-rate 
program was required to implement content filtering before July 2002 (ED). 
A study by Neumann and Weinstein (1999) pointed out that every parent has a 
unique definition of what is harmful to a minor based on individual beliefs and no single 
definition can be successfully applied by a central authority. Content filtering should 
allow for parental involvement in the guidance role, but no regulation currently supports 
this recommendation. There is no clear agreement on what is harmful to minors 
(Neumann & Weinstein). 
Filtering opponents such as the EPIC launched a series of studies identifying the 
major faults of available filtering products (EPIC, 1999a). The National Coalition 
Against Censorship (NCAC) published a public policy report by Heins and Cho (2001) 
analyzing available content-blocking products, and all were identified as performing 
inappropriately depending on the selected test sites. On May 31, 2002, a three-judge 
panel in Philadelphia ruled that the CIP A was in violation of the First Amendment. An 
appeal was granted for U.S. Supreme Court review, but the response of the Court is 
unknown at this time (EPIC, 2002). 
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The extensive increase in unwanted e-mail generally containing references to 
pornography, illicit pharmaceuticals, physical-enhancement procedures, sweepstakes, and 
other topics inappropriate for children is regarded as a major problem by Symantec 
Corporation, an Internet security provider (Symantec, 2003). Symantec funded a survey 
conducted by Applied Research to identify children's responses to inappropriate e-mail 
content. In this survey, 1,000 children between the ages of seven and 18 were 
interviewed to determine the extent to which they are subjected to unsolicited e-mail and 
their response to those intrusions (Symantec). Over 80% of the children using e-mail 
reported receiving inappropriate content daily, and 46% responded that they gave their 
personal e-mail addresses to unfamiliar Web sites or strangers without their parents' 
consent (Symantec). When the child is under 13 years of age, both acts are in violation 
of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). K-12 schools and school 
districts must consider the accountability issues for inappropriate actions by Web sites 
when school-provided connectivity is used as the access mechanism (Anthony & Cohn, 
2000). 
A study by Verton (2002) identified children with advanced technical skills as a 
growing risk to other Internet users. Much of the available research is anecdotal and 
obtained through interviews with convicted juvenile hackers. However, technical 
analysts at the SEI have confirmed the ready availability of technical tools that can be 
used for broad Internet attacks with limited technical skill (Pethia, 2003). The growing 
technical capability of children with unsupervised access to technology presents an 
increasing potential to create Web-based problems (Carpenter, 2001). 
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One incident at the Newark Junior High School in New Jersey involved a seventh 
grader who hacked into the school system and deleted grade files for ten of the 55 
teachers, resulting in a two-day delay in home progress reports (Kuznia, 2003). The 
impacted teachers blamed the lax technical security on recent budget cuts in technology 
support (Kuznia). In a separate incident, a junior at the Marion High School near 
Rochester, New York deleted all the password-protected student folders where class 
projects were stored (Legon, 2003). The student in New Jersey was expelled, and the 
student in New York was arraigned on felony charges. In yet another incident, a student 
at Richard Middle School in Richland Hills, Texas sent an e-mail to every computer in 
the school using an obscure system utility. Teachers determined that use ofthat utility 
constituted unacceptable use even though no acceptable use policy (AUP) was in place 
and the student was suspended for three days (Lieber 2004). 
Security Risk Management and the OCTAVE Approach 
The transition from stand-alone computers to networked environments increased 
the importance of protecting the information accessible through the Internet (Lange et aI., 
2000). Scambray, McClure, and Kurtz (2001) provide a comprehensive reference to 
techniques and mechanics used to create Web-based security problems. Most of the 
attacks are software specific and tied to selected operating systems, browsers, computer 
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software development languages, and communication enablers such as e-mail and chat 
software (Allen, 2001). Protection requires an in-depth assessment and adjustment of 
purchased systems to remove security weaknesses that are often provided by a vendor to 
allow for ease of installation instead of secure functioning (Allen). Extensive technical 
knowledge of the specific hardware and software tools used in the construction and 
support of each network component is required to establish a secure infrastructure 
(Allen). Detailed steps, also called security practices, are provided by organizations such 
as CERT/CC and Mitre Corporation that research illternet vulnerabilities to help the 
installer minimize the likelihood and impact of technical attacks (Wadlow, 2000). 
Standards for information technology security practices, such as ISO 17799, are 
published by the International Standards Organization (ISO). 
ill addition to techniques for the secure installation of selected hardware and 
software, specific protection tools are available that focus exclusively on network 
security. Encryption techniques, firewalls, and intrusion-detection tools address a range 
of technical protection requirements such as the confidentiality of information during 
transmission, the rejection oftransmitted information that matches known vulnerability 
patterns, and the identification of potentially inappropriate network access (Stallings, 
2000). Each added security function requires special technical skills as well as additional 
financial resources to evaluate and implement it. Organizations with finite resources for 
technology, such as educational institutions, are faced with a difficult choice between 
added functional capabilities and security protection (Updegrove & Long, 2001). 
Defining appropriate protection requires the identification of potential risks to 
information assets in the infrastructure and the ensuing impact should the risk be realized 
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(Peltier, 200 I). Many security risks, such as password management and policy 
enforcement, materialize through the organizational use of network capabilities and are 
outside of the direct control of the technicians (parker, 1998). Educational institutions 
that do not regard technology as part ofthe primary organizational mission may not have 
a standard mechanism for addressing organizational security issues (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2002). An information gap exists between the technical staffwho react to the 
infrastructure security problems and organizational managers who focus on the 
expanding information needs of the organization (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 
2001). Organizational managers are slow to realize their responsibility for provisioning 
information security due in part to a lack of recognition of the reliance level the 
organization has on technology (Lipson & Fisher, 1999). 
The gap between the organizational perspective and the technological perspective 
of security was recognized by researchers within the continuous risk management 
program at the SEI (Alberts et aI., 2000). A need existed for a proactive organizational 
approach to defining and addressing security risk by blending the perspectives of multiple 
levels ofthe organization. That need was met through the design of a security risk 
management framework that relied on a cross-functional team to identify, analyze, plan, 
track, and control risks within acceptable levels (Alberts et al.). The experience and 
techniques from SEI research in project risk management were applied to security risk, 
leading to the development of the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE) Methodology. That methodology addressed the identification, 
analysis, and planning needs for security risk management (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
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SEI researchers Christopher Alberts and Audrey Dorofee developed the 
OCTAVE Methodology and produced a technical report (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a) that 
summarized the aspects of organizational management, risk management, and 
information security risk evaluation that were incorporated into the OCTAVE Approach 
design framework. The OCTAVE Methodology is a security risk management 
methodology designed using the OCTAVE Approach and tailored specifically for large 
medical and government organizations (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Other tailored 
security risk management methodologies can be constructed using the OCTAVE 
Approach as long as the tailoring guidelines, referred to as the OCTAVE Criteria, are 
applied (Alberts & Dorofee). 
OCTAVE Methodology activities are focused on the planning portion of the risk 
mitigation effort to establish a communication mechanism across the organization and to 
formalize a means for recognizing and addressing security risk (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2002). Once the plan is defined using the OCTAVE Methodology, the organization will 
need to implement, monitor, and control the specific elements within the plan, and 
subsequently adjust the plan based on its effectiveness (Alberts & Dorofee). These 
additional requirements are not part of the methodology, but are necessary for the 
organization to benefit from the planning effort. Figure 1 provides a diagram of the 
sequence of steps needed to implement security risk management within an organization, 
highlighting those addressed through the application of the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts 
& Dorofee). 
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In applying the OCTAVE Methodology, or another tailored version of the 
OCT AVE Approach, an organization addresses the Identify and Analyze steps, and 
initiates the Plan step of security risk management. 
.. Identify - Capture organizational information assets and related security 
requirements, capture organizational and technological threats to information 
assets, and compare current organizational protection strategies to best practices. 
.. Analyze - Define organizational impact criteria, evaluate risks to information 
assets, and prioritize risks based on the level of their impact on the organization. 
.. Plan - Develop risk mitigation plans to protect critical information assets, action 
plans to address critical weaknesses in the technology infrastructure, and a 
protection strategy to address broad organizational risks. 
Information Security 
Risk Evaluation 
, 
Figure 1: Role of the OCTAVE Methodology in Security Risk Management 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002) 
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After completion ofthe OCTAVE Methodology activities, the organization must 
complete the Plan step and apply the mitigation plans and protection strategy throughout 
the remaining security risk management steps. 
• Plan - Develop detailed plans for the projects, resources, and actions required for 
implementation. 
• Implement - Execute action plans, mitigation plans, and a protection strategy. 
• Monitor - Implement vulnerability management and other means for acquiring 
data about the status of the infrastructure, and evaluate the effectiveness of plans 
through audits and other measurement options. 
• Control- Identify changes in the infrastructure and risk areas that require further 
analysis. Adjust plans based on those identified changes. 
The first version of the OCTAVE Methodology was released for public purchase 
in September 2001 (http://www.cert.orgloctave). It was applied first in medical facilities 
to address the risk assessment required by HIP AA security and privacy regulations 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Since September 2001, over 1,000 organizations have used 
the methodology, including financial institutions, universities, manufacturing companies, 
and government agencies throughout the world. 
OCTAVE and Other Security Risk Methodologies 
The Facilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP) is considered the most widely used 
security risk methodology (Peltier, 2003). The FRAP uses an analysis approach similar 
to the OCTAVE Methodology but does not provide steps for organizational information-
gathering activities. Moreover, applying this methodology requires the purchase of 
specialized materials and the use of a trained and licensed FRAP facilitator (Peltier, 
2001). 
Vulnerability analysis was proposed by Parker (1998) to address security risk 
within the technology infrastructure of the organization. This approach does not fit 
within organizations with few controls in place, since the evaluation critiques how well 
existing controls are applied (Peltier, 2001). Also, vulnerability analysis only addresses 
the technology components ofthe infrastructure, thereby omitting the organizational 
security issues (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
The Computer Security Institute (CSI) provides an Information Protection 
Assessment Kit (IP AK) that consists of a questionnaire developed by industry security 
experts. The IP AK is self-administered and can be purchased through the CSI, but it 
cannot be tailored (Peltier, 2001). 
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The use of security risk management is widely recommended by the audit 
community, and audit methodologies have been expanded to include appropriate 
practices for IT management (Lanz, 2002). The Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA) sponsors a framework called Control Objects for Information 
Technology (COBIT) that includes security risk management as an element in the audit 
review. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICP A) also developed 
an information assurance methodology called SysTrust that includes information security 
risk analysis (Lanz). 
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Research Literature Specific to the Topic 
K-12 schools and school districts have expanded the use of technology in data 
gathering and reporting to improve the administrative efficiency of public education 
(Armstrong, Sibley, & Samara, 2003). This trend is driven by regulatory pressures for 
increased accountability as established in the NCLB Act and a steady decline of funding 
available for administration in K-12 schools and school districts (Armstrong et al.). The 
information security response in K-12 schools and school districts has focused primarily 
on limiting student and teacher access to Internet content and communication tools such 
as e-mail (Armstrong et al.). A survey of811 school districts funded by the National 
School Boards Foundation (NSBF) cited 91 % implementation of content filtering by 
participant districts (NSBF). The initiative for Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse 
funded through the CoSN provided a list of issues that K-12 schools and school districts 
should consider when selecting a filtering option (CoSN, 2002). Chapin (1999) identified 
the need for acceptable use policies (AUPs) along with appropriate physical and technical 
monitoring to effectively implement content management in K-12 schools and school 
districts. However, only 19% of the respondents in the NSBF survey reported 
implementing an AUP. Auditing AUP adherence was addressed by only 2% ofthe 
surveyed school administrators, and only 2% reported the establishment of a security 
position for monitoring Internet and infrastructure activity (NSBF, 2002a). 
Higher education has been a focus of national security concern for several years 
(EDUCAUSE,2002). Stoll (2000) documented one ofthe initial discoveries of computer 
hacking in his analysis of the infrastructure of a higher education institution to determine 
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the cause for accounting discrepancies in computer usage. Those discrepancies resulted 
from unexpected levels of activity on dormant computer accounts. By establishing 
additional dormant accounts seeded with access to fictitious research data and monitoring 
the network activity on these new accounts, Stoll determined that passwords were 
systematically guessed to gain access to the system. Once an account was compromised, 
the account privilege level was elevated providing access to system functions, and 
operating system capabilities were modified to establish administrative access that 
provided full computer control to the intruder (Stoll). His research led to institutional 
changes in account management and acceptable password requirements to reduce 
opportunities for unauthorized access (Stoll). 
University of Delaware administrators Mackenzie and Goldman (2000) described 
infrastructure-based security problems at this institution that included harassment, illegal 
hacking, copyright violations, and illegal commercial activity. These problems were 
subsequently addressed through strengthened security policies and procedures, user 
education, and increased enforcement mechanisms to identify and punish violators 
(Mackenzie & Goldman). 
At the University of Buffalo, Lesniak (2002), the Director of Academic Services, 
listed seven key strategies that are applied by this higher education institution: 
1. Educating staff, faculty, and students to recognize unsafe practices and understand 
security threats; 
2. Deploying technology tools to protect the infrastructure such as anti-virus 
software, intrusion detection tools, and firewalls; 
3. Monitoring Internet security organizations such as SANS and CERT/CC to 
identify good practices and new security problems; 
4. Prompting the application of vendor-supplied patches on critical systems; 
5. Removing unneeded services that are available by default on installed 
components; 
6. Activating and monitoring system logs to identify patterns of abuse; and 
7. Creating a response team of key individuals responsible for identifying and 
repairing security incidents. 
Because the infrastructures ofK-12 schools and school districts are similar to those of 
higher educational technology environments (as identified by Updegrove and Long 
[2001]), each K-12 school and school district should consider applying these same 
strategies. 
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The report issued by the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board 
(CIPB) titled National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (CIPB, 2003) provided national 
visibility to the issues ofInternet security. The strategy was issued to "engage and 
empower Americans to secure the portions of cyberspace that they own, operate, control, 
or with which they interact" (CIPB, p. 8). A comprehensive national program to 
"empower all Americans - businesses, the general workforce, and the general population 
- to secure their own parts of cyberspace" (CIPB, p.13) was identified as a key initiative. 
Higher education was specifically identified as a component of the critical national 
infrastructure (http://www.picb.org). A strategy focused on the needs of higher education 
to approach security management within an educational environment was released by 
EDUCAUSE (2002), an organization for university and college administrators. 
Approximately 100 universities and colleges responded to an online survey 
(http://www.educause.edulsecurity/security-survey.html) that provided input to the 
EDUCAUSE pUblication titled Higher Education Contribution to National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace. 
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The Exploring the Future of Learning (EFL) Spring 2003 Forum recommended 
that "a national K-12 Network Security Initiative be created to provide school leaders 
with vital information on education security networks, data collection, and acceptable 
policies in order to ensure privacy and the security of data within their systems" 
(Armstrong et aI., 2003, p. 20). Because of the technological similarities among K-12 
schools and institutions of higher education, the EDUCAUSE strategy can ensure that the 
K-12 Network Security Initiative considers shared critical issues (Updegrove & Long, 
2001). 
K-12 schools and school districts have not considered the unintended 
consequences that can arise from inappropriate access to the growing repositories of 
detailed student records that are accessible using Internet connectivity (Armstrong et aI., 
2003). According to school administrators participating in a focus group at the EFL 
Spring 2003 Education Forum, K-12 schools and school districts are amassing detailed 
student information beyond the needs of current regulatory requirements such as the 
NCLB Act in anticipation of future needs. However, accountability for controlling 
access to that information is unclear (Armstrong et al.). Also, school administrators are 
not considering the need for limitations on the length of time information is maintained in 
Web-accessible repositories. As a consequence, access to personal information may be 
available through K-12 school and school district sources permanently (Armstrong et aI.). 
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Each K-12 school and school district must define the appropriate role for 
technology within its educational curriculum to make effective and appropriate use of 
technology (Holmes, 1999). The security threats and impacts vary based on the use of 
technology within each K-12 school and school district, but the need to address relevant 
risks is common to every entity with Internet connectivity (Peltier, 2001). Security risks 
are those that represent a potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability to 
information assets within an infrastructure (Parker, 1998). Identifying security risks that 
should be considered by K-12 schools and school districts requires the identification of 
events and related consequences that could result in a non-negligible impact to the entity 
ifthe event occurred (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Alberts & Dorofee structure a security 
risk into three components: (1) a security event, (2) a consequence, and (3) a degree of 
uncertainty. A security event is initiated by a human or natural event that exploits 
organizational or technological vulnerabilities to invoke a consequence. To reduce the 
potential impact on the entity, security practices that reduce the likelihood of a security 
event are applied (Alberts & Dorofee). Each security risk must be linked to one or more 
security practices that an entity can apply to mitigate the potential impact if the security 
event occurs. 
In a detailed evaluation of references included in this literature review, this 
investigator applied the structure described by Alberts & Dorofee (2002) to identify 
security risks relevant to K-12 schools and school districts (see Appendices A and B). 
For each security risk, the components of event and consequence were identified based 
on information in the reference source. In addition, associated security practices that 
would reduce the potential impact of the risk were identified based on the mapping of 
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infonnation from each literature source to the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (Alberts & 
Dorofee). The degree of uncertainty, the third security risk component, is defined within 
the context of an individual K -12 school or school district and is not meaningful in a 
general context (Alberts & Dorofee). 
Texts and journal articles identified in the bibliography for this dissertation were 
reviewed to identify K -12 security events. In addition, this investigator monitored the 
following electronic sources that collect and broadcast security and K-12 domain news 
and reviewed available archive copies for the period beginning January 2002 to identify 
specific source documents for K-12 security events to augment literature sources: 
• Top Ten Tech Issues provided weekly by AIG Online from American 
International Group, Inc. (http://home.aigonline.com), 
• ComputerWorld Daily Update provided daily by ComputerWorld 
(http://www.computerworld.com). 
• SANS News Bites published weekly by The SANS Institute 
(http://www.sans.org/newsletters ), 
• TechLearning News published bimonthly by the CoSN and Technology & 
Learning Magazine (http://www.techLearning.com). 
• Educational Technology News published biannually by the North Central 
Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL) (http://www.ncrel.org/tech/etnews), 
and 
• Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report published daily by the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security Infrastructure Analysis Infrastructure Protection 
(DHS/IAIP) (http://www.nipc.gov/dailyreports/dailyindex.htm). 
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To identify the security risks unique to K-12 schools, the security practices 
assembled by this investigator were compared to a representative set of security practices, 
specifically, the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices, to identify those not widely used 
(Alberts et aI., 2001). The representative set of security practices were developed from 
CERT/CC experience and widely accepted standard security practices provided from 
organizations such as the ISO and NIST. That catalog is referred to as the OCTAVE 
Catalog of Practices because it is used within methodologies that follow the OCTAVE 
Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
Security risks and linked security practices identified by this investigator that are 
not included in the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices are assembled in the table in Appendix 
A. The security practices that are a part of the current OCTAVE Catalog of Practices and 
associated K-12 security risks are assembled in Appendix B. The large number of 
security issues identified as unique to K-12 schools and school districts (see Appendix A) 
provides a strong indication of the need for a security risk methodology with extensive 
tailoring capabilities in addressing K-12 school and school district security management 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Identifying evaluation criteria appropriate to the K-12 school and school district is 
an important part of security risk management. Security threats must have a defined 
impact based on criteria appropriate to the organization before the threats can be 
considered risks to the organization (Peltier, 2001). The OCTAVE Methodology uses a 
set of impact categories derived from research in U.S. Department of Defense medical 
organizations. These categories include reputation, life and health of customers, 
productivity, regulatory fines and legal penalties, and financial loss (Alberts & Dorofee, 
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2002). Regulatory fines and legal penalties, as well as reputation, are potential areas of 
impact important to K-12 schools and school districts (LeBaron & Collier, 2001). Other 
impact categories that establish evaluation criteria appropriate to the K-12 school 
environment are suggested by Norris, Soloway, and Sullivan (2002) in their review of 
technology use in education: 
.. Insufficient access to technology for students and teachers - No specific target 
levels are identified, but a one-to-one relationship is projected as needed. 
.. Teacher preparation and technology support - Training in technology use, 
techniques for incorporating technology into classroom use, and technical support 
of Internet connectivity. 
.. Student achievement results - Changes in student achievement that are traced to 
use of Internet connectivity will impact technology access. 
.. Financial support for school and school district administration - Limitations to 
provisions for funding teacher and student training, and limitations in technical 
support to maintain an appropriate working level of the technology could severely 
impact Internet connectivity. 
.. Community reputation - The reputations of K -12 schools and school districts in 
the community could be impacted by the inappropriate use of technology. 
The Exploring the Future of Leaming (EFL) Spring 2003 Education Forum 
identified student information privacy and educational effectiveness as defined by the 
NCLB Act as key areas of impact on each school (Armstrong et aI., 2003). Failure to 
maintain student information privacy could enable high impacts such as identity loss and 
inappropriate physical access to a child. Failure to meet the effective educational 
71 
standards could lead to increased regulatory monitoring, remedial actions, and possible 
school closings if a sufficient number of students transfer to other schools (Annstrong et 
al.). 
Summary of What Is Known and Unknown About the Topic 
Anthony and Cohn (2002) documented the need for parental control of Internet 
interactions for a child to assure protection of that child's privacy. Armstrong and 
Casement (2000) identified limitations of technology in meeting educational 
requirements for every child. Caregivers and parents are on both sides of this issue. 
Some are exerting efforts toward greater control in the protection of their children by 
prohibiting Internet access in schools and libraries (Bradsher, 2000). Others are pressing 
to expand the use of technology within the classroom as a mandate for effective 
education (Armstrong & Casement). Regulations related to Internet access in K-12 
schools and school districts such as the COP A and CDA have been implemented and 
removed by the courts (Hunter, 2000). The usage requirements for E-rate funding 
defined in the CIP A mandated the implementation of content-blocking capabilities in K-
12 schools and school districts by July 2002 (Heins, 2001). However, these 
requirements, like earlier regulations, have been challenged in the courts and may be 
removed (Pruitt, 2003). 
The reactions of 811 school administrators to technology security issues as 
summarized by the National School Boards Foundation (NSBF) show the focus for 
security protection on content-blocking with less consideration of other security concerns 
such as anti-virus protection, acceptable use policies (AUPs), and auditing (NSBF, 
2002b). To meet reporting requirements for the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 
2001, K-12 schools and school districts continue to expand extensive data repositories 
with sensitive information for use by local, state, and federal officials via the Web (ED, 
2001), thereby expanding opportunities for the inappropriate use of that information. 
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Information gathered by the CERT/CC shows that the number of vulnerability 
incidents doubled each year between 1998 and 2003 (Pethia,2003). Analysis ofthese 
incidents indicates that increased availability of enhanced attack tools contributes to the 
capability of individuals to initiate attacks with broader impact (Carpenter, 2001). 
Available tools are capable of compromising large volumes of Internet-connected sites 
just minutes after a vulnerability is exposed (Carpenter). These tools are disseminated to 
all interested individuals through Internet communication facilities such as bulletin 
boards, chat rooms and listservs (pethia). Responding to each vulnerability incident as it 
is identified is no longer a reasonable approach to security management (pethia). 
A compromise can lead to disclosure and modification, as well as the permanent 
loss of information or temporary loss of access (Parker, 1998). According to Richardson 
(2003), survey results by the San Francisco FBI Computer Intrusion Squad (CIS) 
indicated that 530 computer security practitioners from U.S. corporations, government 
agencies, financial and medical institutions, and universities reported heavy financial 
losses involving Web-initiated intrusions. Currently in its eighth year, the FBI survey 
documents problems that persist each year with growing frequency and expanded impact 
as organizational reliance on technology increases (Richardson). 
The Technology Standards for School Administrators (TSSA) and International 
Society for Technology in Education (ISTE) promote the expanded use of technology 
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within the K-12 school environment for administration, teaching, and learning (TSSA, 
2001). Funding sources such as the U.S. Department of Education (ED) support the 
expansion of technology in K-12 schools and school districts. However, security 
considerations are not included as part of the evaluation results (ED, 2000a). Regardless 
of the reason, incorporating technology into the K-12 classroom introduces security 
issues that must be addressed once connectivity to outside networks is implemented 
(Parker, 1998). Cases of children in the sixth grade using poor security practices to 
illegally adjust grades have been reported (Shah, 2003). Moreover, high-school students 
use tools readily available on the Internet to break into school databases and change 
information (Akizuki, 2003). 
In K-12 schools and school districts, minimum standards of best practice are not 
yet established (Armstrong et aI., 2003). Limitations oftime, money, and technical 
expertise have conspired to promote less than optimal solutions (Cuban, 2001). 
Technology use in the classroom is inconsistent, resulting in a wide variance of security 
risk among K-12 schools and school districts. Students and parents continue to demand a 
greater use of technology in education, increasing the potential for security risk (ISTE, 
2002). Reliance on volunteer assistance and student technical expertise increases the 
need for security risk management (Armstrong et aI.). 
Security risk from Internet-connected sources increases annually (Schneier, 
2000). K-12 schools and school districts can benefit from applying general security 
practices (see Appendix B) but require the ability to tailor a selected security risk 
methodology to meet the needs related to domain-specific issues (see Appendix A). 
Financial and technical resources for technology support available in the K-12 schools 
and school districts are limited with strong indications that greater limitations will be 
forthcoming (NSBF, 2002a). Extensive help from volunteers and student assistants is 
needed to meet current minimal support levels (Cuban, 2001). 
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Many types of security risk methodologies are available for addressing 
information technology risk, but many widely used options involve a purchase fee and 
special training. In addition, many require the inclusion of areas such as auditing, which 
extend beyond the scope of this research effort (Lanz, 2002). To meet the domain-
specific requirement for K-12 schools and school districts, a methodology with extensive 
tailoring capabilities is required. The OCTAVE Methodology fulfills these requirements 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
The Contribution this Study Makes to the Field 
When an information security risk methodology that addresses the unique needs 
of K -12 schools and school districts is applied, improvements in security management are 
possible. Improvements for K-12 schools and school districts can be similar to those 
experienced by U.S. health care organizations, financial institutions, government 
agencies, and manufacturing organizations in which information security risk 
management is already widely adopted (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). K-12 technology 
planners can use the tailored security risk management methodology to articulate 
requirements, identify accompanying security risks, and define good security practices to 
address unacceptable levels of security risk (Alberts & Dorofee). As a result, technology 
planners for K-12 schools and school districts can consider security risk management as 
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part of the technology-related needs oftheir students, teachers, student's parents, and the 
local community. 
This researcher identified the infonnation security requirements for K -12 schools 
and school districts through a broad literature review. These requirements were applied 
to the OCTAVE Methodology using in-place tailoring capabilities. The tailored 
methodology was used at a selected K-12 school district and reviewed by K-12 experts, 
confinning the validity of the identified requirements. A framework for identifying and 
prioritizing infonnation security risk focuses attention and resources on security issues 
with the greatest impact (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). A self-directed infonnation security 
assessment for use by K -12 schools and school districts is of great interest to the 
Consortium for School Networking (CoSN) as identified by Keith Krueger, CoSN 
Executive Director (personal communication, July 31,2003). With a methodology 
tailored to meet their needs, K-12 school administrators can proactively construct and 
evaluate the ability of their networking solutions to facilitate safe and secure access to 
Internet-accessible resources. 
A correlation exists between the security threats identified within higher 
education such as those reported by administrators at the University of Delaware 
(Mackenzie & Goldman, 2000) and those expected in K-12 schools and school districts. 
That correlation indicates that a successful security risk methodology tailored to the 
unique needs ofK-12 schools and school districts would also be of value to technology 
planners in higher education. Higher education is one of the critical sectors for national 
security as identified in the CIPB (2003) National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace report. 
Members ofthe EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Security Task Force plan to review the K-12 Risk 
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Methodology as part ofthe development process for a risk methodology tailored for 
higher education and based on the OCTAVE Approach (Rodney Peterson, Security Task 
Force Project Coordinator, personal communication, October 29,2003). 
K-12 schools and school districts have no regulatory mandate for information 
security and have not addressed security risks (Updegrove & Long, 2001). 
Documentation of the steps taken and issues encountered while identifying security 
requirements and applying a security risk methodology tailored to K -12 schools and 
school districts provides a template for inserting a security risk management process into 
organizational sectors that exhibit limited recognition of security risk (Armstrong et aI., 
2003). 
Research Method Employed 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
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K-12 schools and school districts increasingly support expanded Internet 
connectivity. However, survey results issued by the National School Boards Foundation 
(NSBF, 2002a) indicate a lack of recognition by school administrations ofthe need for 
protecting users and devices connected to the Internet through the K-12 infrastructure. 
Moreover, an understanding ofthe importance of monitoring K-12 Internet connectivity 
to ensure that its use is limited to legitimate functions is also lacking (NSBF). The 
Internet is by design an environment of trust (Schneier, 2000). Security options were 
developed and applied as participation expanded exponentially and the validity of trust 
provided in the original design proved inappropriate (ClPB, 2003). 
Medical organizations must perform periodic technology risk assessments under 
the Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HlP AA) provisions (DHHS, 2003). 
Provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 require financial institutions 
to perform a security risk assessment (Lanz, 2002). The Government Information 
Security Reform Act (GISRA) requires every U.S. government agency to perform a 
security risk assessment to assure the appropriate levels of security protection needed for 
continued technology funding from federal sources (Swanson, 1998). Based on the 
number of regulatory mandates across a wide range of organizational domains, K -12 
schools and school districts should consider the importance of applying a security risk 
assessment (Annstrong et aI., 2003). 
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The lack of clear standards for good security and confusion over appropriate 
security assessment mechanisms motivate organizations to apply risk management in the 
area of information security (Peltier, 2001). Lanz (2002) reported options for security 
risk management that were considered by the American Bankers Association (ABA). 
The framework sponsored by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
(ISACA) and called Control Objects for Information Technology (COBIT) was included. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AlCP A) information assurance 
service called SysTrust was included. Additionally, the OCTAVE Methodology and the 
NIST Self-Assessment 800-26 used by federal agencies to validate federal regulatory 
compliance were included for consideration. 
Lanz (2002) noted that COBIT and SysTrust are broad audit assessments covering 
much more than security. According to Lanz, the OCTAVE Methodology is a 
comprehensive self-directed approach for large organizations using risk considerations to 
first determine which information assets need protection, and then define how protection 
should be applied based on security practices assembled from academia and industry. 
Lanz reported that the NIST Self-Assessment 800-26 is focused primarily on U.S. 
government security regulations. 
In addition to the options identified by the ABA, Peltier (2001) identified the 
Facilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP) as the most widely used security risk 
assessment methodology in business and finance. The OCTAVE Methodology and the 
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NIST Self-Assessment 800-26 are both self-directed and available via the Web at no cost. 
The OCTAVE Methodology can be tailored to fit the unique context of an organization 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2001), but the NIST self-assessment requires strict adherence to the 
specifications established within the methodology (Swanson, 2001). The FRAP is 
applied by security experts who are trained and licensed to deliver the methodology 
(Peltier). An Information Protection Assessment Kit (IP AK) consisting of a series of 
questions developed by security experts can be purchased from the CSI, but no tailoring 
options are available for it (Peltier). 
This researcher used the OCTAVE Methodology for this investigation in applying 
security risk management for Internet connectivity in K-12 schools and school districts. 
The methodology accommodated financial limitations for technology usage in K-12 
schools and school districts (CoSN, 2002). The methodology does not attempt to impose 
those regulatory compliance requirements appropriate for banks or hospitals. K -12 
schools and school districts lack specific security regulations beyond content filtering 
(NSBF,2002a). The methodology supports the unique context of the educational 
environment, which requires a blending of academic and business needs with limited 
technical support expertise (Cuban, 2001). Also, the methodology does not enforce any 
general auditing requirements that exceed the proposed focus of this research effort 
(Lanz, 2001). 
The OCTAVE Methodology takes into account the unique characteristics of each 
individual K -12 school and school district. In addition, this methodology provides a 
comparison of current security procedures to the general best practices assembled from 
the security standards of the BSI, NIST security recommendations, and the CERT/CC 
vulnerability analysis (Alberts et al., 2001). Moreover, the OCTAVE Methodology 
provides a systematic process for guiding a K-12 school or school district in the 
identification of its unique security risks and the development of a plan for addressing 
those risks (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The OCTAVE Methodology has been 
implemented by over 1,000 medical, government, university, financial, and 
manufacturing operations throughout the world (http://www.cert.org/octave). The U.S. 
Department of Defense medical community has selected the OCTAVE Methodology to 
meet its mandated security risk assessment requirement for compliance with Health 
Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIP AA) regulations (DHHS, 2003). The 
OCTAVE Methodology is publicly available as part ofthe SEI program to improve the 
overall state of security risk management in networked environments (Alberts & 
Dorofee). 
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For this study, this investigator tailored the OCTAVE Methodology using options 
provided within the methodology (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Although the methodology 
was constructed for large organizations, tailoring options were available to streamline the 
steps for any size entity (Alberts & Dorofee). The tailored methodology was validated as 
being appropriately based on the OCTAVE Approach through the use of the OCTAVE 
Criteria. The OCTAVE Criteria consist of principles, attributes, and outputs that define 
the required elements of risk management for an effective security risk management 
evaluation using the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). Validation ofthe 
tailored methodology using the OCTAVE Criteria confirmed that tailoring adjustments 
did not impact the value of the security risk assessment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
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The tailored methodology is referenced throughout this dissertation as the K-12 
Risk Methodology. A tailored methodology that continues to carry the OCTAVE name 
requires licensing from Carnegie Mellon. Based on previously identified financial 
resource limitations for technology in K-12 schools and school districts, the added 
licensing cost of using the OCTAVE name was deemed a deterrent by Steve Miller, 
CoSN Executive Board member (personal communication, February 24, 2003). As a 
consequence, the OCTAVE Methodology is referenced as the basis for the K-12 Risk 
Methodology, but the OCTAVE name is removed from all documents within the tailored 
version (http://www . cert.org! octave/licensing.html). 
The OCTAVE Methodology addresses the overall planning aspects for Internet 
security within the K -12 school and school district, and not the details of applying 
security technology within the school environment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The 
OCTAVE Methodology establishes a general process for the initial development of 
information security plans to protect information assets within the organization. 
Approaches for including evaluation results within the continuous planning cycles of an 
organization, as well as acquisition strategies for new technology, are suggested but not 
specifically provisioned within the OCTAVE Methodology (Alberts & Dorofee). 
OCTAVE Methodology Description 
The OCT AVE Methodology is applied through a series of structured workshops 
performed by an analysis team composed of carefully selected individuals who represent 
the range of technology interests and responsibilities across the organization (Alberts & 
Dorofee,2001c). The members of the analysis team must assemble their individual 
knowledge into a shared perspective to define both the current technology security 
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environment and the needs ofthe organization that technology must support. This effort 
can take from three days to two months depending on the level of effort applied by 
analysis team participants (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). OCTAVE Methodology 
workshops are grouped into three phases: (l) Organizational View, (2) Technological 
View (which is optional), and (3) Security Strategy and Planning. 
Phase I: Organizational View 
In the first phase, the analysis team establishes the organizational view through 
the identification of information assets (systems, software, applications, and people) that 
are important to the organization. For each asset, security requirements are identified. 
Moreover, the organizational perspective of how the information is protected and/or 
threatened by the existing environment is ascertained. From the first phase, the analysis 
team selects the most critical information assets, generally three to five, to carry forward 
to the remainder of the process. Assets that represent large adverse effects when their 
security requirements are violated are considered critical assets (Alberts & Dorofee, 
200Ic). For each selected critical asset, threats to confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability are identified and assembled into threat profiles (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ib). 
The activities in Phase I support the assembly of an organizational view of assets, 
threats, vulnerabilities, and current security practices. Assets are identified through a 
series of facilitated workshops with participants from several organizational layers, 
including senior management, operational management, administrative staff, and 
technical staff. Current security practices and organizational vulnerabilities that could 
adversely impact the assets are also identified. Each workshop group selects the three to 
five most important assets from their list of important assets and identifies the security 
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requirements that should be in place to protect them. The analysis team summarizes the 
information collected from all the workshops for use in subsequent methodology 
activities. From that summary, the team selects three to five critical assets and refines the 
security requirements to carry forward through the remainder of the evaluation as a 
representative sample of all the organizational assets (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). For 
critical assets, threat profiles are constructed using generic threat profiles based on the 
summarized organizational vulnerabilities identified in the workshops and gaps identified 
in the current security practices (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001b). The final outputs of Phase I 
are the following: 
• Organizational assets, organizational security concerns, and security requirements 
summarized from a series of data collection workshops; 
• Critical assets selected by the analysis team and related security requirements 
them; 
• Threats to critical assets identified using generic threat profiles; and 
• Current security practices. 
Phase 2: Technological View 
In the second phase, which is optional, the analysis team plans and executes a 
targeted vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses in the technology infrastructure 
that confirm and augment the threat profiles for the critical assets developed in the Phase 
1. Components of the infrastructure that are linked to each critical asset and relevant to 
processing, storing, or transmitting data are selected for assessment. Firewalls, routers, 
and switches, as well as external service providers and links from other devices that 
provide access paths to critical assets, are also selected for assessment (Alberts & 
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Dorofee, 2002). Phase 2 is perfonned only when the organization can readily hire 
individuals experienced in vulnerability management to perfonn the assessment (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 2001c). 
The vulnerability infonnation is used to identify major weaknesses in the 
infrastructure that need immediate attention and to define ways the technology allows for 
asset compromise (Allen, 2001). In addition, vulnerabilities may represent additional 
threats to critical assets that augment the threats assembled during Phase 1 (Alberts & 
Dorofee, 2001a). The outputs of Phase 2 include the following: 
• Infrastructure components important to each critical asset, and 
• Summarized technological vulnerabilities from the targeted assessment of 
selected components. 
Phase 3: Security Strategy and Planning 
In the third phase, the analysis team defines the organizational impact of each 
threat identified in the prior phases. The combined threat and corresponding impact 
represent a risk to the organization that must be considered for acceptance or mitigation. 
Evaluation criteria that define the level of concern an impact represents to the 
organization are assembled. The evaluation criteria allow the analysis team to quantify 
risks (high, medium, or low) so that resources for protection can be applied to risks that 
represent the greatest organizational impact. Risk mitigation plans for each critical asset 
are developed to address high-impact risks by analyzing the gaps between the 
organization's current security practices and best practices described in the OCTAVE 
Catalog of Practices. The analysis team develops an organizational protection strategy by 
reviewing the risk mitigation plans for the critical assets to identify commonalities that 
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should be applied broadly across the organization. Results are assembled into a series of 
reports that identify near-term actions, mitigation plans focused on specific information 
assets, and an organizational protection strategy that identifies the framework for 
establishing the appropriate protection for current and future assets (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2002). 
Evaluation criteria to prioritize financial impacts and threats to health and safety, 
productivity, fines and legal penalties, and reputation are suggested by the methodology 
as a reasonable baseline for impact analysis (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Each critical 
asset risk is analyzed using the evaluation criteria and valued to provide a scale for 
prioritization. Security practices that need improvement are compared to the highest 
priority risks to identify the practices most needed by the organization. The analysis 
team identifies immediate, near-term, and long-range activities for applying security 
practices that address the highest risks to critical information assets (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2001a). The analysis team presents the proposed plan to the organizational decision 
makers to obtain approval from appropriate groups within the organization to carry the 
plan forward to implementation. The outputs of Phase 3 are the following: 
• Risk measures, also called evaluation criteria; 
• Risks to critical assets; 
• Action items or plans for immediate activities; 
• Mitigation plans or plans for near-term activities related directly to critical assets; 
and 
• Protection strategies or plans for long-range activities across the organization. 
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OCTAVE Criteria Principles 
The OCTAVE Methodology is based on the OCTAVE Criteria principles, 
attributes, and outputs that define the required elements of risk management for an 
effective security risk management evaluation using the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & 
Dorofee,2001a). Principles are defined as fundamental concepts of risk management 
that must drive the nature of the evaluation. Attributes are characteristics of a successful 
evaluation for risk management. Outputs define the results that must be achieved to 
accomplish a successful evaluation. The tailored methodology must incorporate the 
OCTAVE Criteria to validate its application of the OCTAVE Approach for security risk 
management (Alberts & Dorofee). 
The principles in OCTAVE Criteria define key concepts that describe the nature 
ofthe evaluation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). These principles are built from the SEI 
research experience in risk management, organizational management, and information 
security risk management and each is described in the remainder of this section (Alberts 
et aI., 2000): 
• From SEI experience in information security risk management, the principles of 
self-direction, adaptable measures, defined process, and foundation for a 
continuous process are drawn (Alberts & Dorofee). 
• From the field of risk management, the principles of forward-looking view, focus 
on the critical few, and integrated management are included (Alberts & Dorofee). 
• From organizational management, the principles of open communication, global 
perspective, and teamwork are drawn (Alberts & Dorofee). 
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Principles from Security Risk Management 
The self-direction principle allows people in the organization to manage and 
direct the evaluation process. This principle is based on the assumption that personnel in 
the organization understand how to manage organizational risk, but must be guided in 
identifying and managing security risk (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
The adaptable measures principle results in the application of flexible 
measurements that are adapted to work within the unique context of the organizational 
environment. Available measurements include known security threats and known 
technological weaknesses that are identified by authoritative sources such as the 
CERT/CC and the Mitre Corporation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
The defined process principle requires the use of standardized evaluation 
procedures within which the analysis team is required to assign each activity or action to 
a responsible individual or group (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). The procedures used by 
the analysis team include: defining all evaluation activities, assigning responsibilities for 
each evaluation activity, specifying evaluation mechanisms, and creating a common 
format for documenting evaluation results. Defined evaluation procedures are structured 
from template worksheets including detailed instructions that make up a structured and 
consistent framework for the identification and analysis of security risk. In addition, 
documentation within the methodology of the processes used to identify risks, impacts, 
and plans in addressing critical risks contributes to defined evaluation procedures 
(Alberts & Dorofee). 
The foundation for a continuous process principle establishes security 
management as ongoing. Each evaluation provides a framework for the identification, 
analysis, and planning of security requirements for the organization. This framework 
forms the basis for implementing, monitoring, and controlling information security to 
complete the cycle of continuous security management (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
Principles from Risk Management 
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The forward-looking view principle enables participants to look beyond the 
existing environment and establish a protection strategy that will allow for continuous 
change. Change can occur in the composition of an organization's information assets and 
the technology infrastructure that supports the assets. Change can also be triggered by 
threat events that are initiated either internally or externally and that put the infrastructure 
and assets of the organization at risk (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
The focus on the critical few principle provides a mechanism for addressing 
security risk within the limitations of organizational resources. The efficient use of these 
resources focuses organizational attention on the highest priority risks. The methodology 
is structured to provide an effective and efficient means for limiting the volume of data 
under consideration at each activity (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
The integrated management principle points to the need to have security policies 
and strategies consistent with overall organizational ones. Trade-off choices made in 
organizational policy setting at the highest levels of the organization must be reflected 
consistently in the choices applied to security policy (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Principles from Organizational Management 
The open communication principle emphasizes the need for broad participation 
across many areas of the organization. A collaborative effort is required to assemble 
information and develop decisions that are shared among participants assembled across 
the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
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The global perspective principle requires that consensus be reached in addressing 
security issues since it would be ineffective for one part of the organization to act under 
one set of policies and procedures while other parts ofthe organization use a different set. 
Security requires consistency at all levels across the organization to appropriately address 
threats to the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
The teamwork principle emphasizes the challenges involved in dealing with an 
issue as complex as information security. No one individual or group of individuals can 
have all the knowledge and requisite response information. Information must be pooled 
from the broad range of participants within the organization and possibly include experts 
outside of the organization to assemble data and develop the appropriate plans that 
address the security needs of the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
aCTA VE Criteria Attributes 
Attributes define the structure of each process within the methodology and 
establish essential elements that must be present for an appropriate application of the 
OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). Within the OCTAVE Criteria, 
attributes establish the characteristics of the principles. The following attributes are 
included in the OCTAVE Criteria: analysis team, augmentation of analysis team skills, 
catalog of practices, generic threat profile, catalog of vulnerabilities, defined evaluation 
activities, documented evaluation results, evaluation scope, next steps, focus on risk, 
focused activities, organizational and technological issues, organizational and 
information technology participation, senior management participation, and collaborative 
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approach. Along with principles, attributes must be maintained when any tailoring is 
applied to assure consistency with the OCTAVE Criteria (Alberts & Dorofee). A 
summary list of principle and attribute links is provided in Appendix C. Some principles 
map to multiple attributes, and some attributes link to multiple principles (Alberts & 
Dorofee). A description of each attribute, grouped by the principle to which it applies, is 
provided below. 
Attributes for Self-Direction 
An analysis team composed of personnel from within the organization is 
assembled to lead the evaluation activities. Personnel who use technology within the 
organization, as well as technology specialists who implement and support the 
organization's infrastructure, must work together to forge a unified view of the security 
risk from an organizational perspective. The organization's leadership must take 
ownership of identified information risks and agree to the steps developed by the analysis 
team to address the risks, thereby ensuring that appropriate measures will be taken to 
implement plans built using the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ia). 
Augmentation of analysis team skills extends the ability of the organization to 
address the complexities of security management and the challenge of assembling a 
sufficiently strong team to cover all needed aspects. This attribute provides a mechanism 
for adding skills without transferring organizational responsibility. Through the selective 
expansion of the team to address specific areas where analysis team skills are limited, the 
OCTAVE Approach provides a mechanism for addressing skill and knowledge variations 
without jeopardizing ownership and responsibility for the results (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2001a). 
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Attributes for Adaptable Measures 
Use of a catalog of practices ensures that the organization will consider the range 
of strategic and operational security practices important for good security risk 
management. The OCTAVE Catalog of Practices is assembled from experience at the 
CERT/CC in responding to reported Internet vulnerabilities, results from the SEI's 
experience in performing security evaluations, and security practices from recognized 
international standards organizations such as the British Standards Institution (BSI). The 
BSI published a code of practices in 1995 that was adopted in 2000 by the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) as ISO 17799 (Brykczynski & Small, 2003). The 
OCTAVE Catalog of Practices incorporates the practices from the BSI publication BS 
7799: Part 1: 1995 (BSI, 1995). That body of knowledge provides a basis of security best 
practices against which an organization can measure its own internal efforts and identify 
opportunities for improvement (Alberts et aI., 2001). 
With the use of a generic threat profile, the organization considers a range of 
threats that are formalized into structured profiles (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001b). A threat 
represents a potential combination of a security event source identified as an threat actor 
performing a deliberate or accidental action that results in an undesirable outcome. The 
outcomes are security compromises to information assets that result in disclosure, 
modification, loss/destruction, or interruption, thus causing undesirable consequences for 
the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001 a). The OCTAVE Methodology incorporates 
four structured threat profiles representing threats from four actor sources: (1) human 
actors using network access, (2) human actors using physical access, (3) system problems 
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such as hardware and software defects, and (4) other problems such as floods and power 
outages (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001b). 
Using a catalog of vulnerabilities assures that infrastructure vulnerabilities are 
evaluated in terms of standard sources such as the Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE). The CVE consists of a list of known vulnerabilities developed 
collaboratively by security professionals and maintained by the Mitre Corporation 
(http://cve.mitre.org). The list also provides characteristics of vulnerabilities so that 
security experts and assessment tools can detect when a specific vulnerability is present 
in an infrastructure. A severity rating for each vulnerability (high, medium, or low) 
based on the ease of its exploit by an unsophisticated attacker is provided in the CVE 
along with instructions for removing the vulnerability (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). It is 
important to note that the volume of reported vulnerabilities is doubling annually with no 
expected rate decrease (Pethia, 2003). 
Attributes for Defined Process 
Defined evaluation activities ensure that a well-structured and comprehensive 
evaluation is performed. Procedures are specified for the series of workshops required to 
perform the methodology. Detailed instructions, provided for each workshop, include 
preparation activities, task lists, worksheet templates, examples of anticipated outcomes, 
and reference catalogs to be used. This level of definition provides a repeatable process 
that serves as the framework for an ongoing risk management effort. Moreover, the steps 
in the process and expected outcomes can be evaluated in advance of resource 
commitment, thus, providing a means of establishing appropriate expectations for 
decision makers. Tailoring requirements for specific types of organizations can be 
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identified and incorporated in advance for each required activity (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2001a). 
With documented evaluation results, the sponsoring entity, or in this case the K-
12 school or school district, records the information captured within each activity to 
produce a body of material that represents the organization's use of the OCTAVE 
Methodology. That material becomes a permanent record that defines the security risks 
of the organization and represents a formal attempt to address risks outside of acceptable 
organizational tolerance levels. The documented results support implementation 
decisions that are part of security mitigation plans and protection strategies (Alberts & 
Dorofee,2001a). 
The evaluation scope must be delineated carefully to assure inclusion of critical 
organizational areas within the assessment. The resource and time limitations 
established by organizational decision makers must be considered when defining the 
segments of the organization to be included in the evaluation. Large and complex K-12 
schools or school districts can manage the scope by including only a few departments 
critical to their mission. These departments should represent a good sample of the K -12 
school or school district as a whole (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
Attributes for Foundation for a Continuous Process 
With the next steps, the OCTAVE Methodology is formally recognized as a basis 
for planning. Effective adoption requires that plans developed within the OCTAVE 
Methodology provide the basis for subsequent implementation as part of a complete risk 
management process. Decision makers review the results ofthe evaluation process and 
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determine follow-up actions to appropriately manage the security risks identified through 
the application of the methodology (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ia). 
Senior management participation communicates active sponsorship to members of 
the organization. Implementing plans to manage security risks requires resource 
commitments from the leadership of the organization. Through active participation in the 
process, decision makers gain an understanding of the importance of security risk 
management and ensure that the mission, risk tolerance, and resource limitations of the 
organization are represented appropriately (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). In addition, the 
attribute catalog of practices, described previously with adaptable principles, applies to 
the principle foundation for a continuous process. 
Attribute for Forward-Looking View 
A focus on risk requires consideration of the impact of potential threats instead of 
simply the identification of all possible threats. Scarce resources are allocated to the 
highest priority risks - those that would result in the greatest potential harm to critical 
assets of the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
Attributes for Focus on the Critical Few 
Focused activities facilitate the delineation of security risk issues impacting 
important information assets. A comprehensive view of all assets, all vulnerabilities, and 
all security issues is not addressed within the methodology. The analysis process is 
complex and becomes ineffective if too broad a perspective is attempted (Alberts & 
Dorofee,2001a). In addition, the attribute evaluation scope, described with the defined 
process principle, applies to the focus on the critical few principle. 
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Attributes for Integrated Management 
Organizational and technological issues must be examined in the security 
evaluation. Security threats and serious risks can result from inappropriate and 
ineffective organizational policies and practices. Moreover, serious risks can result when 
technology vulnerabilities are not effectively addressed in the infrastructure (Alberts & 
Dorofee,2001a). Activities within the methodology are structured to incorporate both 
the organizational and technological views, which are critical to the fOlTIlUlation of an 
effective protection strategy (Alberts & Dorofee). If an organization relies only on 
vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the security risk of the infrastructure, the 
assessment will address only a small segment ofthe security risks that should be 
considered (Alberts et aI., 2001). Vulnerability tools identify known weaknesses in the 
technology, improper configurations of administrative functions such as accounts with 
null passwords, and information a possible attacker can use to locate infrastructure 
weaknesses (Parker, 1998). Vulnerability tools do not identify improper systems 
administration that allows access to the wrong individuals, unknown vulnerabilities that 
may allow future inappropriate access, or incorrect applications of policies and 
procedures (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Organizational and information technology participation is required to address the 
principle of integrated management. A range of perspectives across the organization is 
necessary to identify the assets, threats, security requirements, and risks that are critical to 
the organization. Without strong organizational participation in the evaluation's 
activities, the mission of the organization cannot be represented properly, and without 
strong technology participation, the infrastructure risks are not identified properly. A 
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balanced perspective assures the appropriate consideration of both organizational and 
technological issues (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). In addition, senior management 
participation, described earlier in this report under the heading of Attributes for a 
Foundation for a Continuous Process, applies to the principle of integrated management. 
Attribute for Open Communication 
A collaborative approach for sharing information and building consensus in 
decision making is required to ensure that the broad range of perspectives represented by 
analysis team members is considered in the evaluation. Participants see the value and 
accept responsibility for implementing resulting plans if they are part of the process that 
identifies the needs and establishes the plans (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). 
Attributes for Global Perspective 
The attributes referenced as organizational and technological issues and 
organizational and information technology participation, described earlier in this 
dissertation under the heading of Attributes for Integrated Management, apply to the 
principle of global perspective. Based on the application of other principles such as open 
communication, the blending of participants from across the K-12 school or school 
district should yield a global perspective. 
Attributes for Teamwork 
The attributes described earlier in this dissertation under the heading of Attributes 
of Self-Direction, namely analysis team and augmenting analysis team skills, apply to the 
principle of teamwork. The attribute described earlier under the heading of Attributes of 
Open Communication, namely collaborative approach, applies to the principle of 
teamwork as does the organizational and information technology participation attribute 
described under the heading of Attributes of Integrated Management. 
Specific Procedures Employed 
97 
A tailored version of the OCTAVE Methodology to support this investigation was 
designed for use in the K-12 schools and school districts (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The 
unique requirements ofthe K-12 technology environment identified in the literature 
search and the security practices unique to K-12 schools and school districts listed in 
Appendix A were incorporated into the OCTAVE Methodology. The OCTAVE Catalog 
of Practices and each activity, along with worksheets and step-by-step instructions, were 
modified as needed to build a methodology uniquely tailored for this domain (Alberts & 
Dorofee, 2001). Based on a review by Christopher Alberts, an SEI researcher and 
developer of the OCTAVE Methodology, of the unique needs ofK-12 schools and school 
districts that are relevant to information security (C. Alberts, personal communications, 
December 13,2002), the following tailoring options within the OCTAVE Methodology 
were selected for consideration: 
• Expansion of the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices incorporating requirements 
unique to K-12 schools and school districts. 
• Adjustment of the data-gathering process used in the workshops for Phase 1: 
Organizational View that is currently based on a hierarchical organization 
structure, allowing for the collection of asset and security requirements from a 
distributed organizational structure that included administrative staff, teachers, 
parents, and students. Schools comprise a blend of three sub-organizations that 
must be represented within the Organizational View. These sub-organizations 
include administration to address the business processes of the K-12 school or 
school district such as payroll and purchasing; teaching to address classroom 
instruction and information distribution; and learning to address student 
participation that may extend to parental involvement. 
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• Augmentation of the guidelines and worksheet templates for defining threats to an 
asset to provide a means for explicitly identifying authorized and unauthorized 
individuals or groups of individuals. In the OCTAVE Methodology, individuals 
who hold organizational positions that enable them to access an asset are called 
insiders, and individuals or groups that should be denied access to an asset are 
called outsiders. The designation of insiders and outsiders within a K-12 school 
or school district is inconsistent and must be qualified for each asset. For 
example, for classroom assignment folders, students and teachers are insiders and 
administrative personnel are outsiders. For the payroll system, administrative 
personnel are insiders and students are outsiders. 
• Adjustment of evaluation criteria to categories important to K -12 schools and 
school districts. Productivity, reputation, and customer confidence, suggested by 
the OCTAVE Methodology as evaluation criteria, are not as important in K-12 
school and school district settings as regulatory compliance, curriculum 
effectiveness, student performance on standardized tests, and community support 
(Norris et aI., 2002). 
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.. Adjustment of the tenninology used in worksheets and instructions developed for 
medical, manufacturing, financial, and government agencies to incorporate K-12 
school and school district tenninology. 
The following steps, described in greater detail in Chapter 4, were perfonned by 
this investigator to build the prototype K -12 Risk Methodology: 
.. Identified security risks relevant to K-12 schools and school districts and security 
practices that mitigate the risk from the literature search (see Appendices A and 
B). 
.. Expanded the aCTA VE Catalog of Practices to incorporate each security practice 
unique to K-12 schools and school districts from Appendix A. 
.. Examined the tailoring options within the aCTA VE Methodology to understand 
the relationships among steps in the process and detennine how changes to one 
area impacted other parts of the methodology. 
.. Applied the tailoring options selected for consideration as appropriate to K-12 
school and school district requirements. The selection process is described earlier 
in this section of this document. 
.. Evaluated the tailored methodology to assure compliance with the aCTA VE 
Criteria. 
.. Perfonned a risk evaluation using the tailored methodology at a selected K-12 
school district. This process is further described in the remainder of this section 
and in Chapter 4. 
• Reviewed the methodology with experts from various K-12 schools and school 
districts to confirm broad applicability. This process is further described at the 
end of this section and in Chapter 4. 
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Based on the SEI's experience with inserting the OCTAVE Methodology into 
multiple domains, this researcher determined that not every unique requirement for this 
inquiry would be identifiable from the literature review (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
Following the approach used in the development of the OCTAVE Methodology for the 
U.S. Department of Defense medical community, this researcher selected a pilot site for a 
facilitated use of the K-12 Risk Methodology to identify additional tailoring needed to fit 
the methodology to needs ofthe K-12 schools and school districts (Alberts & Dorofee). 
Participants at the pilot site were required to learn and apply the tailored methodology for 
their school and evaluate the results of the methodology, as well as the applicability to 
their school setting. To be considered for the pilot site, the K-12 school or school district 
was required to have the full age range of students and actively use technology within the 
curriculum at most grade levels. To assure on-site availability and eliminate conflicts 
with vendor contract provisions, technology support personnel were required to work for 
the school or school district rather than an external provider. 
The Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD) met the selection criteria and was 
chosen as the pilot site. A leader from the SPSD coordinated the district's internal effort 
to use the methodology. This individual was responsible for planning and budget 
management within the SPSD and recognized the value of using the K-12 Risk 
Methodology in justifying technology expenditures. To assure that appropriate 
individuals were selected for participation on the analysis team, the SPSD leader 
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reviewed the description for this research, specifically part of Chapter 1 of this document, 
to gain an understanding of the importance of pilot site participation and the 
responsibilities of the selected analysis team. Selected members of the teaching staff, 
curriculum design staff, technology staff, and administrative staffwere chosen for the 
SPSD analysis team. In addition, these individuals had good communication skills and 
were interested in improving information security. The analysis team committed one day 
a week for eight weeks to learn and complete the evaluation to meet the specified 
timeframe. 
This researcher conducted four guidance sessions with the analysis team to 
familiarize participants with the methodology and review progress as the team performed 
the methodology workshops. For Guidance Session 1, this researcher provided an 
introduction to the issues of security risk management and an overview of the K -12 Risk 
Management analysis team activities. The PowerPoint slide presentation Managing the 
Risk of Internet Connectivity (Woody, 2003) introduced the need for security risk 
management in K-12 schools and school districts to SPSD analysis team participants. 
During the remainder of the first session, the K-12 Risk Methodology materials used by 
analysis team members in their execution of the methodology were reviewed. Those 
materials consisted of worksheets and step-by-step instructional guidelines for each 
activity to be performed. The activities were grouped by the phase in which they occur. 
Appendix D contains a detailed description of each activity within each phase and the 
title of each worksheet to be used by the analysis team to document the results of each 
activity. 
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For Guidance Session 2, this researcher returned to the SPSD when the analysis 
team completed the required activities and outputs of Phase 1: Organizational View. 
During this session, the analysis team presented the results for the following: assets, 
areas of concern, security requirements, current protection strategy survey results, critical 
assets, and threats to critical assets. As a consequence of questions from analysis team 
members about the use of the Organizational View worksheets for constructing threat 
trees, two separate workshops were required: Guidance Sessions 2A and 2B. During 
Guidance Session 2A, analysis team questions were resolved. During Guidance Session 
2B, the SPSD analysis team presented the completed worksheets for Phase 1. Work to be 
addressed in Phase 2: Technology View was also discussed during Guidance Session 2B. 
Phase 2 of the methodology is performed only if individuals knowledgeable in the use of 
vulnerability assessment tools are available. The SPSD analysis team determined that 
Phase 2 could not be performed because the school district did not have access to the 
necessary expertise and could not purchase the expertise from external sources within the 
time constraints ofthe pilot. As a consequence, the analysis team moved forward with 
Phase 3: Security Strategy and Planning. 
During Guidance Session 3 the results of the Phase 3 activities were reviewed. 
Analysis team members presented their completed worksheets and answered the 
following questions: 
• How has the use ofthe methodology expanded your understanding ofK-12 school 
information security issues? 
• How have the plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies that were 
developed with the methodology addressed school district security concerns? 
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4& How has use of the methodology prepared you to address information technology 
(IT) decisions and security issues in your school district? 
Guidance Review Sessions 2B and 3 identified additional K-12 school and school 
district issues that were not included in the initial tailoring of the methodology. In 
addition to responding to questions about the value of the methodology, SPSD analysis 
team participants were asked for ideas about how to improve the methodology and its 
effectiveness for K-12 schools and school districts in general. Members of the SPSD 
analysis team provided information about the following: 
4& Gaps and issues not addressed by the tailored methodology that should be 
incorporated, 
4& Areas where the structure and format hindered the SPSD analysis team's use of 
the materials, and 
.. Recommended revisions that would improve the usability of the materials. 
All K-12 Risk Methodology outputs created during the SPSD use ofthe tailored 
methodology remained the property of the SPSD and were not part of the reported 
research results. This research focused on the methodology and its effectiveness for 
helping K-12 schools and school districts, and SPSD as a sample member of this domain, 
identify and address security risks through the application of a security risk assessment 
methodology. 
Because ofthe wide variation in school size and technology capability among K-
12 schools and school districts, an individual pilot site could not be considered a 
representative sample (K. Krueger, personal communication, February 21,2003). To 
expand the review process to a broader audience, the tailored methodology was presented 
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for review and comment to a group often K-12 school officials, including school board 
members, technology directors, and superintendents. Reviewers were members of the 
Consortium for School Networking (CoSN), a national non-profit organization that draws 
its members from K-12 schools and school districts across the country. In preparation 
for this review, the CoSN assembled a Security Focus Group (SFG). Participants in that 
group included three individuals serving on the CoSN executive board who previously 
expressed interest in K-12 school security and several attendees at the K-12 School 
Networking Conference 2003 in Arlington, VA who signed up to participate in the SFG 
through self-selection. The SFG participants met once at the conference to review the 
same PowerPoint slide presentation used as an introduction for the SPSD analysis team. 
Communication with SFG participants was coordinated through an assigned member of 
the CoSN executive board (S. Miller, personal communication, February 27,2003). 
After the SPSD finished using the K-12 Risk Methodology, changes 
recommended by analysis team participants were applied, and the updated version was 
released to SFG members for their review. In addition to suggestions and questions 
about specific methodology content, SFG participants were asked to respond to the 
following questions: 
.. How is the methodology applicable to your K-12 school or school district? 
.. Is the provided material sufficient for use in your K-12 school or school district? 
.. Has your concern about the K-12 school security issues increased, decreased, or 
remained unchanged based on review of the methodology? 
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Formats for Presenting Results 
Two products in Microsoft Word format were assembled from this research. The 
first product was the K-12 Risk Methodology based on the OCTAVE Methodology. That 
product consisted of worksheets and step-by-step instructions for completing process 
activities included in the security risk evaluation tailored for K-12 schools and school 
districts using the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Major segments of 
that first product are included in this report (Appendices E, F, G, and H) to illustrate 
specific tailoring actions applied to the methodology. 
The second product was a report highlighting the shortcomings and value of the 
methodology as identified by the analysis team and CoSN Security Focus Group (SFG) 
participants. That second report incorporated the lessons learned from tailoring activities, 
and pilot and expert reviews of the methodology. The information in that report is 
described in Chapter 4 and Appendix L ofthis document. 
Outcomes 
This research raised the awareness of security risk management issues for analysis 
team participants at the selected pilot site. In addition, K-12 schools and school districts 
represented by the participants in the SFG review group reported increased awareness. 
Copies of the two products of this research were provided for use by CoSN members. 
Since a high level of interest in information security was expressed by its members as a 
result of this research, the CoSN announced an initiative for cyber-security in the K-12 
schools and school districts. That initiative involved establishing funding for 
development and dissemination of an assemblage oftraining and tools tailored to K-12 
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school security (http://securedistrict.cosn.orgl). The focus of the U.S. on information 
security underscores the importance of a viable methodology to address the risk ofK-12 
school and school district Internet connectivity nationwide and contributes to the 
involvement of school administrators in addressing issues and challenges in that area 
(CIPB, 2002). 
As a consequence of this investigation, a security plan developed by the analysis 
team using the K -12 Risk Methodology was implemented at the SPSD. That plan 
included action items for immediate needs, mitigation procedures for protecting critical 
information assets, and a protection strategy for long-term security management of 
critical technology resources within the K-12 school district. Team participants who 
implement security plans are expected to become advocates for security risk management 
and assist the CoSN in helping other K-12 schools and school districts benefit from the 
use of this methodology. The SPSD analysis team participated in the announcement of 
the CoSN cyber-security initiative at the National School Boards Association's (NSBA's) 
2003 Technology Plus Learning Conference, October 2003, in Anaheim, CA. 
Based on statements from SFG reviewers during the initial meeting at the 2003 K-
12 School Networking Conference, participants in the review process gained an 
understanding of the issues of security risk management that are applicable to the K -12 
school environment. They are expected to seek additional information about security 
issues and support the planned CoSN initiative for applying security risk management 
within their K-12 schools and school districts (S. Miller, personal communication, 
February 27,2003). 
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Through the application of a tailored risk methodology based on the OCT AVE 
Methodology, the benefits of knowing the best practices assembled by SEI researchers 
and incorporated into the OCTAVE Methodology through the OCTAVE Catalog of 
Practices are available to K-12 schools and school districts. In the long term, through the 
use of a consistent structure across a range of K -12 schools and school districts, patterns 
for the best practices suited to the unique security risks and needs of the K-12 
environment are expected to emerge. Those patterns can then be incorporated into an 
enhanced K-12 Risk Methodology (K. Krueger, personal communication, August 26, 
2003). 
Researchers at the SEI continue to refine the OCTAVE Methodology based on 
feedback from entities tailoring the methodology to unique needs such as K -12 schools 
and school districts. This researcher used the methodology publicly available 
(http://www.cert.org/octave) as of December 15,2002 for this investigation. 
Refinements to the OCTAVE Methodology since that time should be reviewed and 
incorporated into the K-12 Risk Methodology in future investigations to further enhance 
the process if those refinements are appropriate for the needs ofK-12 schools and school 
districts. 
Resources Used 
This researcher gained an understanding of the OCTAVE Methodology through 
training and helping government agencies apply the methodology. An understanding of 
the K-12 school environment has been gained through experience and document reviews 
to successfully build a tailored version for use by the selected pilot site. As a member of 
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the Networked Survivable Systems technical staff at the SEI, this investigator worked for 
two years with the SEI researchers who developed the OCTAVE Methodology and is 
qualified to teach the OCTAVE Methodology. Moreover, this researcher worked with 
licensed OCTAVE Methodology transition partners to develop automated tools for the 
U.S. Department of Defense medical community to support the expanded use of the 
methodology. In addition, this researcher has 25 years of application and systems design 
experience with large complex environments for Yale University, Land and Legal 
Records for West Chester County of New York, and the Administration for Children's 
Services of New York City. 
Knowledge of challenges and solutions available within the field of information 
security protection was needed to conduct this investigation. Some of that expertise was 
incorporated within the OCTAVE Methodology template worksheets and instructional 
guidance that served as a basis for the K-12 Risk Methodology. This researcher 
completed the SANS Institute Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC) for 
GIAC Security Essentials (GSEC) in January 2002 to better understand the focus and 
limitations of the OCTAVE Methodology for security risk management. 
A pilot site with a student body and teaching staff that serviced the full age range 
ofK-12 students was required. Also, participants from a range of areas within the K-12 
domain including teaching and technology support were required. The burden of 
regulatory reporting imposed by NCLB requirements was given as the reason for several 
possible sites declining to participate in this process. The Scarsdale Public School District 
in Scarsdale, New York met the selection criteria and volunteered to be the pilot site. 
The director of instructional computing led the analysis team in this effort. Selected 
analysis team participants at the pilot site contributed time to learn the steps ofthe 
methodology, apply it to their school environment, and identify areas where the 
methodology failed to meet their needs. 
A resource to help identify experts in the K-12 school technology environment 
who could perform the follow-up review of the material used in the pilot was critical to 
the completion of this research. The executive director of the Consortium for School 
Networking (CoSN) accepted this responsibility in exchange for use of the resulting 
methodology content by Consortium members. 
Reliability and Validity 
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Within the field of security risk management, no general measurements that can 
define reliability and validity for K-12 schools and school districts are identified (Pethia, 
2003). Much ofthe field expertise is contextual in nature and focused on defining 
responses to vulnerabilities within the infrastructure as each vulnerability is identified 
(Allen et aI., 2000). Validation is provided through a series of peer reviews performed by 
individuals working within security management who address a wide range of security 
challenges (Allen & Sledge, 2002). The tailored methodology for K-12 schools and 
school districts was subjected to reviews by the pilot site and K-12 experts. This process 
is similar to validation steps used for the OCTAVE Methodology (Alberts et aI., 2000). 
Organizations that used the OCTAVE Methodology realized benefits that 
included an increased awareness of applicable security issues and recognition that 
security must address threats that have a real impact on the capabilities of the entities to 
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perfoIm critical functions effectively. This same benefit was expressed by the pilot site 
and SFG K-12 reviewers in their use ofthe K-12 Risk Methodology. 
Another benefit of using the OCTAVE Methodology was the development of a 
common understanding of the value of security risk management as a consequence of 
understanding the real risks across the entity (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). As noted in the 
feedback from the K-12 pilot site participants (see Appendix L), use ofthe K-12 Risk 
Methodology provided similar benefits though improved decision-making that grew from 
a shared understanding of the need for security and an increased awareness ofthe risks if 
security issues were not addressed. 
Summary 
The OCTAVE Methodology was selected for use in this research effort as a basis 
for introducing security risk management into K -12 schools and school districts. 
Purchase, training, and licensing costs were not required for its use. Tailoring options 
were available for addressing the unique requirements ofK-12 schools and school 
districts. Because the methodology is used by a sufficiently broad range of organizations, 
it is considered appropriate for addressing the security issues ofK-12 schools and school 
districts that use Internet connectivity. 
Based on an initial analysis of the methodology and confiImation with the SEI 
researchers who developed the methodology, the OCTAVE Methodology was tailored to 
fit the unique needs of the K -12 environment as identified by this researcher. 
Requirements identified in the literature review were applied to the OCT AVE 
Methodology to build a tailored version referred to as the K-12 Risk Methodology. This 
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researcher had sufficient training and support from the SEI to construct an appropriately 
tailored methodology. The OCTAVE Criteria were used to confirm completeness of the 
tailored methodology as required for consistency with the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 200Ia). A school district was identified to apply the tailored methodology 
for initial validation. In addition, experts in the K-12 school domain were assembled to 
review the methodology and provide further validation of its applicability to K-12 
schools and school districts. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Data and Process Analysis 
This research consisted of four major segments: (1) building the tailored 
methodology; (2) validating the tailoring process; (3) testing the tailored methodology in 
a K-12 school district; and (4) reviewing the tailored methodology with K-12 school 
representatives. The specific actions of each segment are summarized below to provide 
sufficient information to support the findings and allow for replication as needed by other 
researchers. 
Building the Tailored Methodology 
This researcher worked independently to build the K -12 Risk Methodology by 
applying in-place tailoring options from the OCT AVE Methodology. Based on an initial 
review of those options best suited to incorporate unique K-12 school security risk issues 
as described in Chapter 3, the following changes were applied: 
• Expanded security practices to incorporate those important for K-12 schools but 
missing from the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (see Appendix A); 
• Restructured data collection activities used in assembling an organizational view 
in Phase 1: Organizational View to incorporate an expanded K-12 Catalog of 
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Practices and include modifications to accommodate a distributed organizational 
structure typical ofK-12 schools and school districts, as opposed to the 
hierarchical structure embedded in the OCTA VE Methodology; 
• Augmented the threat profile content in Phase 1 to incorporate the unique 
characteristics of information asset users within the K-12 environment that differ 
from the delineations assumed by the OCTAVE Methodology; 
• Restructured Phase 3 worksheets to allow for evaluation criteria different from the 
OCTAVE Methodology and incorporate the expanded K-12 Catalog of Practices 
for mitigation and protection strategy considerations; and 
• Adjusted terminology within the methodology to remove the use of terms such as 
business and customer that were irrelevant in the K-12 environment and 
renumbered the materials to accommodate the restructured segments and 
worksheets. 
The application of each selected change to the methodology is described in detail in the 
remainder ofthis section. 
Expanding the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices 
The OCTAVE Catalog of Practices is divided into two major groups: strategic 
practices and operational practices. Practices within each group were determined to be 
relevant to K -12 schools and school districts by this researcher and remained in the 
expanded K-12 Catalog of Practices for the tailored methodology. This decision was 
based on the number of security risks identified in the literature review for this 
investigation that were addressed by security practices currently included in the 
OCTAVE Catalog of Practices. A table containing 49 entries of security risks, associated 
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outcomes, and the security practice that mitigates each risk is provided in Appendix B. 
Those practices mapped to existing practice areas within the OCTAVE Catalog of 
Practices. Security practices that are not in the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices but were 
needed to address K-12 school and school district security risks (39 in all) were inserted 
into the K-12 Catalog of Practices. Appendix A lists those practices. Those practices 
were organized into four general categories that are referenced as educational security 
practices in this document: 
1. Content-blocking. This category includes practices that filter for pornography 
and restrict access to inappropriate activities for minors. 
2. Structured access. This category includes practices for equipment sharing, 
privacy, and access rights within an environment that requires extensive resource 
sharing. 
3. Regulatory compliance. This category includes state regulations as well as 
federal ones including the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), Protection of Pupil Rights 
Amendment (PPRA), No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, and the USA 
PATRIOT Act. 
4. Acceptable educational use. This category includes restrictions against 
commercial use of educational facilities, ethics, individual responsibilities for 
using the infrastructure, and limitations for monitoring. 
By keeping educational practices in a separate group within the expanded K-12 Catalog 
of Practices, K-12 school and school district personnel could determine how well they 
were addressing risk with respect to general security practices and how well they were 
meeting specific educational security practices. Appendix D includes the revised 
structure ofthe OCTAVE Catalog of Practices as it was tailored for the K-12 Risk 
Methodology. 
Restructuring Data Collection 
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Data collection activities within Phase 1: Organizational View of the OCTAVE 
Methodology are grouped into three processes that include similar activities, but are 
structured to address three levels of an organization: (1) senior management, (2) 
operational management, and (3) staff. Staff includes information technology (IT) 
representatives (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The main difference among these processes 
is the worksheet survey form used to define the current security practices considered 
relevant to each level of the organization. Within the staff level, technical staff and 
organizational staff also use different survey instruments. These distinctions have no 
relevance to K-12 schools and school districts (TSSA, 2001). Moreover, it is unclear 
whether any selected subset of current security practices would be sufficiently universal 
to all K -12 schools and school districts to be meaningful. Instead of creating separate 
processes used by specific K-12 groups with an uncertain knowledge of relevance, a 
single data-gathering process was built by collapsing all the separate activities into a 
single process. This unified process was applied once by the pilot site, but could be used 
repeatedly with varying participants for broader information gathering in Phase 1. 
The data collection process for the K -12 Risk Methodology can be applied 
through two distinct approaches that can be used separately or together depending on 
school requirements. In the first approach, each member of the analysis team addresses 
each activity in the data collection process independently. A group discussion is the next 
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step to refine the perspective, share knowledge, and construct an agreed group output. 
This approach was used by the Scarsdale Public School District analysis team during the 
validation of the K -12 Risk Methodology. 
The second approach is similar to using of data collection within the OCTAVE 
Methodology. For this approach, the analysis team conducts a facilitated workshop with 
a carefully selected group or groups of participants that represent one or more important 
segments ofthe K-12 school or school district. The workshop can be repeated for 
multiple groups based on the size and complexity ofthe sponsoring entity. Following the 
workshops, the analysis team consolidates data from all workshops and uses that data to 
construct an agreed group output. Participants in the facilitated workshop can include 
teachers such as computer science instructors, parents, students at varying ages and 
technology skill levels, and external support groups. These individuals are not required 
to join the analysis team and commit to the full amount oftime required for methodology 
deployment. That flexibility allows the methodology to be applied to individual schools, 
school districts, and statewide programs with minimal adjustments. 
Within Phase 1 ofthe OCTAVE Methodology, the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices 
is applied through a set of practice survey worksheets used to gather information about 
the current security practices (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). To incorporate the expanded K-
12 Catalog of Practices, some tailoring ofthe survey worksheets was required. That 
expanded catalog includes strategic and operational practices from the OCTAVE Catalog 
of Practices. Two surveys from the OCTAVE Methodology that incorporate these 
practices, specifically, the Current General Security Practices Survey and the Current IT 
Security Practices Survey, were maintained unchanged in the K-12 Risk Methodology 
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(Alberts & Dorofee, 2001c). An additional survey was required to include educational 
security practices. The Current Educational Security Survey was modeled from the 
strategic and operational worksheets to gather information on current educational 
practices (see Appendix F for the Current Education Security Survey). The questions in 
this survey reflect the practices identified in Appendix A. These practices were 
incorporated into the expanded catalog of practices for the K-12 Risk Methodology. 
When assembling survey results from a range of participants into a consolidated 
group response, the OCTAVE Methodology recommends a summative approach to 
survey responses. Consolidated survey results reflect a count of each response to each 
survey question (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). For a small group or wide range of 
participant groups with varying levels of expertise, an, evenly weighted assembly of 
responses is not appropriate. The K -12 Risk Methodology provides for a group procedure 
that enables the analysis team to use the survey responses from all participants in 
constructing a consolidated perspective. Survey responses from a range of sources can be 
weighted differently based on the known expertise of the participants. This approach 
builds an analysis team perspective on the current state of security practices within the K-
12 school or school district based on a qualitative assessment of survey responses. 
Appendix G includes a Security Practices Summary that provides a combined survey 
worksheet with results grouped by practice area. The analysis team can assure that all 
perspectives are considered through team discussions even when the participant count is 
skewed to selected participant groups. 
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Augmenting Threat Profile Content 
Threats within the OCTAVE Methodology are divided into those posed by 
outsiders who do not have legitimate access to infonnation assets and insiders who have 
legitimate access but may not use it appropriately at all times (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
This division is based on the SEI findings that entities must apply different mitigation and 
protection strategies, depending on the origin ofthe threat (Alberts & Dorofee, 200lc). 
The OCTAVE Methodology assumes insiders are employees of the entity and outsiders 
are non-employees. Within K-12 schools and school districts, there are gray areas when 
applying the insider and outsider designation. Students can function as either, depending 
on the infonnation asset considered. Moreover, the role of parents in accessing student 
infonnation is changing. Vendors may own and manage assets on behalf of the K -12 
school or school district (A WS, 2002). Areas of concern identified about an asset within 
the assessment process must be linked to specific school positions such as student or 
teacher to establish appropriate relevancy. To make this distinction more explicit in the 
K-12 Risk Methodology, a field for specifying the positions with legitimate access and 
those without it was added to the asset description area of the Asset Profile Workbook. 
The Asset Profile Workbook is a set of worksheets completed for each critical asset 
selected by an analysis team within an application of the methodology. In that workbook, 
the analysis team records relevant infonnation about a critical asset selected for 
evaluation. Instructions for the analysis team in defining insiders and outsiders were 
added to the guidelines for activity Al.3 to accommodate the Workbook change. See 
Appendix E for a description of that activity. The roles of insider and outsider are 
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specified to insure that all participants in defining threats to an infonnation asset share a 
similar perspective of who should and should not be pennitted access to the asset. 
Restructuring Phase 3 Worksheets 
Three worksheets are used for the analysis process within Phase 3 of the 
OCTAVE Methodology: (1) Evaluation Criteria, (2) Protection Strategy for Strategic 
Practices, and (3) Protection Strategy for Operational Practices. Each worksheet required 
adjustments to appropriately incorporate the needs ofK-12 schools and school districts. 
The impact categories on the Evaluation Criteria worksheet represent major concern 
areas for an entity in the event of a security breach. The OCTAVE Methodology 
incorporates the following basic areas of concern based on work with U.S. medical and 
manufacturing organizations: reputation or customer confidence; life or health of 
customers; productivity; fines or legal penalties; and financial impact. The research of 
Norris, Soloway, and Sullivan (2002), in evaluating the impact of technology within the 
classroom, identified the following categories of impact as appropriate evaluation criteria 
for K-12 schools and school districts: regulatory compliance; classroom planning and 
curriculum effectiveness; life, health, and safety of students, teachers, and staff; student 
perfonnance on standardized tests and evaluations; family and community support; 
school and district administration support; teacher preparation and technical support; and 
other. The Evaluation Criteria worksheet was modified for use in the K-12 Risk 
Methodology to reflect the recommendations of Norris et al. 
OCTAVE Catalog of Practice categories are incorporated into Phase 3: Security 
Strategy and Planning. Those categories fonn the structure of the Protection Strategy for 
Strategic Practices worksheet and the Protection Strategy for Operational Practices 
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worksheet. Those worksheets provide a series of questions for each practice area to be 
used in the analysis. To appropriately incorporate the educational practices (added into 
the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices for the K-12 Risk Methodology as described 
previously in this document) the worksheets for Phase 3 activities were augmented with a 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices worksheet (see Appendix H). Although 
closely following the format of the other worksheets used in assembling the protection 
strategy, that worksheet emphasizes the educational planning practices instead of 
strategic or operational practices. 
Review of Terminology 
The OCTAVE Methodology consists of 1,800 pages divided into 18 volumes. 
Those volumes include a range of additional material such as technical reports and 
background information relevant to individuals with an extensive background in 
information security management but overwhelming to a group attempting to learn the 
rudiments of a new topic area (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). To minimize the volume of 
information imposed on the K-12 pilot group participants, only content relevant to the K-
12 Risk Methodology was included, and the text was condensed into a single manual. 
That manual included step-by-step instructions for each activity of the K-12 Risk 
Methodology grouped by phase. In addition, the manual included a section containing all 
worksheets used once within the methodology activities. Worksheets that applied to each 
critical asset and required multiple uses within the methodology activities were 
assembled within a separate section in the manual for ease of duplication. Throughout 
the manual, the terms business and enterprise were changed to the general term school. 
Also, the term department was changed to unit. (The complete table of contents for the 
K-12 Risk Methodology manual is included in Appendix E.) 
Validation o/the Tailored Methodology 
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This researcher conducted a review of each adjustment to methodology activities 
and worksheets with SEI researchers who developed the OCTAVE Methodology. In 
addition, as described in Chapter 3 of this report, the tailored methodology was reviewed 
to assure conformance with the OCTA VE Approach. Conformance was measured 
through a review using the OCTAVE Criteria, which are divided into ten principles 
describing the methodology approach and fifteen attributes that identify how the 
principles must be applied within the methodology. A detailed description of the 
principles and attributes and an explanation of the relationships between them are 
provided in Chapter 3. 
Validating conformance of the K-12 Risk Methodology to the OCTAVE Criteria 
required a review of guidance instructions to assure the appropriate application of each 
principle and attribute (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). Also, validation ofthe principles and 
attributes based on the use ofthe methodology provided assurance of the appropriate 
application of the guidance. Based on this review, the K-12 Risk Methodology 
conformed to the principles and attributes ofthe OCTAVE Criteria. For each principle, 
the table in Appendix I provides the following validation data: 
• In the column labeled Principle the name of the principle; 
• In the column labeled Applied assurance that the principle was applied; 
• In the column labeled When a definition of when the principle was applied; 
.. In the column labeled Applied to Methodology Guidance a description of the 
application of the principle to the guidance; and 
.. In the column labeled Applied by Pilot Site a description of use of the principle 
by the pilot site. 
All rows in the Applied column contained the yes, indicating successful confonnance. 
The When column contained one of two options: 
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.. Unchanged, which means guidance and use in the tailored version were the same 
as in the OCTAVE Methodology. 
.. Tailored, which means the guidance and use were modified for the K-12 Risk 
Methodology, and the mechanisms for maintaining confonnance are described the 
columns labeled Applied to Methodology Guidance and Applied by Pilot Site. 
The K-12 Risk Methodology confonns to the attributes ofthe OCTAVE Criteria. 
For each attribute, the table in Appendix J provides the following validation data: 
.. In the column labeled Attribute the name of the attribute; 
.. In the column labeled Applied an assurance that the attribute was applied; 
.. In the column labeled When a definition of when the attribute was applied; 
.. In the column labeled Applied to Methodology Guidance a description of the 
application of the attribute to the guidance; and 
.. In the column labeled Applied by Pilot Site a description of the use ofthe 
attribute by the pilot site. 
The values used in the Applied and When columns are the same as described above for 
the table of principles in Appendix I. 
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Testing in a K-12 School District 
Selection requirements identified in Chapter 3 were met by the selected entity. 
Based on the information assembled from the school handbooks for each grade level, 
interviews with the site coordinator and technical staff, this researcher applied the 
selection criteria defined in Chapter 3 of this report and determined that the Scarsdale 
Public School District (SPSD) met requirements for selection as the pilot site. Four 
individuals were chosen by the site coordinator to join him as analysis team participants. 
This researcher participated in four meetings with the analysis team, specifically 
referenced as Guidance Session I, Guidance Session 2A, Guidance Session 2B, and 
Guidance Session 3. An overview of those sessions is included in this section. In 
addition, the SPSD analysis team met multiple times between each of the four sessions to 
complete assigned segments of the methodology. 
The SPSD consists of one high-school with an enrollment of 1,200 students, one 
middle school with an enrollment of 900 students, and five elementary schools with 
enrollments in each ranging from 350 to 500 students. Every school has at least one 
computer laboratory for use by every grade level. In addition to the laboratory, every 
classroom has active computer connections for instructional use by teachers. A fiber 
optic Gigabit Ethernet wide-area network (WAN) interlinks all the schools. The 
Technical Services staff, with third-party support, coordinates district-based technology 
activities. Internet Service Provider (ISP) services, firewall operations, and content 
filtering are handled by a third party. Students do not assist with network administration, 
but they do assist with classroom audiovisual support. Students attend regularly 
scheduled computer classes at all grade levels. The computer education curriculum 
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includes courses addressing the following topic areas: computer operations; publishing 
and presentation; creativity and design; problem-solving; and research. All students, 
starting in kindergarten, are provided with access to the school network. 
Initial Meeting 
This researcher met with the technology coordinator to review requirements for 
consideration as a pilot site for this investigation and confirmed that participants from the 
SPSD could invest the required time to validate the K-12 Risk Methodology. A copy of 
the first chapter of this document was provided to the SPSD coordinator prior to the 
initial meeting. The coordinator shared the document with the technical services 
supervisor and network specialist responsible for the general supervision of the school 
district network infrastructure. During this initial meeting, the following topics and 
concepts were reviewed: 
• Hardware, software, network infrastructure components and services, and 
technical support from a system administration perspective; 
• Security policy, procedures, practices, monitoring efforts, and problems; and 
• Distinctive features of the K-12 population including student emollment 
demographics, teaching and administrative staff demographics, technology use 
and support in the school curriculum. 
Each participant expressed a strong interest in the risk assessment process. No 
previous risk or vulnerability evaluation work had been conducted by the participants 
because of cost constraints. At the coordinator's suggestion, the analysis team included 
participants in this initial meeting who represented the curriculum and technology areas. 
In addition, an administrative manager and assistant manager joined the analysis team. 
125 
The technology coordinator was the analysis team leader and handled all communication 
between this investigator and the analysis team. Analysis team participants worked 
together on other school district initiatives and shared information extensively. 
Guidance Session 1 
This researcher initiated Guidance Session 1 with a presentation using materials 
from a CoSN conference presentation in February 2003 (Woody, 2003). In addition, a 
brief description of the K -12 Risk Methodology, and an overview of the expanded 
OCTAVE Catalog of Practices were provided. The SPSD analysis team determined that 
the assessment would focus on the instructional technology, the administrative systems, 
and Internet usage by the school district. For the validation process ofthe tailored 
methodology, the analysis team selected one critical asset from each ofthe focus areas to 
use in the methodology workshops. The student folder repository was selected to 
represent instructional technology; the payroll database represented administrative 
systems, and the ISP represented Internet usage. 
Guidance Session 2A 
The second meeting between this researcher and the SPSD analysis team was 
scheduled to occur when the analysis team completed the Phase 1 activities. However, 
team participants were unable to apply the generic threat trees to the selected assets. 
Analysis team participants reported difficulty in identifying threats that had not actually 
materialized. This researcher determined the participants were applying a reactive 
approach to the analysis and had not considered the impact of potential threats. By 
adjusting the original sequence of activities and developing evaluation criteria prior to 
using the generic threat trees in Phase 1 instead of waiting until Phase 3, the analysis 
team was able to proceed with the assessment activities. 
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To address the evaluation criteria, the analysis team chose to adjust the impact 
areas provided in the K-12 Risk Methodology. The team members identified impacts in 
terms of the highest priority for K-12 schools and school districts as follows: 
• Required by a regulatory mandate; 
• Led to an article on the front page of the local newspaper; 
• Resulted in parents calling members ofthe school board with complaints; 
• Affected the ability of teachers and students to meet their classroom schedule; and 
• Interrupted online services especially Internet access. 
As a result ofthe dependency of all work at the school district on electronic 
communication, a loss or interruption of online services was selected by the SPSD 
analysis team as the most critical impact, and the team decided to use that as the only 
evaluation criteria within the application of the methodology. The methodology allows 
for the selection of multiple evaluation criteria, and the analysis team's decision to focus 
on only one is unique. To apply the evaluation criteria to the selected threat paths and 
determine the importance of each possible threat, varying degrees of impact were 
established. The OCTAVE Methodology uses a qualitative scale of high, medium, and 
low. The analysis team established the levels of impact for interruption of online services 
as follows: 
• A low impact would involve up to a half-day interruption. 
• A medium impact would involve up to two days of interruption. 
• A high impact would involve any interruption that lasted two or more days. 
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With defined evaluation criteria, the analysis team returned to the Phase I activity 
(AI.6) of defining threats to the selected assets using the generic threat trees worksheets 
in the Asset Profile Workbook. Those trees provided a template of potential threats that 
should be considered when analyzing an asset (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001b). The 
template, the same for both the K-12 Risk Methodology and the OCTAVE Methodology, 
groups threats into four categories based on the threat source or access path used to reach 
the asset: 
• Human actors using network access; 
• Human actors using physical access; 
• System problems such as viruses, software defects, system crashes, and hardware 
defects; and 
• Other problems outside of the entity's control such as power supply problems, 
telecommunications problems, and natural disasters. 
Within each template group, asset threats are selected based on the following: 
• An actor who can be categorized as an insider or outsider of the asset; 
• A motive that can be deliberate or accidental, and only applies to human actor 
threat sources; and 
• A security outcome that can be disclosure, modification, loss/destruction, or 
interruption. 
These combinations are organized graphically into a tree structure. The template for 
Human Actors Using Network Access is provided in Appendix K for reference. Usually, 
a subset ofthe possible threats applies to an asset, and the selected paths appropriate to 
the asset are highlighted in the Asset Profile Workbook. However, the analysis team 
found no means of eliminating any ofthe paths and so chose to include all of them for 
each critical asset. 
Guidance Session 2B 
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Instead of constructing a team output for each critical asset as described in the 
instructions, each SPSD team participant selected a single critical asset and individually 
assigned an impact value to all the possible generic threats for the critical asset using the 
single evaluation criterion established in Guidance Session 2A, specifically, loss or 
interruption of online services. Next, each risk in the Human Actors Using Network 
Access category for each critical asset was reviewed by the technology participants, and 
impact values were adjusted to reflect existing protection mechanisms that reduced the 
potential impact. Subsequently, all individual worksheets were discussed by the team, 
and impact values were adjusted to reflect a team result. Though the analysis team used a 
different sequence of steps, the results met the requirements for outputs of Phase I: 
Organizational View. 
The SPSD analysis team next considered the activities for Phase 2. This 
researcher provided a brief review of the skills required to address the Technological 
View. The technology participants confirmed that their school district had neither the 
necessary skills nor a means of acquiring external expertise within the required timeframe 
for the evaluation. Based on the lack of required expertise, the analysis team decided to 
bypass Phase 2. The interactions between the school district and the service provider 
were informal and undocumented. The technical supervisor accepted an action item to 
document future interactions and discuss the possibility of a future vulnerability 
evaluation ofthe school district infrastructure with third-party support. To initiate Phase 
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3: Security Strategy and Planning, the team discussed which critical asset risks would be 
carried forward for mitigation consideration and decided to consider only high impact 
risks. 
Guidance Session 3 
The final session was scheduled when the SPSD analysis team completed Phase 
3. The team selected three security practice areas for strategic improvement and 
developed a plan for initiating improvement in each selected area. Selected analysis team 
members were assigned responsibility for the detail planning and implementation of 
improvement activities. The three areas were chosen to address the high-impact risks to 
the critical assets. The coordinator for the analysis team presented the protection strategy 
and implementation plan to the Scarsdale District School Board as the product of the 
security risk assessment to obtain approval to address the remaining activities for security 
risk management beyond the planning steps provided in the K-12 Risk Methodology. 
SPSD analysis team participants reported an increased awareness of security risks 
after completing the surveys in Phase 1. Participants also suggested that examples of the 
completed worksheets for K-12 schools would clarify some of the activity instructions for 
future K-12 school and school district users. Participants suggested the following two 
sequence changes within the methodology based on problems encountered in its use at 
the SPSD: (1) introduce action planning in the survey analysis activities of Phase 1 and 
(2) move the activity of creating evaluation criteria to Phase 1 prior to addressing the 
threat profiles. 
The SPSD analysis team agreed that the methodology was effective because of the 
following characteristics: 
.. The developer of the methodology was available to provide initial guidance as 
well as follow-up visits. This guidance kept the team focused on the 
methodology. 
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.. The methodology provided a structure for allowing the team to assess its school 
district's security practices and make specific recommendations for improvement. 
.. The methodology was not focused on specific technology products and could be 
applied to all areas of the school district. 
.. The methodology facilitated an examination of a wide range of security practices 
and the development of recommendations based on selected critical assets. 
.. The security review activities provided a means of viewing security information 
from multiple perspectives, enhancing the confidence level of the analysis team in 
planned improvements. 
The SPSD analysis team coordinator (Gerald Crisi, personal communication, July 25, 
2003) provided the following recommendations assembled from analysis team input to 
better fit the methodology to the needs of other K-12 schools and school districts: 
• Provide a documented introduction to the methodology that highlights its value to 
K-12 schools and school districts. 
• Stress the importance of completing the assessment before applying its results. 
Participants at the SPSD considered implementing selected actions identified in 
Phase 1. Only one of the three security practice areas selected for mitigation in 
Phase 3 was identified in the earlier Phase 1 plan. Without completing the 
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methodology, the analysis team would have initiated actions to address lower 
priority risks without realizing the higher impact risks were not being considered. 
Survey responses were provided by all analysis team participants (see Appendix L). The 
individual evaluations supported the team summary. 
This researcher facilitated a discussion with SPSD analysis team participants to 
identify additional issues after receiving the survey responses. The following 
recommendations for future uses of the tailored methodology were identified during that 
discussion: 
• Schedule the introduction to the materials in multiple sessions to avoid 
overloading individuals who are new to the concepts of risk and security with too 
much information at once. 
• Schedule analysis team working sessions closer together to carry learning from 
one step to the next. A great deal of review was needed to re-engage SPSD team 
members between sessions. 
• Assemble worksheet information and notes from each meeting for distribution to 
each team member to improve information sharing since not everyone can attend 
each team meeting. 
• Consider team conversations that result in shared knowledge among the members 
as a major value in using the methodology. 
As a result of using the K-12 Risk Methodology, the SPSD analysis team participants 
reported the following outcomes: 
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• Individual team members initiated changes within their specific areas to improve 
procedures and accountability for security that had not been previously 
considered. 
• The team members planned to meet quarterly to consider high-impact risks for 
other information assets and to expand the use of the methodology within the 
school district. 
• Survey worksheets were administered to groups ofteachers and students to 
evaluate perceptions of security throughout the school district. 
Review by K-12 School Representatives 
Because there is a wide variation of size and technology capability among K-12 
schools and school districts, an individual pilot site could not be considered a 
representative sample (K. Krueger, personal communication, February 21,2003). To 
expand the review process to a broader audience, the tailored methodology was presented 
for review and comment to a group often K-12 school officials representing nine states. 
Review participants were selected from the membership of the Consortium for School 
Networking (CoSN), a national non-profit organization that draws its members from K-
12 schools and school districts across the country. In preparation for this review, the 
CoSN assembled a Security Focus Group (SFG). Participants in this group included 
three individuals serving on the CoSN executive board who previously expressed interest 
in K-12 school security and attendees at the K-12 School Networking Conference 2003 in 
Arlington, VA who signed up to participate in the SFG through self-selection. Each 
participant was responsible for a student body that ranged in size from 2,500 to 6.5 
million. Participants described their positions as follows: 
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• Director of instructional media and technology, 
• Chief information officer, 
• Associate superintendent, 
• Educator, 
• Director of technology, 
• Content director, 
• Consultant, 
• Executive director, and 
• School board member. 
The SFG met once at the conference to review the same PowerPoint slide 
presentation used as an introduction at the pilot site. Participants expressed the following 
reasons for their interest in the methodology: (1) security is complex because the use of 
technology in K-12 schools and school districts is controlled at the individual classroom 
and student level; (2) existing resources are not sufficient for performing a complete 
assessment; (3) K-12 schools and school districts must respond to conflicting mandates 
for security from parents and regulators. 
Each SFG participant received a copy of the K-12 Risk Methodology guidelines 
and worksheets. Methodology changes identified by the SPSD analysis team required a 
reordering of the activity steps. However, to avoid confusion of two versions of the 
methodology with differing sequences, these recommendations were communicated to 
the SFG review participants verbally by the CoSN coordinator. 
Following the review of the K-12 Risk Methodology, SFG participants were 
asked to complete a questionnaire. Seven participants representing six schools and 
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school districts responded. The questionnaire contained seven statements to which the 
SFG participant selected agree, disagree, or do not know responses. 
The following summarizes the responses: 
Statement Agree Disagree Do not know No response 
My school or school district currently addresses 6 1 
security risk adequately. 
Information security is considered in new 4 3 
technology purchasing and implementation in my 
school or school district. 
My school or school district devotes time and 3 3 1 
resources to security issues on a regular basis. 
The K -12 Methodology presentation expanded 6 1 
my concern of security risk in my school or 
school district. 
The presentation was adequate to understand the 7 
purpose and scope of the K-12 Risk 
Methodology. 
The K-12 Risk Methodology is something I 7 
would consider recommending for my school or 
school district. 
My school or school district would need training 3 2 1 1 
and technology assistance to consider the K-12 
Risk Methodology. 
Findings 
As demonstrated by this investigation of the K-12 Risk Methodology including its 
use by the Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD), a risk management approach can be 
used by K-12 schools and school districts to improve the management of Intemet security 
risks. In addition, the selected school district was able to self-direct its efforts in applying 
risk management using the K-12 Risk Methodology. By applying the methodology, the 
SPSD analysis team used risk analysis to identify high-impact security risks to critical 
information assets. Subsequently, that team used risk mitigation to define a protection 
strategy for addressing those security risks. 
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At the SPSD and during the expert review, participants initially focused on 
specific actions that could be resolved quickly until the impact of potential risks was 
clarified. The opportunity to focus on a few critical assets provided by the K-12 Risk 
Methodology instead of attempting an exhaustive review was cited as important by 
participants in both the SPSD validation and expert review. According to findings from 
this investigation, K -12 school and school district personnel have limited time to apply to 
tasks outside ofthe daily responsibilities oftheir jobs, and these individuals benefit from 
a process that helps define achievable results within a finite timeframe. 
Regulatory compliance is a primary focus ofK-12 school administrators. 
Reviews and audits are performed on a constant basis by local, state, and federal 
authorities. None ofthe regulatory or audit controls for K-12 schools and school districts 
mandate a security risk assessment. However, the growing visibility of problems related 
to technology use in colleges and universities, and the increased visibility of technology-
related incidents in K-12 schools and school districts has motivated K-12 administrators 
to consider the value of a security risk assessment. By addressing security risk 
management, an analysis team is prepared to respond to oversight inquiry when an 
Internet security problem occurs in its community. This capability was validated when 
the town of Scarsdale's Internet capability was compromised during the SPSD 
methodology validation, and school district leaders were required to respond to questions 
from the Scarsdale District School Board about the school district's Internet risk. 
Linking the K-12 Risk Methodology with the Technology Support Index (TSI) 
(http://tsi.iste.org/techsupport), an assessment tool for profiling the support programs of 
K-12 schools and school districts provided by the ISTE, was suggested by SPSD analysis 
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team participants. The TSI assessment identifies four areas: (1) equipment standards, (2) 
staffing and processes, (3) professional development, and (4) intelligent systems. 
Although the TSI assessment is not mandatory, it is used by K-12 schools and school 
districts to justify resource allocations for technology. Within each TSI assessment area, 
practices for technology are identified, but security practices are not included. In 
addition, existing audit and regulatory requirements used by local, state, and federal 
agencies to evaluate technology in K-12 schools and school districts should be expanded 
to incorporate the appropriate emphasis on security management. Based on the report of 
the Exploring the Future of Learning (EFL) Spring 2003 Education Forum, educators 
respond when regulatory and audit requirements are instituted (Armstrong et aI., 2003). 
Findings Specific to the Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD) 
Identifying information assets, security requirements, threats, evaluation criteria, 
impacts, and information security risks using the required worksheets within the K-12 
Risk Methodology for documentation was time-consuming for analysis team participants. 
The provided written instructions were sufficient after an initial introductory guidance 
session. A K-12 school or school district learning the methodology would benefit from a 
case study that supplied solution worksheets using a K -12 school or school district 
example for use as a training tool. Examples for a hospital are provided with the 
OCTAVE Methodology (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Analysis team participants relied 
extensively on additional explanations provided by this researcher in applying the 
methodology, and compensating options for that individualized guidance are needed for 
broad use of the methodology to be feasible. 
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Technical personnel were not prepared to perform vulnerability evaluations at the 
SPSD. The constantly changing mix of equipment within the network prohibited the use 
of vulnerability tools that were equipment specific. The K-12 school district 
infrastructure in this investigation was complex, spanning many locations and blending a 
wide range of technology components. The need for a low-cost approach to technology 
support eliminated the usage of many of the available vulnerability evaluation tools. K-
12 schools and school districts would benefit from the development of a shared pool of 
tools, training materials, tips, and techniques based on security practices successfully 
applied at other K-12 schools and school districts. 
SFG Review Findings 
The SFG review group demonstrated a strong interest in the use of a security risk 
management methodology. The Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act 
(HIP AA) regulations for security that were issued in February 2003 and mandated a risk 
assessment intensified interest of this review group since many K-12 schools and school 
districts must comply with HIP AA regulations. Such regulations specifically designate 
privacy control of student information to the existing Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERP A) regulations, thereby, increasing the visibility of the K -12 school's 
and school district's role in the privacy of each student's personal information. 
Based on survey responses, only a portion ofthe participating K-12 schools and 
school districts would be able to address security risk without additional support and 
training. A means of providing a low-cost training option is needed for the broad 
application ofthe K-12 Risk Methodology in K-12 schools and school districts. 
Examples specific to the K-12 school environment and an introduction that helps an 
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entity understand the value of a risk assessment, the selection of an analysis team, and the 
establishment of an appropriate scope for an assessment can partially address the training 
requirement. 
SFG participants identified a major security risk for K-12 schools and school 
districts that provide a technology learning environment and an administrative support 
environment within the same infrastructure. A means of identifying security practices 
that work well within the K-12 school domain and a mechanism for sharing these 
practices with participants as lessons learned can benefit K-12 schools and school 
districts with limited resources. 
K-12 Risk Methodology Structure and Use 
The addition of an introductory document to provide direction in the selection of 
an analysis team and the scoping of an assessment is needed for new users. Also, based 
on observations by this researcher, a flowchart to help the analysis team track where it is 
at any point in the process would be beneficial. This flowchart could serve as a constant 
reminder of the overall goal of the series of activities, thereby, keeping the analysis team 
on track. The guidelines provide a complete and detailed process for using the 
worksheets and developing a protection strategy. 
Linkage of the risk assessment with existing audit and assessment tools already in 
use in K-12 schools and school districts, such as the TSI assessment, can help provide a 
way for administrators to coordinate risk assessment activities with existing workloads. 
The survey instruments from Phase 1: Organizational View can also be used for multiple 
purposes since these instruments are based on good security practices that are applicable 
to a range ofK-12 school and school district audits and evaluations. 
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Based on the SPSD usage, a reordering of selected methodology steps is needed. 
By introducing the action list in Phase 1 instead of Phase 3, ideas generated in security 
discussions can be documented. By moving the development of evaluation criteria into 
an earlier position in the process, the analysis team will be better prepared to consider 
potential threats and, thereby, avoid shifting from planning into execution mode with 
each identified security need. However, the true measure of threats will not be realized 
until the criteria are applied to value the threats, which cannot be accomplished until the 
final steps in Phase 3. 
Some terminology used within the K-12 Risk Methodology is not consistent with 
common usage in the K-12 school domain. This researcher addressed major 
inconsistencies as part of the tailoring effort. Examples specific to the K-12 school 
domain can help clarify the meanings of terms not used regularly within this domain. 
Importantly, a careful review by individuals closely involved in the K-12 school domain 
should be considered before broad deployment of the K-12 Risk Methodology is 
attempted to minimize questions and reduce potential confusion. 
Summary of Results 
K-12 schools and school districts can apply security risk management using the 
K-12 Risk Methodology as confirmed by its application at the selected pilot school 
district and its review by a group ofK-12 school experts. Constraints of time and 
resources hamper broader use unless K-12 schools and school districts are mandated to 
perform a risk assessment or recognize the value of performing a risk assessment based 
on the impact of network security problems. At a minimum, the use of pieces of the 
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methodology such as survey worksheets from Phase I: Organizational View can provide 
a starting point for considering the security practices needed for Internet security in K -12 
schools and school districts. 
The K-12 Risk Methodology provides a low-cost approach to security risk 
management that incorporates sufficiently unique characteristics ofK-12 schools and 
school districts to be highly effective. Training support, expanded introductory materials, 
and automated tools to help manage the information collected using the methodology can 
enhance adoption by improving the mechanisms for learning and using the K-12 Risk 
Methodology. The changing and uncertain regulatory climate combined with a lengthy 
budget and approval cycle for funding underscore the importance of planning for security 
risk management in K-12 schools and school districts. With the K-12 Risk Methodology, 
investment for security can be planned to focus limited resources on the greatest security 
risks. 
K-12 schools and school districts cannot continue to rely on teachers to control 
security within the classroom when these individuals are provided with limited 
preparation. Problems stemming from the lack of appropriate monitoring can be 
expected to increase as student use oftechnology with Internet connectivity extends 
beyond classroom time. Students cannot be used as resource extensions without effective 
management and monitoring. K-12 schools and school districts have an opportunity to 
address information security risk within the context of what is appropriate to each entity 
before general mandates are legislated. 
By monitoring issues relevant to higher education, K -12 schools and school 
districts have the opportunity to recognize potential security problems and plan 
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appropriate responses instead of reacting to a realized impact. This planning opportunity 
may not remain available for a long period of time since behavior patterns point to K-12 
students closely following those of older students. The increased visibility ofK-12 
student involvement in worm, virus propagation, and other criminal Internet activities 
that jeopardize critical national infrastructure can be expected to be accompanied by 
efforts to control the environments that provide Internet access to those individuals. 
K-12 schools and school districts should proactively seek to influence the 
technology solutions for security available for use in classrooms. A shared repository of 
effective security practices should be established that identifies security implementation 
requirements for widely used K-12 software and hardware. Shared training programs for 
security awareness and guidelines for the unique needs ofK-12 schools and school 
districts can augment limited staff technical skills. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
Conclusion 
This research demonstrated that security risk management can be applied by K-12 
schools and school districts to address the security risks of Internet connectivity. This 
research also demonstrated that increased understanding of the impacts of security risks 
for Internet connectivity is a sufficient motivator for K-12 school and school district 
administrators to identify ways to address risk mitigation. 
Expanded awareness of security issues by stakeholders within K-12 schools and 
school districts benefits administrators, teachers, curriculum developers, infrastructure 
support staff, students, and parents. From a shared understanding of the security threats 
to the classroom and their potential impacts, planned approaches can be developed to take 
advantage of lower cost opportunities and existing capabilities. A planned and reasoned 
approach effectively counters expensive politically motivated reactions performed to 
appease the vocal discord that arises from a crisis. Given the susceptibility of Internet 
connectivity to increasingly harmful security events, expanded Internet connectivity for 
the classroom will lead to an increase of security challenges for K -12 administrators 
(Pethia, 2003). Without planned security management, reactive responses can leave K-12 
schools and school districts vulnerable to repeated security occurrences whose root 
problems are unaddressed. 
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Not all stakeholders require the same level of awareness. K-12 administrators 
need to understand the impact of security issues and ways the K-12 school and school 
district can effectively address those issues. Teachers and parents need to be aware ofthe 
steps taken by the K-12 schools and school districts to address security risk. Teachers 
also need to understand and follow procedures for reporting problems and identifying 
new areas of risk that may appear as classroom technology use expands and changes. 
Students need to be aware of the K-12 school's and school district's focus on addressing 
security risk, appropriate behavior patterns, and the penalties and sanctions they will face 
if their behavior deviates outside of expected norms. 
K-12 school and school district personnel must recognize that the introduction of 
technology into the classroom environment is accompanied by an unknown level of 
security risk that must be managed. Students cannot be viewed as replacement resources 
for skilled staff, and student involvement in technical support must be closely and 
effectively managed. By performing a security risk assessment using the K-12 Risk 
Methodology, school personnel gain an increased awareness of the security risks within 
the context of their domain. Within the assessment, participants identify the greatest 
risks so that mitigation efforts can be focused on the most critical challenges. 
According to this research, K-12 school districts such as the Scarsdale Public 
School District (SPSD) lack the expertise to address vulnerability evaluations and 
security audits. A structured assessment process tailored to the K-12 school domain that 
provides a means for identifying and correcting technology vulnerabilities can enhance 
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security functions provided by current K-12 technology staff. However, it is important 
that K-12 schools and school districts do not rely solely on technology solutions. K-12 
school and school district administrators must also address the strategic and educational 
security practices required in effective security risk management. 
The K-12 Risk Methodology provides a low-cost solution that allows schools and 
school districts to approach the risk assessment activities over an extended period of time. 
General security practices incorporated into the K-12 Catalog of Practices provide an 
increased awareness of risk areas that K-12 school and school district personnel must 
consider and appropriate practices that should be applied at each entity. The K-12 Risk 
Methodology is a planning process that guides K-12 school personnel in assembling an 
information protection strategy. To realize the full benefit of security risk mitigation, 
school and school district personnel must execute the resulting plan. 
Implications 
In the process of conducting this investigation, this researcher introduced a wide 
range of individuals within the K-12 school domain to issues of security risk. This 
researcher spoke at the following conferences and presented issues related to the need for 
security risk management in the K-12 school domain: 
• Consortium for School Networking, CoSN K-12 Networking Conference, 
Arlington, Virginia, February 2003, a panel presentation titled Meeting the 
Security Challenges of the Connected Schoolhouse; 
• Exploring the Future of Learning (EFL) Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., April 
2003, a two-day facilitated discussion of invited participants to identify critical 
educational challenges. This researcher proposed K-12 security needs in a 
presentation titled The Security Challenges of the Internet; and 
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• The FBI Infraguard of Pittsburgh hosted a one-day conference for K-12 school 
and school district administrators held at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, P A, 
November 11, 2003. This researcher delivered a presentation titled Addressing 
the Risk of Internet Connectivity for K-12. 
The Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD), the pilot site for this investigation, 
was selected by the National School Boards Association (NSBA) as one of the top five 
technology schools in the U.S., and participants from the analysis team shared their 
application of security risk management at the award presentation in October 2003 
(http://www.nsba.org). In addition, the April 2003 issue of School Planning & 
Management Magazine, a publication for K-12 administrators, contained an article by 
Enderle (2003) titled "Are School Networks as Safe as We Think?" That article 
referenced this research effort and a cyber-security initiative established by the 
Consortium for School Networking (CoSN). 
Based on its K-12 school and school district members' need for help in managing 
security risks, the CoSN established a partnership for launching a new initiative called 
Cyber Security for the Digital District (http://securedistrict.cosn.org). That partnership 
involved the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and vendors that sell security tools and 
services within the K-12 school domain, such as Symantec and SurfControl. That 
initiative, which builds on this research, will develop a program to accomplish the 
following goals: 
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• Promote an awareness of technology security issues that must be considered in the 
K-12 schools and school districts. 
• Identify K -12 school and school district best practices for information security 
that can be adopted as K -12 infrastructure standards and incorporated into training 
and tools that provide information about security options to network 
administrators. 
• Promote the inclusion of digital-age ethics in the K-12 school curriculum. 
• Show school decision makers and technology directors how to improve the 
security for systems that handle data collection, transmission, storage, retrieval, 
and distribution of sensitive information. 
• Provide publications to the K-12 vendor community to clarify the needs of 
information security in products designated for the K-12 school and school 
district. 
This researcher has no formal involvement with the funded project beyond supplying a 
copy of the K-12 Risk Methodology for use by CoSN members at the completion ofthis 
investigation. 
Specific actions planned by the CoSN to address initiative goals include the 
following: 
• A white paper to define security risk management issues in terms appropriate for 
K -12 school and school district administrators. 
• Training programs for K-12 school and school district administrators in the 
application of the K-12 Risk Methodology. 
.. A survey of the security problems and practices in use within the K-12 schools 
and school districts to identify common problems and best practices. 
.. Enhancement of the usability of the K -12 Risk Methodology by addressing 
formatting issues identified by participants in this research and automating the 
assembly of required documentation. 
.. The creation of a Web site for school network administrators to serve as a 
resource for K -12 security information, training, and vulnerability assessment 
tools. That site will parallel other CoSN leadership initiatives including Taking 
Total Cost of Ownership to the Classroom (http://www.classroomtco.org) and 
Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse (http://www.safewiredschools.org). 
.. A presentation of Web interactive conferences with participation from network 
leaders, security consultants, and vendor representatives to debate information 
security issues in K-12 schools and school districts. 
.. Tools developed or assembled to help local education leaders and network 
administrators analyze and address K -12 information security risks and 
infrastructure vulnerabilities. 
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.. Workshops, conference presentations, and online courses developed to clarify 
information security issues, demonstrate available tools, and feature action plans 
for K -12 personnel. 
.. Articles published in magazines and professional journals, such as School 
Planning and Management Magazine, that target K-12 school board members, 
administrators, and other K -12 decision makers to broadly distribute ideas and 
148 
increase awareness ofinfonnation security solutions for K-12 schools and school 
districts. 
Recommendations 
The educational results of current legislative efforts to insert technology into the 
classroom are unclear (Armstrong & Casement, 2000). Measurements that will become 
available through further educational research should be applied to evaluate security 
practices in use by K-12 schools and school districts. Measurement of the effectiveness 
of security practices will provide a means for a stronger alignment of applied security 
actions with the educational mission. 
A single methodology approach for security risk management was considered in 
this research. Comparing the results of using the K-12 Risk Methodology with other 
widely used risk assessment methodologies, such as the Facilitated Risk Analysis Process 
(FRAP) or the Infonnation Protection Assessment Kit (IP AK), could enhance the options 
available to K-12 schools and school districts in addressing a security risk assessment. 
Such a comparison could also expand the understanding of security risk analysis in the K-
12 school domain. 
Issues related to security awareness and training should be reinforced consistently 
for students beginning at the kindergarten level and continually as they progress through 
all levels of the educational system. Research should be conducted to detennine whether 
the consistent application of good security practices that are structured using a unifonn 
risk methodology and adopted by K-12 schools and school districts improves the 
adoption of ethical behavior by K -12 learners. 
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Advanced training of K -12 technical staff in security for new technology areas 
should be considered. If a K -12 school or school district initiates a program that 
introduces hardware and software new to its technology infrastructure, such as a wireless 
network, funding should be allocated for security. That funding should be spent on 
training technical support personnel about security problems and practices for the new 
technology. Funding should also support implementation of monitoring capabilities to 
support an acceptable level of security risk. This process may require a change in the 
way new technology is implemented in the K-12 classroom. 
Based on feedback from the SPSD analysis team and responses to the survey 
questionnaire by K-12 school and school district representatives in the Security Focus 
Group (SFG), K -12 schools have not planned for security management. This lack of 
planning is exhibited in the K-12 administrative responses to security incidents reported 
in the news media. Harsh responses such as felony charges and jail sentences for student 
incidents of adjusting or deleting files (Legon, 2003) indicate an administrative reaction 
instead ofa planned response. Only 19% ofK-12 schools and school districts have 
acceptable use policies (AUPs) (NSBF, 2002a). If appropriate ethical training for 
students is not applied and appropriate use policies are not in place and enforced, security 
breaches from K -12 students can be expected to increase. 
Higher education institutions are bound by many of the same federal regulatory 
requirements such as FERP A and HIP AA that apply to K-12 schools and school districts. 
Similar security risks are applicable to both domains because both types of institutions 
must support teaching, learning, and administration (Salomon et aI., 2003). Findings from 
the application of security risk management in K-12 schools can serve as a foundation for 
the application of security risk management in community colleges, colleges, and 
universities. 
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K-12 schools and school districts have the opportunity to prepare for problems 
with technology use by monitoring what is occurring in college and university 
environments and learning from the experiences of those institutions. As technology use 
in K-12 classrooms increases, administrators must assume that the associated security 
management problems experienced in higher education will also appear in their K-12 
schools and school districts. K-12 administrators have an opportunity to establish 
appropriate authority figures knowledgeable in technology to reinforce appropriate 
behavior patterns for students (Verton, 2002), but doing so will require an expanded 
investment in technical staff resources that are documented as under-funded (NSBF, 
2002B). 
As a large consumer group oftechnology, K-12 schools and school districts have 
an opportunity to influence technology developers to provide more secure products. 
Technology currently in use in K-12 classrooms is not secure by design, and vendors 
serving the K-12 market must be encouraged to improve the functionality of available 
security (Armstrong et aI., 2003). Expanded technical training of teachers and staff 
responsible for technology management in K-12 schools and school districts is a 
necessity (Schwartau, 2001). It is no longer sufficient for self-taught teachers and 
volunteers to be assigned full responsibility for the technical infrastructure when Internet 
connectivity is added to it (Kenneally, 2002). 
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Summary 
This researcher introduced security risk management concepts and a structured 
methodology for evaluating security risk to K-12 administrators. The OCTAVE 
Methodology was tailored to incorporate security practices and measurements unique to 
K-12 schools and school districts, and was successfully applied by the Scarsdale Public 
School District (SPSD) to identify and plan for security risk mitigation. 
In contrast to medical, financial, and federal-government agencies, security risk 
management is not mandated for K-12 schools and school districts. Based on responses 
from participants of the SPSD analysis team and the SFG review group, this investigator 
determined that limited awareness of security issues resulting from Internet connectivity 
and the lack of funding available to maintain technology security are major causes of 
poor security management within K -12 schools and school districts. K -12 administrators, 
staff, and teachers would benefit from the application of a structured methodology 
tailored to the needs ofthe K-12 domain. In addition, K-12 administrators would benefit 
from a formalized means of sharing security practices and security technology expertise. 
Through the CoSN and its planned distribution ofthe K-12 Risk Methodology to its 
membership along with supplemental educational and technical support tools, low-cost 
security risk management processes can become available to individuals responsible for 
Internet connectivity in K-12 schools and school districts. 
School administrators and teachers are pressured by potentially competing 
demands to improve minimum student learning as measured by the NCLB regulations 
and to apply technology within the K -12 school and school district infrastructure as 
emphasized by the E-rate program. As a result, technology installed using E-rate funding 
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has not been consistently applied within the K-12 curriculum except by individual 
teachers with sufficient training and technical support to incorporate technology usage 
into their classrooms (Cuban, 2001). The lack of standard practices for technology 
training, support, and protection within the K-12 classroom has contributed to a lack of 
regard for technology security by teachers and school curriculum developers (TSSA, 
2001). In contrast, technology dependency has increased within the administrative 
functions in K-12 schools and school districts where regulatory monitoring in response to 
the NCLB Act has forced extensive automation through external sources (A WS, 2002). 
In order to understand and address the security needs of this complex and changing 
technology environment, K-12 school and school district administrators can benefit from 
the planned approach to information asset identification, security requirement 
identification, and security threat identification and assessment provided by the K-12 
Risk Methodology. 
Educational oversight organizations such as the Department of Education (ED) 
have not recognized a responsibility for balancing the expanded reporting and data access 
requirements with appropriate security risk management requirements. In addition, K-12 
school and school district administrators and school board members have not recognized 
their responsibility to evaluate the security risk of the technology infrastructure to 
establish acceptable use policies in the same manner as acceptable facility use and risks 
to student health and safety are evaluated and addressed. 
Federal, state, and local regulators for K-12 schools and school districts must 
consider the importance of security risk management in the funding and monitoring of 
153 
K-12 school and school district technology use. The appropriate consideration of 
security for Internet-accessible infonnation assets under the responsibility of each K-12 
school and school district must become standard practice. The similarity of security risk 
management issues in K-12 schools and school districts to those of institutions of higher 
education has not been recognized by ED. Federal funding is available to colleges and 
universities to address security risk but not to K -12 schools and school districts. 
Acceptable levels of security risk must be established and monitored to assure the privacy 
and protection ofK-12 school and school district online resources. 
Based on responses of the SFG, all participants in the technology decisions within 
K-12 schools and school districts require training to understand the security risk that is 
introduced through Internet access. In addition, training for K-12 decision-makers must 
support the development of an understanding of available measures for addressing 
security risk, implementation and maintenance mechanisms for continued security risk 
management, and resource levels needed to support effective security risk management. 
The lack of technology expertise for general technology support, which has been 
augmented by student assistance (NSBF, 2002a), is further aggravated by the lack of 
understanding of the need for security risk management by K-12 school and school 
district administrators. 
The appropriate level of participation of students and teachers in K -12 school and 
school district technology support must be established. Involvement developed 
infonnally based on individually acquired technical expertise and technical staffing 
shortages has created potential security risk that must be addressed. Within each K-12 
school and school district, a planned level oftechnology access for students and teachers 
based on a security risk management plan that defines the appropriate level of 
participation for students and teachers can be established using the K-12 Risk 
Methodology. 
154 
Security risks within each K -12 school and school district are not well understood 
by those that plan and support the technology infrastructure. Content filtering has been 
the focus of concern for technology use based on regulatory mandate. This focus fails to 
address the wide range of risks to data quality and connectivity from both inside and 
outside sources that can occur through technology access. Based on the experience of 
SPSD, use of a well structured security risk methodology that includes the evaluation of 
current practice with a catalog of good security practices can enhance the concern for 
security by analysis participants. 
K-12 administrators must recognize the complexity of the technology 
infrastructure available to support the teaching and administrative needs within each K-
12 school and school district. Technical staffhired or contracted to provide support and 
maintenance must acquire sufficient skill to address technology infrastructure 
vulnerability evaluation and security monitoring. The skills needed to assist in 
performing the activities of Phase 2 in the K -12 Security Risk Methodology are critical to 
the ability of an entity to effectively recognize, resist, and recover from security events 
affecting the technology infrastructure. The technology support for the complex 
infrastructure implemented in K-12 schools and school districts must include in-depth 
security risk management expertise. 
It is incumbent upon the leaders ofK-12 schools and school districts, such as 
school board members and school administrators, to assign responsibility for security risk 
155 
management and monitor the effectiveness of applying security practices. 
Inappropriately managed Internet connectivity can have serious impacts on the ability of 
K-12 schools and school districts to function effectively. This investigation has shown 
that use of the K-12 Risk Methodology can aid K-12 schools and school districts in 
addressing security risk management for Internet connectivity. 
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Appendix A 
Security Practices Unique to K-12 
School Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Context Practice 
Access to quality Payment for technology access Learning may be Content ALA,1999 
content must be will be required without jeopardized if blocking 
funded by advertising dollars and may appropriate content 
someone. replace book purchases for quality standards are 
libraries. not imposed. 
Search engines Library materials are not Learning may be Acceptable ALA,1999 
are based on key readily available on the jeopardized if educational 
words provided Internet. Quality does not reliance on digital use 
by supplier. They always fit into the appropriate technology replaces 
cannot be equated educational segment for paper books too soon. 
with library books learning. 
that are selected. 
Placement of Level of availability will be Digital divide may Acceptable ALA,1999 
Internet in skewed to those with greater impact educational educational 
learning must be technology access. capabilities of those use 
defined. Only with less access to 
small segment of technology. 
world information 
is digitized. 
Means for Total reliance on generalized By providing means Content Chapin, 
identifying software is not realistic based for human oversight blocking 1999 
acceptable and on the limitations of the & including local 
unacceptable Web technology. requirements (defined 
sites is needed. by parents and local 
authorities) the 
school can provide a 
better overall result. 
Extended use of Portals are restricted to a Provides controlled Content Chapin, 
specific portals subset of content and not environment without blocking and 1999 
instead of general always maintained consistently arbitrary limitations structured 
searches to focus (e.g., science imposed by the access 
student learning [http://www.enc.org], math technology, but may 
can standardize [http://forum.swarthmore.edu], exclude content 
availability of language arts critical to specific 
content. [http://www.eserver.org]). learning 
Establish Providing a consistent student Establishes a baseline Content Chapin, 
bookmark file to interface that is repeatable that can be blocking and 1999 
focus student across multiple class visits maintained between structured 
activity and multiple users for the access 
provide consistent same equipment but 
content access. requires technology 
resources to establish 
and maintain 
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued) 
School Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Context Practice 
Web-based Systems must be established Techniques of sharing can Acceptable Bell,2001 
utilities can that can appropriately be compromised to allow educational 
establish a means control what is shared and outsiders to see and use 
for classroom with whom. Access must be change the contents 
collaboration and controlled and maintained. inappropriately. 
sharing of files 
using free Web 
products. 
Students should Parents, teachers, and Poorly educated users will Content NSBF, 
be protected from students need to know the react to problems as blocking 2002b 
inappropriate limitations of the blocking technology failings when 
content. capabilities of the school. they do not understand the 
limits of implemented 
choices. Education of the 
parents in adopted 
processes shows due 
diligence. 
Parental guides Failure to consider parental Verification that parental Acceptable NSBF, 
for limiting wishes when controlling interests are considered educational 2002b 
child's use of Internet connectivity may shows recognition of use 
Internet and lead to adverse publicity. parent's role in defining 
monitoring sites access for the child. 
are important 
High cost of Establishing an Internet Requires collective Acceptable Brewin, 
connectivity may service provider to cut costs buying such as statewide educational 2001 
require and provide extensive to establish sufficient use 
outsourcing, software to students at low volume for cost effective 
sharing of cost technology purchasing; 
resources across requires tight 
multiple school administration of access 
districts, or to meet the restrictions 
sharing with applied by software 
libraries or provider licensing and 
corporate appropriate isolation of 
environments. content for each group 
sharing the resource base 
Chat rooms A Web site that provides Children must be Content Brooke, 
provide daily tips to promote online educated in the risks of blocking and 2001 
inappropriate safety is technology use as well as acceptable 
meeting grounds http://www.chatdanger.com its value; parents and educational 
for children and which claims 80,000 teachers must know use 
harmful elements. visitors. where to locate 
information to help them 
in the technology 
management of children. 
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued) 
School Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Context Practice 
COPPA COPPA regulations require Compliance failures are Regulatory Cannon, 
compliance conspicuous posting of privacy prosecuted by FTC, and compliance 2001 
requires carefully policy and verifiable parental schools share in the 
controlled private permission for all data liability if violations 
information collected. Actions must match occur using school 
collected on posted policy. Parents must connectivity. 
children. This have a means to revoke 
regulation applies consent. Security and integrity 
to all children of the collected data must be 
under the age of assured. 
13. 
COPPA personal First and last name, physical School choices for Regulatory Cannon, 
data must be address, email address, screen connectivity compliance 2001 
protected if name, other online identifiers, management may 
collected online. telephone number, and social violate COPPA 
security number must be compliance without 
protected. Cookies and other careful review. 
persistent electronic location 
identifiers are considered 
personal data. 
Safe-harbor status Submission of site information Registration as a safe- Regulatory Cannon, 
is available from to FTC for registration harbor provides compliance 2001 
COPPA. requires special controls and validation of 
proof of compliance. compliance. 
Typing skills must Repetitive stress injuries are a The school may incur Acceptable Biersdorfer, 
be taught to high risk when work spaces liability for excessive educational 1999 
children to make are not tailored to incorporate technology interaction use 
use of keyboard ergonomic considerations of of children at too early 
input small and growing bodies. an age without proper 
mechanisms. consideration of the 
Curriculum desks, chairs, posture, 
planning must and other factors that 
establish a point contribute to 
in time when this maintaining healthy 
skill is required. bodies. 
Are Internet- A definition of learning Internet connectivity Acceptable Bruckman, 
facilitated experience must be established may continue to be educational 2002 
learning to assure proper use of all custodial in nature use 
experiences being types of access. Internet without proper 
provided? connectivity is only one incorporation into the 
portion of the social context learning environment. 
necessary for learning from 
this media. 
Exploration of the Peer-to-peer relationships and Is this level of access Acceptable Bruckman, 
capabilities of the communications with outside cost justified? How will educational 2002 
digital learning experts have been identified as this level of access be use 
environment are effective learning models but managed so as not to 
still underway. require extensive connectivity. disrupt other modes? Is 
the cost of control too 
high? 
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued) 
School Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Context Practice 
Should Existing metrics for Funding sources have Acceptable Schulte & 
technology use be evaluating success of an used poverty as a primary educational Keating, 2001 
linked with test application may not be driver for technology use 
scores and student appropriate. need based on the 
performance? assumption that the 
lowest performers need 
the greatest technology 
access. 
Number of Gains in state mastery test Cost of technology does Acceptable Davis, 2000 
"student gains identified as not include sufficient educational 
suspended" days increased with computer levels of assurance for use 
was identified as a installation. quality use. Teacher 
metric for training seen as key to 
educational making gains. (Cost is 
interest. greater than equipment 
and software.) 
Teachers who Students reluctant to Removal of the prejudices Acceptable Chamberlin, 
understand and communicate in class that visibility adds to the educational 2001 
use technology as have been known to communication can be use and 
a new means of participant online in class beneficial. structured 
communication discussions. access 
can gain student 
involvement. 
Asynchronous Requires different mode Rules of engagement need Acceptable Chamberlin, 
communication of communication and to be established or the educational 2001 
can provide instructor thinking access path will be use 
broader abused. 
availability. 
Immediate Requires specific Requires greater Acceptable Chamberlin, 
grading and technical tools and management to provide a educational 2001 
analysis facilities individual student access view of performance over use 
promote to execute time and assurance of 
immediate privacy of each 
feedback. participant 
Federal regulation Expanded regulatory Title I, Title II, Title III, Regulatory Chambers et 
must be included oversight with the Goals Title IV, Title VI compliance al.,2000 
as appropriate. 2000: Educate America compliance may add to 
Act and Elementary and data needs and expand 
Secondary Education Act potential for abuse. 
(ESEA) 
State and local Standards, assessments, Funding sources are Regulatory (Chambers et 
regulation must be curricula, teacher requiring measurements compliance al.,2000) 
included as preparation, and of success that expand 
appropriate. professional development data collection and 
must include technology control (e.g., NCLB). 
considerations. 
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued) 
School Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Context Practice 
Marketers are Evaluation mechanisms for "Free" equipment may Acceptable Colkin, 2001 
disguising vendor-supplied materials not be usable because educational 
advertising as are not standardized and of the control aspects use 
educational may not consider the used by the supplier. 
content to capture consequences of alternate 
youth spending. content usage. 
Compliance with Technology is frequently a Technology solutions Structured Cunningham, 
Americans with support mechanism through for disability divide access 2000 
Disabilities Act the use of adaptive may not be workable or 
must be provided. technology. may compromise 
student learning if not 
managed properly. 
Children must be Human interactions are Balanced curriculum Acceptable Davis, 2000 
taught the value of identified as an area that is must incorporate both educational 
computers and of being lost with computer use computer use and use 
things other than especially for younger human interaction with 
computers. children. peers and teachers. 
Controlled access Technology is applied EKlDS by Silvertech Acceptable Davis, 2000 
to content is inappropriately and content Inc. is an example of a educational 
available through is controlled excessively closed environment that use 
simulated within a limited closed is considered safe for 
Internet. environment. children, but it is 
unclear if it addresses 
learning needs. 
Policies, quality Goals for technology use in Administrative support Acceptable Sarkar, 2002 
of available the classroom are unclear. and teaching tools are educational 
materials, and Expectations of each not sufficiently use 
availability of stakeholder are not being consistent for 
consistent met, causing frustrations. classroom reliance. 
connectivity limit 
computer 
classroom use. 
Content filtering Filtering best practices Mechanisms to override Content Balkin et aI., 
must be applied should be applied to the the filtering must be blocking 1999 
appropriately to selection and available to allow 
provide effective implementation processes. choice to overcome 
blocking of Choices for filtering must limitations ofthe 
undesirable reflect the planned use of the technology. 
material with Internet for instruction and 
minimum impact research. 
on access to 
appropriate 
material. 
Use oftechnology Formal and consistent Teachers must change Acceptable NETS, 2002 
in the classroom structure cannot be assumed their expectations and educational 
changes the to exist with Internet approach to materials to use 
manner in which materials, and each class use match the environment 
assignments are will vary. of the Internet. 
approached. 
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued) 
School Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Context Practice 
Use ofE-Rate Reporting is required to the Schools must develop a Acceptable ED,2000b 
funding requires Schools and Libraries technology plan that educational 
monitoring of Division (SLD) of the specifies incorporation use and 
effective use of Universal Service of technology into regulatory 
technology. Administration Company curricula. compliance 
(USAC) of the Federal 
Communications 
Commission (FCC). 
Copyright Control of use of digital Students and teachers Acceptable Gaunt, 2002 
restrictions on materials is complicated by must be educated in the educational 
digital materials the changing regulatory restrictions that apply to use and 
are in flux. environment. copyright materials. regulatory 
Violations can put the compliance 
school programs at risk. 
Expectations in Appropriate use of Gauging local interest Acceptable GAO,2001 
the use of technology must be linked and value is a educational 
technology vary to the local characteristics of continuously changing use 
by region and Internet users. effort. 
economic level of 
school districts. 
Funding for Experience in other projects, Establishing shared Acceptable Meyer, 2000 
technology and such as public goals can benefit the educational 
ongoing support is transportation, shows that acceptance of limitation use 
dependent on including public opinion choices. Expectations 
goals shared with within the planning can must be controlled 
the public. greatly improve acceptance. carefully to avoid 
additional regulatory 
oversight. 
Choices of Teaching needs must drive A shared forum for Acceptable Sonwalker, 
technology must the selection of appropriate identification of needs educational 2001 
match the learning technology. and evaluation of use 
needs of the technology that 
classroom. incorporates planned 
use is needed. 
Written Regulations such as Family Directory information Regulatory ED, 2002a and 
permission is Educational Rights and may be disclosed compliance ED,2002b 
required from Privacy Act (FERPA) and without consent, but 
parents for release Protection of Pupil Rights parents must be notified 
of any child Amendment (PPRA) apply with an option to 
education privacy restrictions to use exclude their child's 
information or and disclosure of student data. 
from the child personal information. 
when reaching age 
18. 
Parents have the 2001 education bill Failure to comply Regulatory EPIC, 2003 
right to inspect all addresses indirect use of places the school at risk compliance 
survey instruments data collected for if collected information 
that are used to educational purposes from is used improperly. 
collect data from third parties and sold to 
children. others. 
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Appendix B 
K -12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices 
School Context Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Practice 
Tracing physical Physical location of Child can be located by Security Moad,2001 
location of equipment can be sources that may do harm. management 
machine traced with data 
provided from a 
Web site. 
Enhance the Vendors are Learning is disturbed by Security ALA,1999 
educational providing content inappropriate content, and policies and 
opportunities but but not always behavior is influenced regulations 
minimize the supporting the inappropriately. 
entertainment educational needs of 
functions. students. 
Children's personal Widely used school Schools using Security http://www.co 
information must applications (e.g., applications that collect management malex.com 
be protected from Cafe Terminal the inappropriate information 
applications online cafeteria will be penalized. 
collecting private payment system by 
information Comalex, Inc) 
inappropriately. collect inappropriate 
data in violation of 
the COPPA. 
Acceptable use Appropriate Informed parents will Security Chapin, 1999 
policy should be notification of raise concerns within policies and 
linked to filtering parents is needed in school channels instead of regulations 
mechanisms in use, all actions. attacking educational 
and parents should efforts. 
be notified of the 
policy restrictions 
imposed by the 
school. 
Monitoring of log AUP enforcement Established rules must be Security Chapin, 1999 
files collected by a and a means for enforced, or they will be management 
browser, filter, or updating filtering ignored. 
proxy Web server processes to 
can identify maintain currency 
acceptable usage are required for 
problems. effective 
enforcement. 
Shared machines Allows students Establish specific start-up Information Chapin, 1999 
provide access to using the same and shutdown procedures technology 
private information equipment to see that limit reliance on security 
through caching, and plagiarize what individual actions and 
browser history others students are remove personal 
file, personal doing (privacy information between uses. 
bookmarks, and invasion). 
cookies. 
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued) 
School Context Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Practice 
Desktop security Access to infected Internet access can Information Chapin, 1999 
can be impacted by email and adversely impact the technology 
actions of the user. acceptance of desktop, rendering it security 
cookies can unusable. Restrictions on 
compromise user what the user is allowed 
privacy and device to do and what functions 
software. are automated must be 
considered. 
Outbound text Technology is only Validation of acceptable Information Chapin, 1999 
filters can be used partially effective. activities is needed. Will technology 
to block personal Requires links with chat and peer-to-peer be security 
information in chat AUP and training of allowed? Will email be 
rooms, emails, and individuals in available? 
Web forms. acceptable use 
Training is Technology will not Resources to address Security Strauss, 2002 
required for help if users are not proper training of awareness and 
educational use of knowledgeable in teachers, aides, and training 
tools. the use of the students must be 
available tools. considered. 
Teachers require Proper use of Reliance on teachers Security Strauss, 2002 
training in specific facilities, protection when they are not awareness and 
equipment and of passwords, and properly trained is training 
capabilities of protection ineffective and will 
school. mechanisms in place subject the students to 
must be part of potential harm. 
standard 
teacher/aide training. 
Control of access Assurance is needed Information availability Information O'Toole, 2002 
to private student that access to must be balanced with technology 
information is student personal effective authorization security 
needed. information is and authentication 
limited to caregivers mechanisms. Control of 
and teachers. access must define and 
limit who can view and 
change data. 
Lockdownof Physical and Physical control of the Physical O'Toole, 2002 
machines to avoid software control is machine can allow security 
unanticipated needed to avoid complete compromise of 
compromise is unexpected software all standardized 
needed. changes. limitations. 
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued) 
School Context Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Practice 
Means for Mechanisms must be Monitoring is required to Information Mackenzie & 
identifying in place to control assure compliance. technology Goldman, 
inappropriate who can view and Access to monitoring security 2000 
behavior on the adjust information information must be 
system is needed. logs. controlled, or violators 
will remove the evidence. 
Mechanism for Who is the All participants must be Security Mackenzie & 
enforcement of enforcement agent- aware of who is management Goldman, 
violations must be students, teachers, or monitoring and why. 2000 
delineated clearly. administrators? 
Mechanisms are How much remote The establishment of Security Mackenzie & 
needed to limit access will be priorities for critical policies and Goldman, 
traffic on network. provided to parents, applications and the regulations 2000 
teachers, students, or prioritization of classroom 
community access? needs over casual use may 
Remote access for be required to assure asset 
students and protection. 
teachers traveling? 
Are those Confirmation that Confirmation of Security Mackenzie & 
accessing the AUP has been read knowledge of AUP management Goldman, 
network tested and understood is provides greater leverage 2000 
before access is needed. in enforcement. 
granted to validate 
comprehension of 
AUP and other 
training? 
Formal procedures Greater compliance Procedures require the Information Mackenzie & 
exist for is expected with identification of problems technology Goldman, 
establishing assurance of and resources for problem security 2000 
computer abuse, consistency and resolution. 
reporting problems, knowledge in 
and adjudicating advance of 
violations. processes. 
Procedures for Potential abuses Recognition of problems Security Mackenzie & 
handling computer include sexual that extend outside of the management Goldman, 
violations include harassment, spamto control of school 2000 
identification of mailing lists, forging administration and how 
when police are to mail, sniffing the they are to be addressed 
be notified network, port scans, must be established in 
cracking passwords, advance of the situation. 
commercial use of 
the network 
Clear definition of Restrictions of Appropriate use must be Security Mackenzie & 
what constitutes inappropriate defmed in advance of management Goldman, 
resources under behavior require providing access, and use 2000 
control of the clear definitions of must be monitored. 
school acceptable use. 
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued) 
School Context Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Practice 
Handling of chain Inappropriate Teacher and technology Information Mackenzie & 
mail and pyramid structuring of support training is technology Goldman, 
schemes - potential internal technology required to learn how to security 2000 
for mail storms use can lead to recognize and respond to 
with class lists internal denial of potential problems in 
service. advance. 
Do mechanisms How will shared Monitoring of individual Information Mackenzie & 
exist for tracking devices be actions requires individual technology Goldman, 
specific actions evaluated? With identification. security 2000 
back to specific logon usage to 
individuals for identify who is using 
redress? machines, how can 
sharing of access 
passwords be 
prevented? 
Education is How can the Policies and procedures Security Mackenzie & 
needed for students potential for selling are needed. policies and Goldman, 
and teachers on access to illegal regulation 2000 
copyright materials be 
restrictions. managed? How can 
Limitations for processes such as 
educational scanning be limited 
material are based to legitimate 
on licensing purposes? 
agreements. 
Implementation of Due diligence Resources needed to Information Mackenzie & 
available requires attention to apply all known technology Goldman, 
technology known technology corrections can be high. security 2000 
standards is needed vulnerabilities (e.g., Consider must be given to 
to prevent known SANS 20 highest the value of standardized 
problems. security holes). installations. 
What is an Formal training, Consider the need for Information Mackenzie & 
appropriate informal training, training technical support technology Goldman, 
education of sharing of problems in security issues. security 2000 
systems with other sites? 
administrators? 
Who can add Control of illegal The level of control for Security EDUCAUSE, 
machines to the Web sites and machines inserted into the policies and 2002 
network? How are machines using network will define the regulations 
they controlled? illegal access to level of security possible. 
Can personal enhance capabilities 
machines of inappropriately is 
students, faculty, or needed. 
parents be added to 
the network? 
166 
K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued) 
School Context Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Practice 
Do individuals set Easily guessed Passwords that are too Security Verton, 2002 
up their own passwords provide hard to remember require management 
passwords or are an opening to the greater support assistance. 
they assigned? network for anyone. 
What forum exists Shared forum to Communication among Security EDUCAUSE, 
for raising and identify problems all participants in the management 2002 
evaluating security before they are organization is needed for 
issues? Does this widespread will effective security. 
include technical, enhance response 
admin,and without increased 
teachers? cost. 
All users of the Student, teacher, and Failure to require training Security Lesniak, 2002 
network are administrator access for network use will allow awareness and 
educated as to should be dependent users to make mistakes training 
security threats and on the level of that harm the 
prevention options. training completed. infrastructure through 
ignorance. 
Anti-virus software Protection of the Protection may be Information Lesniak, 2002 
is available, used, infrastructure from required at multiple technology 
and updated on all externally levels,especially with security 
levels of introduced malicious mobile devices. 
connectivity software is needed. 
( desktop/laptop, 
server, network). 
Are patch levels of By not applying Patch application is Information Lesniak, 2002 
all software patches, the software resource intensive and technology 
maintained to remains vulnerable time-consuming. Many security 
acceptable to compromise applications may be 
currency? Who through a known disabled when changes 
defmes acceptable? opening. for which they were not 
validated are applied. 
Someone is Identified Resources must be Information Lesniak, 2002 
assigned the vulnerabilities are assigned to monitor and technology 
responsibility for doubling annually. support the infrastructure. security 
environment Support of effective 
security and connectivity requires 
monitors the constant vigilance. 
available 
knowledge sources 
(e.g., SANS, 
CERT/CC). 
Unneeded services The greater the level If services are available Information Lesniak, 2002 
are removed, and of resources on a but not used, there is a technology 
passwords are device, the greater tendency to limit support security 
controlled for all the level of required to reduce resource usage. 
devices. support. Known problems are not 
fixed leaving 
vulnerabilities available 
for exploit. 
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued) 
School Context Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Practice 
Response team When the Security attacks will Information Lesniak, 2002 
exists and knows infrastructure is happen, and methods for technology 
what to do if the compromised, addressing them are security 
network has resources must know required. 
problems. what to do to 
address the problem 
quickly and restore 
connectivity. 
How are Without appropriate Reliance on resources that Information Verton, 2002 
technically skilled monitoring, the are not contractually technology 
students identified students who know obligated to maintain an security 
and managed? the network can effective environment 
become inside poses a high risk with 
threats. very little recourse in the 
event of problems. 
How are ethical What enforcement School resources will be Security Colkin,2002 
issues of copyright options exist for placed at risk if users of policies and 
and intellectual these issues, these resources do not regulations 
property being regardless of the take their responsibilities 
communicated to media? seriously. 
network users? 
Biometrics devices Passwords require a Biometrics are more Information Carr, 2001 
represent a means level of reading that expensive to implement technology 
of authentication may be above some but more difficult to security 
that is easy to use of the K-12 school bypass. 
and can be users. 
implemented 
without reading 
skills. 
Internet Entertainment Control of the use of Security Clark, 2001 
connectivity options consume available infrastructure management 
provides access to bandwidth that is resources requires 
a broad range of needed for other restrictions to non-
non-educational purposes. essential services. 
opportunities. 
Wireless Security for wireless Can wireless be limited to Information Cope & 
connectivity connectivity is areas where functionality technology Brewin,2000 
provides flexibility extremely limited. exceeds risk? security 
for workspace and 
teaching locations. 
Clear definitions of Employees and Infrastructure Security Cohen, 2000 
the level of privacy students anticipate administrative capabilities management 
and what privacy while using must be severely 
monitoring is being a computer. restricted to minimize the 
done must be However, risk of inappropriate use. 
communicated. monitoring facilities 
allow administrators 
to see everything. 
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued) 
School Context Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Practice 
Communication of Violation of Tools and their use can Security Clayton & 
acceptable and copyright laws can overwhelm students. policies and Watkins, 2002 
unacceptable reuse be accomplished Care must be taken in the regulations 
of available digital easily with current construction of 
material must be technology. assignments to 
part of the teaching Continuous differentiate original work 
process. reinforcement of electronically from 
appropriate use is plagiarism. 
needed. 
Internet access Agreement on what Policies and procedures Security NSBF,2002b 
requires balancing is meant by safety must be consistent with policies and 
oftwo and achievement is local goals to facilitate regulations 
requirements: needed at each achievement. 
keeping children organization. 
safe and increasing 
student 
achievement. 
Control of access Development is Development of a Security Eisler, 2000 
and clarity of required to build and consistent approach for policies and 
structure can be support portals, but access and control across regulations 
provided through single sign-on and all classes can simplify 
the use of portals. customization administration and use. 
creates a simplified 
learning 
environment. 
Providing access The level of security Technology planning Security Norris & 
though school available to be must be based on the policies and Soloway, 2001 
infrastructure for considered will be connectivity decisions of regulations 
equipment not limited, based on the participants. 
owned and level of control 
controlled by the participants are 
school is needed. willing to accept. 
Outsourcing Protection from Students can be exposed Collaborative Radcliff,2001 
technology support pornography will not to content from shared security 
with insufficient be available if vendor environments management 
control of vendor's outsourcing against planned policy. 
decisions may organizations are not 
compromise applying consistent 
security. protection 
mechanisms. 
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued) 
School Context Security Risk Consequence Security Reference 
Practice 
Access to email Control of Schools must educate Information Rosencrance, 
addresses and information students about the value technology 2002 
contact information unknowingly shared of keeping their network security 
linked with a through outside access private. 
school can access via the 
compromise child Internet can put a 
safety. child at risk. 
Establishing Web-based sources Web sources must be held Collaborative Schulman, 
curricula based on may not represent to the same standards as security 2001 
availability of viable businesses, other information sources management 
specific Internet and materials may to assure that appropriate 
sources can be not be consistently educational standards are 
risky. available. maintained. 
Volunteer sources Limited availability Volunteer sources must Collaborative Schneider, 
and corporate and limited control be held to the same security 1999 
donations must be of volunteers may security standards as other management 
evaluated, based on mean additional information resources. 
the organization's support must be 
goals. absorbed by the 
organization. 
Introduction of Appropriate use of Guidelines for use must Security Colkin, 2002 
technology requires content is not readily be understood before awareness and 
inclusion of provided by the access to technology is training 
appropriate ethics delivery provided. 
for use of delivery mechanisms of 
media. technology. 
Web site and Filtering, acceptable Consistency is required Security Chapin, 1999 
Internet access use enforcement, across all parts of the awareness and 
policies should be and data organization for effective training 
highly visible for management management of 
reference by practices should information protection. 
students and match posted 
parents. information policies. 
Appendix C 
Mapping OCTAVE Principles to Attributes 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a) 
Principle Attribute 
Self-direction Analysis team, 
Augment analysis team skills 
Adaptable measures Catalog of Practices, 
Generic threat profiles, 
Catalog of Vulnerabilities 
Defined process Defined evaluation activities, 
Documented evaluation results, 
Evaluation scope 
Foundation for a continuous process Next steps, 
Catalog of Practices, 
Senior management participation 
Forward-looking view Focus on risk 
Focus on the critical few Evaluation scope, 
Focused activities 
Integrated management Organizational and technological issues, 
Organizational and information technology 
participation, 
Senior management participation 
Open communication Collaborative approach 
Global perspective Organizational technological issues, 
Organizational and information technology 
participation 
Teamwork Analysis team, 
Augment analysis team skills, 
Collaborative approach, 
Organizational and information technology 
participation 
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AppendixD 
Catalog of Practices for K-12 Risk Methodology 
I. Strategic practice areas 
a. Security awareness and training 
b. Security strategy 
c. Security management 
d. Security policies and regulations 
e. Collaborative security management 
f. Contingency planning/disaster recovery 
II. Operational practice areas 
a. Physical security 
1. Physical security plans and procedures 
11. Monitoring and auditing physical security 
h. Information technology security 
1. System and network management 
11. System administration tools 
iii. Monitoring and auditing information technology security 
IV. Authentication and authorization 
v. Vulnerability management 
VI. Encryption 
vii. Security architecture and design 
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Catalog of Practices for K-12 Risk Methodology (continued) 
c. Staff security 
1. Incident management 
ii. General staff practices 
III. Educational practice areas 
a. Content blocking 
1. Filtering pornography 
ii. Blocking access to inappropriate activities 
111. Monitoring to limit censorship 
b. Structured access management 
i. Privacy including the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERP A) and Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA) 
11. Resource sharing management 
iii. Access rights management 
c. Regulatory compliance 
1. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 
11. Copyright and licensing laws for digital media and the Technology 
Education and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act for the 
educational use of electronic media 
111. Federal and state reporting 
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iv. Protection against criminal use of technology to violate state or federal law 
including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CF AA), Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act 
Catalog of Practices for K-12 Risk Methodology (continued) 
d. Acceptable educational use 
1. Participant's responsibilities (varies by age) 
11. Organizational responsibilities 
111. Ethics 
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Appendix E 
Table of Contents for K-12 Methodology Instructional Guidance 
During Phase I 
Activity Description Worksheets 
AU Identify Assets and Identify assets that are used by the organization. Asset worksheet 
Relative Priorities Then, select the most important assets to the (Wl.1) 
organization and discuss their rationale for 
selecting them. 
Al.2 Select Critical Assets Identify assets that can have a large adverse Asset Profile 
impact on the organization if harmed. Workbook (one for 
each critical asset) 
Al.3 Identify Areas of Identify scenarios that threaten the most Areas of Concern 
Concern important assets, based on typical sources and worksheet (W1.2) 
outcomes of threats. Consider impacts to the Asset Profile 
organization for those scenarios. Workbook 
A1.4 Identify Security Identify the security requirements for the most Asset Profile 
Requirements for important assets. Select the most important Workbook 
Most Important security requirement for each important asset. 
Assets 
A1.5 Current Protection Complete surveys to indicate which practices are Current General 
Strategy Practices and currently followed by the organization's Security Practices 
Organizational personnel, as well as ones which are not Survey (Wl.3) 
Vulnerabilities followed. After completing the survey, discuss Current 
specific issues from the survey in more detail. Educational 
Security Survey 
(Wl.4) 
Current IT Security 
Practices Survey 
(W1.5) 
Protection Strategy 
worksheet (W1.6) 
Security Practices 
Summary (W 1.7) 
Al.6 Identify Threats to Threats are identified from areas of concern Asset Profile 
Critical Assets mapped to structured profiles. Workbook 
A1.7 Identify Evaluation The organization uses evaluation criteria for all Identify Evaluation 
Criteria activities. Areas of greatest impact must be Criteria (Wl.8) 
identified and applied to security. 
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Table of Contents for K -12 Methodology Instructional Guidance (continued) 
During Phase 2 (Optional) 
Activity Description Worksheets 
A2.1 Identify Key Classes of The analysis team establishes the system(s) of Asset Profile 
Components interest for each critical asset. The team then Workbook 
identifies the classes of components that are 
related to the system(s) of interest. 
A2.2 Identify Infrastructure The analysis team selects specific components to Asset Profile 
Components to evaluate. The system(s) of interest is automatically Workbook 
Examine selected for evaluation. The team selects one or 
more infrastructure components from each key 
class to evaluate. In addition, the team also selects 
an approach and specific tools for evaluating 
vulnerabilities. 
A2.3 Run Vulnerability The IT staff or external experts conduct the N/A 
Evaluation Tools on vulnerability evaluation. They are responsible for 
Selected Infrastructure running the vulnerability evaluation tools and 
Components creating a vulnerability summary for each critical 
asset prior to the workshop. 
A2.4 Review Technology The IT staff members or external experts who ran Asset Profile 
Vulnerabilities and the vulnerability tool( s) present a vulnerability Workbook 
Summarize Results summary for each critical asset and interprets it for 
the analysis team. Each vulnerability summary is 
reviewed and refined if appropriate. 
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Table of Contents for K-12 Methodology Instructional Guidance (continued) 
During Phase 3 
Activity Description Worksheets 
A3.1 Identify the Impact of The analysis team defines impact descriptions for Asset Profile 
Threats to Critical threat outcomes (disclosure, modification, loss, Workbook 
Assets destruction, and interruption). The impact 
description is a narrative statement that describes 
how a threat ultimately affects the organization's 
mission. The combination of a threat and the 
resulting impact to the organization defines the 
risk to the organization. 
A3.2 Create Risk Evaluation The analysis team creates evaluation criteria that Asset Profile 
Criteria will be used to evaluate the risks to the Workbook 
organization. Evaluation criteria defme what 
constitutes a high, medium, and low impact. 
A3.3 Evaluate the Impact of The analysis team reviews each risk and assigns it Asset Profile 
Threats to Critical an impact measure (high, medium, or low). Workbook 
Assets 
A3.4 Create Mitigation Plans Create risk mitigation plans for each critical asset. Asset Profile 
A mitigation plan defines the activities required to Workbook 
mitigate the risk/threats to the critical assets. Security 
Practices 
Summary 
worksheet 
(1.7) 
A3.5 Create Action Plans Create action plans for near-term activities that are Asset Profile 
needed to address security areas but do not require Workbook 
specialized training, policy changes, or other Security 
longer term steps. Practices 
Summary 
worksheet 
(1.7) 
A3.6 Create Organization Create a protection strategy for the organization. Security 
Protection Strategy That strategy defmes how the organization will Practices 
enable, initiate, implement, and maintain its Summary 
internal security. worksheet 
(1.7) 
Asset Profile 
Workbooks 
Appendix F 
Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet 
Practice How is this practice used by your organizatiou? 
Content Blocking 
Policies aud procedures for applying content blocking have been defined, and installed software and 
hardware filtering tools are set up to implement the policy. 
Content blocking is applied appropriately to all available services (Internet, email, chat services, and 
applications) and to all types of communication mechanisms available within the organization 
(desktop, laptop, wireless, cell phone, remote devices of varying kinds, etc.) based on policies that 
may vary by role and student age. 
A reporting and correction capability exists for problems with content blocking. Default settings for 
filtering can be adjusted to correct problems. The responsibilities for problem identification and 
problem correction have been assigned within the organization. 
Content-blocking policies and procedures are in accordance with parental and local defmitions of 
inappropriate content (Internet sites, spam, ads, solicitations, etc.). 
Digital content used for education is evaluated for validity and appropriateness to assure that 
learning is not jeopardized through the use of online content instead of textbooks. This process is 
consistently applied to all learning materials. 
Content-blocking mechanisms are sufficiently supported to maintain a consistency as online content 
and capabilities expand. 
Purchase arrangements for technology, which includes vendor monitoring, are evaluated for 
consistency with content-blocking policies and procedures. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No Unknowu 
No Unknowu 
No Unknowu 
No Unknowu 
No Unknowu 
No Unknowu 
No Unknowu 
Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet (continued) 
How is this practice used by your organization? 
Structured Access Management 
Technology choices are matched to the needs of the technology participants. 
Mechanisms have been established to assure that individuals sharing equipment cannot infringe on 
the privacy of others using the same equipment. 
content is available through the use of bookmark files, portals, and other structures that 
assure consistency without reliance on specific access devices. 
Policies and procedures for remote access to information are established and consistently managed. 
They include security considerations appropriate to the devices and applications involved. 
Technology access and availability is consistent with organizational policies for compliance with 
the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
Software- and equipment-selection processes include consideration for physical and online security 
throughout the useful life of the purchase. 
Implementers and monitors are aware of control mechanisms (physical and online), and mechanisms 
exist for the identification, reporting, and correction of problems throughout the useful life of the 
technology. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Regulatory Compliance - Children'S Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 
Controls are in place to assure that all private information for children under the age of 13 is not 
released without parental consent. 
Monitoring mechanisms are in place to assure that children cannot reach sites that do not 
appropriately apply COPPA restrictions in collecting information. 
Yes 
Yes 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet (continued) 
Practice 
Regulatory Compliance - corp A (continued) 
Safe-harbor status has been established internally, and sites approved as such have been identified 
for use by children under the age of 13. 
Regulatory Compliance - Copyright and Licensing Laws 
Appropriate use of digital materials is actively encouraged. 
Discussions of ethical behavior and definition of appropriate use occur on a regular basis at all 
levels of technology participants. 
Penalties for inappropriate behavior are understood as required by all levels of technology 
participants. Monitoring mechanisms are established appropriately. 
Validation mechanisms have been identified and are applied periodically to digital content to 
confirm appropriate licensing management. 
Regulatory Compliance - Federal and State Reporting 
Information collection to support mandated Federal reporting is defined and consistent with 
organization policies of privacy. 
Information distribution is handled in compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA) and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA). 
Compliance requirements linked to standards, assessments, curricula, teacher preparation, and 
professional development are consistent with organizational policies and good practices for secure 
use and availability. 
Programs for inserting technology into the organization provide clear consideration for 
organizational policies and good practices for secure use and availability. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet (continued) 
Practice Is this practice used by your organization? 
Regulatory Compliance - Protection Against Criminal Use of Technology 
Technology users are aware of the restrictions to external sites imposed by the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CF AA), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PARTIOT) Act, and organizational use policy provides a means for enforcing 
these restrictions. 
Mechanisms are in place for identifying the inappropriate use of organization facilities with respect 
to generating potential harm to other sites, and the capability to identify violators and impose 
penalties on their actions is in place. 
Standards of conduct for individuals with technical skills and system access that would allow them 
to violate federal and state restrictions are clearly defined and enforced. 
Acceptable Use Management 
The acceptable use of all educational equipment and services is defined carefully for all technology 
participants. 
All technology participants exhibit an understanding of the required policies and procedures for the 
use of educational technology. 
External groups such as parents, school boards, and other influential local organizations are clearly 
aware of the acceptable use of educational equipment and services, and support the organization in 
its implementation. 
The appropriate use of technology in meeting the goals of the organization is clearly defined and 
applied by all decision makers. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
~"'V 
Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet (continued) 
Acceptable Use Management (continued) 
Penalties for inappropriate use are clearly defmed and understood by all technology participants. 
The use and responsibilities for participants in special programs with technology components have 
been clearly defmed and communicated to all participants. 
Acceptable use includes the communication of the risks of technology use to participants. 
Acceptable Use Policies have been appropriately defmed and communicated to all participants 
(teachers, students, parents). 
A process monitoring acceptable use has been defined and implemented. That includes a means for 
participants to report problems and threats conveyed through the technology. 
Licensing restrictions and other limitations for the use of technology are communicated clearly to all 
participants. 
Mechanisms have been established to identify an unacceptable use and link it to the appropriate 
individual for evaluation and application of penalties. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No UnlalOwn 
No UnlalOwn 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
No Unknown 
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Appendix G 
Security Practices Summary 
Based on responses to the surveys, summarize the results in the following tables: 
Summary of General Security Practices 
Practice Area Status 
Security Awareness and Training Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Security Strategy Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Security Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Security Policies and Regulations Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Collaborative Security Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Contingency PlanninglDisaster Recovery Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Physical Security Plans and Procedures Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Physical Access Control Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
System and Network Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Authentication and Authorization Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Incident Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
General Staff Practices Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Summary of Educational Security Practices 
Practice Area Status 
Content Blocking Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Structured Access Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Regulatory Compliance - COPPA Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Regulatory Compliance - Copyright and Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Licensing Laws 
Regulatory Compliance - Federal and Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
State Reporting 
Regulatory Compliance - Protection Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Against Criminal Use of Technology 
Acceptable Use Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
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Security Practices Summary (continued) 
Summary of Information Technology (IT) Security Practices 
Practice Area Status 
Security Awareness and Training Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Security Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Security Policies and Regulations Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Monitoring and Auditing Physical Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Security 
System and Network Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
System Administration Tools Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Monitoring and Auditing IT Security Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Authentication and Authorization Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Security Architecture and Design Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Vulnerability Management Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
Encryption Fine Needs Improvement Needs Research 
AppendixH 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices Worksheet 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices 
Content Blocking (EDt) 
Questions to Consider 
• What training and education initiatives could help your 
organization maintain or improve its content-blocking practices? 
• What funding level is appropriate to support your content-
blocking needs? 
• Are your policies and procedures sufficient for your content-
blocking needs? How could they be improved? 
• Who has responsibility for defming and implementing the 
details of content-blocking? Should anyone else be involved? 
• How are problems identified and addressed? Would 
adjustments in these procedures improve the value of content-
blocking? 
• What external experts could help you with defining and 
implementing content-blocking? How will you communicate 
your requirements? How will you verify that your requirements 
were met? 
Strate2ies 
Issues: What issues related to content-blocking cannot be addressed by your organization? 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices Worksheet (continued) 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices 
Structured Access Management (ED2) 
Questions to Consider 
• What training and education initiatives could help your 
organization maintain or improve its technology selection and 
distribution practices? 
• What funding level is appropriate to support your technology 
infrastructure needs? 
• Are your policies and procedures sufficient for your technology 
access and availability needs? How could they be improved? 
• Who has responsibility for defining and implementing the 
decisions on availability, distribution, and access control? 
Should anyone else be involved? 
• How are problems identified and addressed? Would 
adjustments in these procedures improve the value of 
technology? 
• What external experts could help you with defining and 
implementing appropriate levels of availability and access? How 
will you communicate your requirements? How will you verify 
that your requirements were met? 
Strategies 
Issues: What issues related to structured access management cannot be addressed by your organization? 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices Worksheet (continued) 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices 
Regulatory Compliance (ED3) 
Questions to Consider 
• What training and education initiatives could help your 
organization maintain or improve its regulatory compliance 
practices? 
• What funding level is appropriate to support your regulatory 
compliance needs? 
• Are your policies and procedures sufficient for your regulatory 
compliance needs? How could they be improved? 
• Who has responsibility for defining and implementing the 
details of regulatory compliance? Should anyone else be 
involved? 
• How are problems identified and addressed? Would 
adjustments in these procedures improve the level of regulatory 
compliance? 
• What external experts could help you with defining and 
implementing levels of regulatory compliance? How will you 
communicate your requirements? How will you verify that your 
requirements were met? 
Strategies 
Issues: What issues related to regulatory compliance cannot be addressed by your organization? 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices Worksheet (continued) 
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices 
Acceptable Use (ED4) 
Questions to Consider 
• What training and education initiatives could help your 
organization maintain or improve its acceptable use practices? 
• What funding level is appropriate to support your establishing 
and monitoring acceptable use? 
• Are your policies and procedures sufficient for your acceptable 
use requirements? How could they be improved? 
• Who has responsibility for defming and implementing the 
details of acceptable use? Should anyone else be involved? 
• How are problems identified and addressed? Would 
adjustments in these procedures improve the compliance of 
acceptable use? 
• What external experts could help you with defining and 
implementing appropriate levels of acceptable use? How will 
you communicate your requirements? How will you verify that 
your requirements were met? 
Strategies 
Issues: What issues related to acceptable use cannot be addressed by your organization? 
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Appendix I 
OCTAVE Criteria Principles to K-12 Risk Methodology 
Principle Applied When Applied to Methodology Applied at Pilot Site 
Guidance 
Self-direction Yes Unchanged Requirement for selection of The site managed all of 
pilot site their analysis and 
planning steps with 
training guidance from 
this researcher. 
Adaptable Yes Tailoring Evaluation criteria adjusted The site applied the 
measures to fit K-12 schools and practices from the 
catalog of practices tailored K-12 Catalog 
expanded to include of Practices to their 
educational issues; other planning and decision 
measurements like making. The site 
vulnerability catalog were selected ITS own 
unchanged from OCTAVE unique evaluation 
Methodology. criteria for valuing 
threats. 
Defined process Yes Tailoring Detailed guidance, adjusted The site followed much 
for changes to Phase 1 and of the sequential 
3, is carried from OCTAVE process defmed in the 
Methodology. guidance. 
Foundation for Yes Tailoring Guidance instructing The site discussed 
continuous analysis team to consider monitoring the 
change establishing a foundation for implementation of its 
continuous change is carried plans and review of the 
from the OCTAVE assessment results 
Methodology. annually to confirm 
continued validity. 
Also follow-on 
assessments with 
additional assets to 
refme the 
organizational threat 
perspective were 
identified. 
Forward-looking Yes Tailoring Guidance instructing Security requirements 
view analysis team to focus and planning 
beyond the current issues to incorporated changes 
consider future requirements expected in funding, 
is carried from the responsibilities, and 
OCT A VE Methodology. connectivity proposed 
for coming school 
years. 
Critical few Yes Unchanged Focus on subset of assets, A subset of assets was 
mapping threats to a range, selected to identify 
and prioritization of threats threats. A subset of 
carried over from OCTAVE potential practices was 
Methodology. selected to focus 
limited resources and 
address the greatest 
threats. 
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OCTAVE Criteria Principles to K-12 Risk Methodology (continued) 
Principle Applied When Applied to Methodology Applied at Pilot Site 
Guidance 
Integrated Yes Tailoring Phase 3 continues to include Both strategic and 
management strategic and organizational organizational issues 
perspectives that were were included in 
expanded to include the planning. Educational 
educational perspective. issues were not viewed 
as potential threat areas 
for the pilot site. 
Open Yes Unchanged Workshop format carried Dialogue about security 
communication over from OCTAVE issues among 
Methodology. participants in the 
analysis team was 
identified as a key 
result in the pilot 
survey responses. 
Global Yes Tailoring Summarization process for Members of the 
perspective survey results added to analysis team provided 
provide a consensus process a range of expertise that 
for current practices. Other spanned beyond the 
workshops carried over teclmical aspects of 
from OCTAVE security into the 
Methodology. educational curriculum 
and administrative 
management. 
Teamwork Yes Unchanged Requirements for pilot site The work was 
addressed by an 
analysis team of five 
individuals, and each 
contributed to the 
success of the result. 
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Appendix J 
OCTAVE Criteria Attributes to K-12 Risk Methodology 
Attribute Applied When Applied to Methodology Applied at Pilot Site 
Guidance 
Analysis team Yes Unchanged Requirement for site selection Team of five 
individuals agreed to 
perform the assessment. 
Augmenting Yes Unchanged Consideration for Consideration was 
analysis team completeness of analysis team given to augmenting the 
skills at pilot site and considered for team with technical 
Phase-2 decision expertise for Phase 2 
but was detennined to 
not be an appropriate 
choice at this time. 
Catalog of Yes Tailoring OCTAVE Catalog of Practices The expanded catalog 
practices expanded to incorporate of practices through the 
educational issues survey and protection 
strategy worksheets was 
incorporated into the 
methodology and 
applied. 
Generic threat Yes Unchanged OCTAVE Methodology threat F our generic threat 
.prbfile profiles carried over to profiles were used for 
tailored methodology threat consideration. 
unchanged They were expanded 
with two additional 
threats considered 
important to the pilot 
site. 
Catalog of Yes Unchanged OCTAVE Methodology threat Consideration for a 
vulnerabilities profiles carried over to catalog of 
tailored methodology vulnerabilities was 
unchanged provided in Phase 2, but 
Phase 2 was not 
peformed by the pilot 
site. 
Defmed Yes Tailoring Detailed guidance is provided Step-by-step guidance 
evaluation for each activity and includes was provided. In some 
activities instructions for all worksheets. areas, the analysis team 
chose to vary the 
sequence based on their 
organizational issues. 
Documented Yes Tailoring Worksheets are provided for Worksheets were 
evaluation results all steps of the evaluation to completed, and a 
provide a location for summary report of the 
documenting each step of each findings was prepared. 
activity. 
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OCTAVE Criteria Attributes to K-12 Risk Methodology (continued) 
Attribute Applied Wben Applied to Methodology Applied at Pilot Site 
Guidance 
Evaluation scope Yes Unchanged Activity in the planning A specific range of 
session with the pilot site organizational units 
(those under the 
responsibility of 
analysis team members) 
was selected. 
Next Steps Yes Tailoring Phase 3 is a planning process The pilot site selected 
that establishes a protection three areas of practices 
strategy for the organization to to apply and developed 
implement. a plan for addressing 
the next steps in the 
application effort. 
Focus on risk Yes Tailoring The evaluation criteria are The impacts of threats 
changed, but use of the were evaluated based 
evaluation criteria as applied on evaluation criteria 
to threats to establish a important to the 
prioritization based on the organization. Plans 
impact is carried over were defined in Phase 3 
unchanged. based on the highest 
risks, which resulted in 
different selections than 
those initially identified 
in the data-gathering 
steps of Phase l. 
Focused activities Yes Tailoring Activities are formed to Each step assembled 
maintain the focus of the another layer of 
analysis team on each separate information that formed 
issue (asset identification, a broad picture of threat 
security requirements, threat and opportunities for 
evaluation, impact evaluation, protection based on the 
analysis and planning) that current environment. 
builds in a logical sequence to 
produce the resulting plan. 
Organizational Yes Tailoring Activities are based on the The application of a 
and technological catalog of practices that is broad catalog of 
issues expanded to include practices provided 
educational issues in addition inclusion of both types 
to organizational and of issues. 
technological ones. 
Organizational Yes Tailoring Requirement for the pilot site The analysis team 
and information selection included both 
technology organizational and 
participation technical participation. 
Senior Yes Tailoring The coordinator for the Senior management 
management analysis team was responsible received interim 
participation for keeping senior briefmgs and will be the 
management appraised of the recipient of the final 
status and results output - a security risk 
management plan. 
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OCTAVE Criteria Attributes to K-12 Risk Methodology (continued) 
Attribute Applied When Applied to Methodology Applied at Pilot Site 
Guidance 
Collaborative Yes Unchanged Selection of the analysis team Analysis team 
approach was based on communication participants had a 
needs with a focus on teamwork. working relationship 
that was augmented 
by the use of the risk 
assessment 
methodology. 
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AppendixK 
Generic Threat Tree Example 
Human Actors Using Network Access 
ASSET ACCESS 
network 
ACTOR MOTIVE OUTCOME IMPACT 
disclosure 
1 
~~5?_~~~~!~1 ______ J~~~4~fi_~~!~~~ ___________________________ _ 
1 1 
1 10ss, destruction 
I 1------------------------------------------
i 
1 
1 
inside 1 
r----------------, 
· . 1 1 
· . 1 1 
· . 
1- _ 
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1 1 1 
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------------------i------------------------------------------
1 
1 
10ss, destruction 1------------------------------------------1- _ 
~rL!~~~~~~~ ____________________________ _ 
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.------------------------------------------1 1 
1 accidental !modification 
I I------------------~------------------------------------------
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
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butside ! l ________________ ~ 
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1 
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,------------------4------------------------------------------
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AppendixL 
Pilot Site Survey Responses 
JOB TITLE: Technology Coordinator 
1. How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding ofK-12 school information 
security issues? 
The methodology was highly effective in increasing my understanding of security issues in three distinct 
ways. First, having an expert work with us to understand security issues in general prOVided an 
important overview of the process and highlighted important areas of concern. Second, having access to 
tools and strategies (the workbooks) allowed us to understand the specific issues that we had to address. 
Finally, the methodology prOVided formal opportunities to discuss our current security practices with my 
colleagues. Although we have opportunities to work together, we never had a chance to share and 
discuss our security practices. The methodology prOVided the opportunity for the administrative, 
technical, and instructional technology staff to engage in serious discussions about security. 
2. How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the 
methodology addressed the school's security concerns? 
With the installation of a wide area network and the increasing reliance on Web services, I became 
very concerned about protecting the integrity of our data, as well as the privacy of students and staff. I 
was also concerned that we did not have important security procedures in place at all levels of the 
system. The methodology confirmed that we needed to address our security concerns, and allowed our 
group to come to that conclusion by collaboration and focused discussion. 
The methodology also provided: 
1. Opportunities for our group to have discussions about important security issues 
2. A framework and context for the discussions 
3. A sense of commitment from all parties to develop an action plan and to make security a district 
priority. 
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Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued) 
JOB TITLE: Technology Coordinator (continued) 
3. How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information teclmology (IT) 
decisions and security issues in the future? 
The methodology established a process for discussions and security reviews that our team will 
continue to use. It also emphasized the importance of continued security awareness and increased our 
commitment to making sure that we have appropriate security measures in place. 
4. Other comments or suggestions? 
The security methodology allowed us to engage in our own problem-solving strategies by reflecting on 
our current practices and engaging in dialogue about possible solutions. It was effective because we 
took ownership over our problems rather than having an outside consultant provide us with solutions. 
The methodology effectively guided our discussions and helped us to understand the threats to our 
security. The emphasis on a collaborative exploratory process allowed us to begin to make meaningful 
changes in our security practices and commit to ongoing review and improvement. 
JOB TITLE: Technical Supervisor 
1. How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding of K -12 school information 
security issues? 
It has given us a template to refer to so that we can organize our security objectives, risks, and policies. 
2. How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the 
methodology addressed the school's security concerns? 
The methodology addressed all of our security concerns and in fact enlightened us to several security 
issues that we would not have addressed without the methodology. 
196 
Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued) 
JOB TITLE: Technology Supervisor (continued) 
3. How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information technology (IT) 
decisions and security issues in the future? 
The methodology has prepared us to address future security decisions by enabling us to focus on the 
weak areas in our security. Without the methodology, too much time may have been spent on 
redundant tasks. The methodology will enable us to approach foture security issues in an organized 
manner. 
4. Other comments or suggestions? 
The methodology that you present has given us the foundation to build good IT security policies. 
Thank you. 
JOB TITLE: Network Specialist 
1. How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding ofK-12 school information 
security issues? 
The methodology increased the awareness of the participants about certain areas of security that were 
not previously addressed. 
2. How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the 
methodology addressed the school's security concerns? 
The plans developed by the methodology have included certain aspects of security that need to be 
reviewed and developed. 
Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued) 
JOB TITLE: Network Specialist (continued) 
3. How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information technology (IT) 
decisions and security issues in the future? 
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The methodology focused the group to formulate a plan of action to rectifY outstanding security issues. 
4. Other comments or suggestions? 
Continue development of additional descriptions and additional instructions to alleviate confusion. 
Include examples and case studies. A Web site with forms and sample tools would be helpful. 
Recommendations for the scope of participants may help other school districts. A timeline to follow to 
complete the methodology would help. 
JOB TITLE: Administrative Manager 
1. How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding ofK-12 school information 
security issues? 
This methodology really gives me an approach to begin seriously thinking security technology. The 
approach is more of a template to jump start us and get us to focus on the issue. Considering all of us 
who participate in the program, we would neve, r or it might be virtually impossible, find the time to talk 
about preventive security. Furthermore, the methodology helps me to focus on specific issues such as: 
student records, the human factor, and definitely physical security. 
2. How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the 
methodology addressed the school's security concerns? 
The methodology helps me to look at our security in stages instead of just finding solutions to 
problem;, for example, critical asset, user community, and system problems. It also helped me to 
examine our security practices which in most cases I would never find the time to even address. 
Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued) 
JOB TITLE: Administrative Manager (continued) 
3. How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information technology (IT) 
decisions and security issues in the future? 
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The key here is that the methodology will help me to prepare or develop long- and short-range plans to 
upgrade my security-related services. 
This will include us establishing clear policies and procedures for my user community. 
Enforce password policies andfind a way for us to better keep track of people (users) entering and exit 
our system. 
4. Other comments or suggestions? 
The session meetings as a group gave me a new approach of evaluating and looking at information, 
technology security, staff, and physical security. 
JOB TITLE: Asst. Computer System Manager 
1. How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding of K -12 school information 
security issues? 
The methodology allowed me to organize my concerns and ideas about security issues and risks. It 
helped me focus on the essential risks and gave me a way to define procedures for a solution to the 
issues. 
2. How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the 
methodology addressed the school's security concerns? 
The plans developed using the methodology gave me something concrete to work with. 
Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued) 
JOB TITLE: Asst. Computer System Manager(continued) 
3. How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information technology (IT) 
decisions and security issues in the future? 
The methodology has given me aframework to address security issues; a way of taking large 
amorphous issues and translating then into smaller more manageable pieces that can be solved in a 
more effective manner. 
4. Other comments or suggestions? 
Because of the limited time and personnel in a school environment, some of the format should be 
collapsed a bit. 
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AppendixM 
Abbreviations 
ABA - American Bankers Association 
ACLU - American Civil Liberties Union 
AICP A - American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
ALA - American Library Association 
AOL - America Online 
ASL - American Student List 
AUP - acceptable use policy 
BGP - border gate protocol 
BSI - British Standards Institute 
CERT/CC - Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination 
Center 
CDA - Communications Decency Act of 1996 
CF AA - Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
CIP A - Children's Internet Protection Act of 2000 
CIPB - Critical Infrastructure Protection Board 
CIS - Computer Intrusion Squad 
COBIT - Control Objects for Information Technology 
COPA - Child Online Protection Act of 1999 
COPPA - Children's Online Privacy Protection Act 
CoSN - Consortium for School Networking 
CSI - Computer Security Institute 
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Abbreviations (continued) 
CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
DHHS - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
DHS/IAIP - U.S. Department of Homeland Security Infrastructure 
Analysis Infrastructure Protection 
DMCA - Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
ECP A - Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
ED - U.S. Department of Education 
EFL - Exploring the Future of Learning 
EPIC - Electronic Privacy Information Center 
ESEA - Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
FBI - Federal Bureau ofInvestigation 
FCC - Federal Communications Commission 
FERP A - Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
FOIA - Freedom of Information Act 
FRAP - Facilitated Risk Analysis Process 
FTC - Federal Trade Commission 
GIAC - General Information Assurance Certification 
GISRA - Government Information Security Reform Act 
GLBA - Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
GSEC - GIAC Security Essentials 
HIP AA - Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act of 1996 
BP - Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 
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Abbreviations (continued) 
ICCSTM - iWatchdog™ Commercial Certification Service 
ICRA - Internet Content Rating Association 
IP AK - Information Protection Assessment Kit by the CSI 
ISACA - Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
ISO - International Standards Organization 
ISP - Internet Service Provider 
ISTE - International Society for Technology in Education 
IT - Information Technology 
LAN - local area network 
MPEG - Moving Picture Experts Group 
NCAC - National Coalition Against Censorship 
NCLB - No Child Left Behind Act 
NCREL- North Central Regional Educational Laboratory 
NETS-A - National Education Technology Standards for School 
Administrators 
NETS-S - National Education Technology Standards for School 
Students 
NETS-T - National Education Technology Standards for School 
Teachers 
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NRCCUA - National Research Center for College and University 
Admissions 
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Abbreviations (continued) 
NSBA - National School Boards Association 
NSBF - National School Boards Foundation 
OCTAVE - Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability 
Evaluation 
PICS - Platfonn for Internet Content Selection 
PPRA - Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment 
PTA - Parent Teacher's Association 
RIAA - Recording Industry Association of America 
SANS - System Administration, Audit, Network, Security Institute 
SEI - Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 
SFG - Security Focus Group of the CoSN 
SLD - School and Libraries Division 
SPSD - Scarsdale Public School District 
TEACH - Technology Education and Copyright Harmonization Act 
of2001 
TSI - Technology Support Index 
TSSA - Consortium for Technology Standards for School 
Administrators 
UFCWS - United Federation of Child Safe Web Sites 
U.S. - United States 
USAC - Universal Service Administration Company 
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Abbreviations (continued) 
USA PATRIOT - Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism 
UT - University of Texas 
W3C - World Wide Web Consortium 
WAN - wide-area network 
WBEC - Web-Based Education Commission 
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